THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTS OF HEAVEN AND OF MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHU HSI

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to chart the development and the inter-relationship of the concepts of Heaven and of Man in Chu Hsi's philosophy. As Chu Hsi (1130-1200) is generally regarded as having brought to its completion the unification of the doctrines of his Neo-Confucianist predecessors, it is hoped that this research will throw light both upon the central tenets of his philosophy and upon those of Sung philosophy in general.

The method adopted is to use the development of these concepts as a central thread. Chu Hsi's metaphysics and ethics will then be discussed accordingly as they are relevant to this theme, although it has not been feasible to present an independent survey of these branches of his philosophy.

The development of these two concepts is discussed in six chapters. In the first chapter, I give a brief account of Buddhist Idealism, to the refutation of which Chu Hsi had dedicated his whole life. In the second chapter, I describe how, in his thirties, he had used the Immanent Vitalism of the earlier Neo-Confucianists to attack the Buddhist view of Emptiness. In the third chapter, I discuss how he struggled, in his forties, to construct his own metaphysics, after becoming disillusioned with the approach to the Way taught by the Immanent Vitalists. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I discuss both the development of the ideas of Principle, Material Force, Nature, Mind, and moral cultivation, and their systematisation in his later metaphysics. In the final chapter, I explain the relation between Heaven and Man within this system, and show the way in which it differs from its Buddhist counterpart.

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND: THE TRANSITION OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN FROM CH'AN TO NEO-CONFUCIANISM

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter is to present a background to Chu Hsi's (1130-1200) philosophy by surveying the changes which took place in the concepts of the World and of Man in the transition from Buddhism to the early Neo-Confucianism.

This account begins with the conception of life and the universe in Hinayana Buddhism, proceeds to the negative method of metaphysics and the Original Mind in Mahayana Buddhism, and to the tendency towards acceptance of the world in Ch'an Buddhism. We shall find that Buddhism was inclined to Idealism, individualism, and the search for supra-moral values. But we shall also see that this idealistic world-view was gradually transformed into a more realistic view with the development of Buddhism. This paved the way for the rise of Neo-Confucianism.

Neo-Confucianism continued this development until a complete reversal of the original Buddhist view was reached. From Chou Tun-i's (1017-1073) *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* [*An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*], we see that the modes of Neo-Confucian thought were Immanent Vitalism, a realistic world-view, and an emphasis on moral and social values.

In addition, I present the socio-political background of the Sung dynasty, in order to show that in a society characterized by bureaucratic politics and dominated by landowning gentry, both Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism were able to flourish.

A. THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF LIFE AND OF THE WORLD BEFORE THE FORMATION OF CH'AN

1. The Concepts of Life and of the World in Hinayana Buddhism

Yamanoi Yô summarizing recent studies on the problem of the origin of Neo-Confucianism, says:

> Confucianism before the Sung dynasty is called "the philological school of Han and T'ang", whose task was no more than making over-detailed but superficial verbal commentaries on the Confucian Classics. Thus from Han onward, in the realm of philosophy Buddhism and Taoism had long since surpassed Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism arose as a school which committed itself to the illumination of the spiritual content of the Classics. In order to compete with Buddhism and Taoism, it developed speculative philosophy which had been weak in the earlier Confucianism. However, in its refutation of their heterodoxies it also borrowed ideas from them, especially from Buddhism, for the sake of enriching its own system. In this sense Neo-Confucianism may be called "the merging of three teachings"...[1]

In this chapter I shall centre my investigation on the development of the concepts of the World and of Man in Buddhism, and on the rise of Neo-Confucianism, which refuted the views of Buddhism but at the same time assimilated some of its fundamental problems and modes of thinking. I shall also discuss this transition from the point of view of the socio-political context. Taoism will be ignored here, partly because, as Yamanoi indicates, Neo-Confucianism had borrowed more ideas from Buddhism, partly because Chinese Buddhism, especially Ch'an, had already incorporated much of Taoism.[2]

In the Sung dynasty Ch'an was the dominating sect of

Buddhism, but its doctrine had grown out of the long history of Buddhism. It will therefore be necessary to give a brief survey of the development of Buddhist doctrine.

The basic doctrine of Buddha is called "the three codes of truth". They are:

1) all activities of will (*sankhara, hsing*) are unstable;

2) all activities of will cause suffering; and

3) all beings (*dharma, fa*) are devoid of self-nature.[3]

Buddhism thought that life is the activity of will, which is always under the pressure of needs. This state they regarded as suffering. The needs which the will pursues occur in an endless sequence. For example, if the basic needs such as food and drink are met, one will then turn to higher needs such as wealth, power, and fame. Therefore the activity of will has no stability and causes continuous suffering.

The third code of truth means that all dharma are dependent. They are determined by previous dharma, affect one another, and determine subsequent ones. There is no independence or freedom for anything in life and the world. In Buddhism this is another proof of universal suffering.

Buddhism is mainly concerned with the means of emancipation from universal suffering. For this purpose it has developed many kinds of interpretation of life and the world in its long history. According to its historical as well as philosophical development, these theories may be classified into two groups, Hinayana and Mahayana.

In Hinayana Buddhism, there is a Self as the subject who suffers and searches for emancipation. The Self comes into existence in the world because illusion (*avijja, wu-ming*) brings out the activity of will. It therefore suffers under the pressure of the struggle for living.

What's more, it not only suffers in this life, but, because at its end illusion will bring it to subsequent lives, it suffers continuously. This is the Buddhist theory of transmigration. But if the Self becomes enlightened, there will be no more illusion and consequently no activity of will incurred. In this case life may be cancelled and the emancipation reached. In principle enlightenment can be accomplished within a second, but in practice it requires assiduous training. For this purpose it proposes three kinds of practice: to behave correctly (*sila, chieh*), to discipline the will (*samadhi, ting*), and to realise the truth of the world (*panna, huei*). They are the right way, so that a person who practices assiduously will someday become enlightened and get out of the wheel of transmigration. This state of perpetual peace is the ideal of Buddhism, which is called Nirvana (*nieh-p'an*).[4]

Generally speaking, Hinayana Buddhism is confined to the phenomenal world. There is an implicit Idealism in it. While it says that the Self starts the will, and the will brings out endless lives, it suggests that the Self is the substratum of the phenomenal life. And in the case of the world, since the world is composed of dependent dharma, it seems reasonable to think that in the state of Nirvana, because the corresponding life is extinguished, the world should also cease to exist. Therefore while the world exists, it should have a certain dependence on the Self. It is implied, then, in Hinayana Buddhism that the Self is the ultimate substance of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, its theory is only concerned with the level of phenomena, thinking that in the state of Nirvana when there are no phenomena there will be no Self either. Since there is no substance at all, it cannot strictly be called Idealism, even if there is implicit a tendency towards Idealism.

The development of this Idealism would result in the discovery of the substantial Self under the phenomenal self and the world. But this step is not reached until the rise of Mahayana Buddhism.

2. The Origin of Realism in the School of Buddha Nature

Fung Yu-lan says:

> On the whole, the way in which Mahayana Buddhism most influenced the Chinese has been in its concept of the Universal Mind, and in what may be called its negative method of metaphysics.[5]

This gives us a clue to the identification of the contributions of Mahayana Buddhism to China and to their development there.

The main difference between Mahayana Buddhism and Hinayana Buddhism consists in the fact that the former seeks Nirvana in the present life and in this world. This doctrine has been propounded in three forms throughout the history of Mahayana Buddhism. Firstly by the School of Emptiness (*K'ung tsung*, in India it is called the School of the Middle Path), which developed the negative method of metaphysics. Secondly by the School of Phenomena (*Hsiang tsung*, in India the School of Consciousness-Only), which devoted itself to the theory of causation to interpret the emergence of the phenomenal world. A third form is associated with the School of Buddha Nature (*Hsing tsung*). None of these schools were native to China. The second had very little influence on the Chinese, and will not be discussed here. The third seems to have received very little attention in India, but aroused the greatest interest in China. I shall discuss first this third

school, the Buddha Nature School, and then the School of Emptiness.

In Mahayana Buddhism, the division of the substantial Self from the phenomenal world is made. But one may still ask what is the Self, and what causes the world to appear. The answer was also implicit in Hinayana Buddhism, and the elaboration of that answer resulted in the School of Buddha Nature.

In its theory of transmigration and salvation, by using the terms "illusion" and "enlightenment" (*wu*), Hinayana Buddhism in fact suggests that the Self is not a physical body, but Mind. The Buddha Nature School is characterized by the identification of the Self with Mind. This Mind is enlightened and underlies the phenomenal world, including mind in its phenomenal aspect. This enlightened Mind is called the Original Mind (*pen-hsin*), and is the same as Buddha Nature (*fo-hsing*).[6] Nirvana is the state of the Original Mind; the phenomenal world is caused by the delusion of the mind. In the Buddha Nature School the implicit Idealism of Hinayana Buddhism has become explicit. The Self as the Original Mind is differentiated from the phenomenal world. The Self is eternal, so it may transmigrate through successive lives, just as the traveller may pass through endless stations. But it is also possible for the Self to leave the world, just as the traveller may step down from this vehicle. In this way the doctrine of transmigration and emancipation are explicitly accounted for.

But here there appears an interesting paradox. The moment the implicit Idealism of Hinayana Buddhism becomes explicit, an incipient realism with respect to the phenomenal world emerges. In the School of Buddha Nature, the Self, the Original Mind, and the Buddha Nature are one and the same because they are all empty. Illusion is the cause of the world. But now for an elightened Mind, although illusion disappears, the phenomenal world

including the phenomenal self remains. It also teaches that it is neither necessary nor possible for seekers of Nirvana to leave the present world. A straightforward expression of this idea was made by the founder of the Chinese Buddha Nature School, Tao-sheng (? -434), who said:

> The Enlightenment of Mahayana Buddhism is not to be sought outside the Wheel of Birth and Death. Within it one is enlightened by the affairs of birth and death.[7]

> As to reaching the other shore, if one reaches it, one is not reaching the other shore. Both not-reaching and not-not-reaching are really reaching. This shore here means birth and death; the other shore means Nirvana.[8]

> If one sees Buddha, one is not seeing Buddha. When one sees there is no Buddha, one is really seeing Buddha.[9]

It is also said that Tao-sheng held the view that for Buddha there is no Pure Land or other world. The world of Buddha is simply here in this present world.[10]

We must now examine the justification for this realistic view of the phenomenal world in Tao-sheng's theory. As long as one realises one's own Buddha Nature, he argues, the veil of illusion is removed, but the phenomena remain. His explanation is as follows. He says of the phenomenal self and world:

> They are not self-generated, and therefore have no self-nature. They have no nature of any kind. If then they have no existence in themselves, how can they cease to exist? Thus they are as it were phantasmata.[11]

Phenomena are accepted as phantasmata. Although they cannot cease to exist, they are valued as emptiness because of their lacking self-nature.

The other side of this argument is that there is not an independent status of Nirvana outside the present

world. Of the dharma, the insubstantial consecutive events of the phenomenal world, he says:

> They are inconstant, subject to suffering, and devoid of nature. If one has an enlightened view of this, one achieves the permanently empty Nirvana. In Nirvana, they never come again into existence. Non-existence implies quiescence. Their ultimate achievement of quietness is possible because they originally did not really exist. Since their existence was not real, how can their extinction be real?[13]

We may conclude that in Tao-sheng's theory, because he combined Nirvana and the phenomenal world, the former cannot be reached except in the latter, and the latter cannot be exterminated because it is as empty as the former. Therefore with respect to the phenomenal world its existence is acknowledged.

3. The Strengthening of Realism in Chi-tsang's Negative Method of Metaphysics

Now we turn our focus to another way of affirmation of the phenomenal world, the negative method of metaphysics in the Emptiness School. Hinayana Buddhism introduced the concept of illusion between the Self and the world, falsifying the latter. The Emptiness School started from this illusory world, and tried to reach the truth by repetitive negation. Here I shall introduce the theory of the last master of this school, Chi-tsang (549-623), who summed up the negative method in his three levels of double truth (common truth and higher truth).

Of his first level he says:

> The common people take all things as really existent (*yu*, "having being") and know nothing about the non-existent (*wu*, "having no being"). Therefore the Buddhas have told them that

> actually all things are non-existent and empty. On this level, to say that all things are non-existent is the higher truth.[13]

This is the first step of the negative method. Common truth takes all things as existent, and the higher truth lies in revealing their non-existence.

His second level of double truth may be paraphrased as follows:

> To say that all things are existent is one-sided, but to say that all things are non-existent is also one-sided. The one-sidedness consists in making this distinction, because existence, flux, and life-and-death will be on *this* side, while non-existence, constancy, and Nirvana will be on *that* side. This choice of one side is the common truth. The "no-two-sides middle path" consists in understanding that there is neither existence nor non-existence, neither life-and-death nor Nirvana. This is the higher truth.[14]

At first sight this second step seems to be a simple negation of what has been negated in the first step. But a closer examination would show that its real purpose is to negate the discriminating mind. The higher truth lies in neither affirming nor negating anything. Compared with the first level higher truth, this is a further negation, but paradoxically things as they are, left without discrimination, are given more reality than they were in the first level, where their existence was denied.

The following paraphrases Chi-tsang's third level:

> The second level which discriminates "no-two-sides" from "two-sides," is still common truth. It regards the distinction between "this side" (of existence and life-and-death) and "that side" (of non-existence and Nirvana) as one-sided. It also thinks of the non-distinction as the "no-two-sides middle path." In this case we find the contrast between one-sidedness and the middle path, which is still two sides. Therefore we have to call it common truth. The real middle-pathed higher truth consists in not distinguishing between the one-sided and the middle-pathed.[15]

The purpose of the third step is to negate the middle path, i.e., the non-discriminating mind of the second step, because it is in contrast to one-sidedness. Elsewhere Chi-tsang indicates that the purpose of the second level truth is to sweep away people's stubborn adherence to either existence or non-existence. But when such adherence is swept away, the sweeping-away is no longer necessary, and should also be swept away. In this case both existence and non-existence may be accepted under the condition of non-adherence.'[6] This is the purpose of the third level of truth.

What concerns me here is the implication of this doctrine for the question of the reality of the phenomenal world. In the third level, what Chi-tsang proposed is that every level of truth from the beginning should be re-affirmed, but under the condition of its following level. In this sense, negation means non-adherent affirmation. The highest truth of the third level consists therefore in the affirmation of both "not-one-sidedness" (meaning the non-discriminating mind), and the "not-middle-pathedness" (meaning the acceptance of both existence and non-existence). The mind makes no distinction now, but neither does it cancel the former distinction it made. Therefore the present world and all things within, according to the highest truth, remain. But they have no objective reality because their existence is still reliant on our non-attachment. However, on the other hand, to say that their existence is due to our indifference is hardly different from saying that they exist objectively. The tendency to realism is therefore greatly strengthened.

Another argument by which Chi-tsang affirmed the present world is that the world is the starting point in the pursuit of Nirvana. Therefore it must be affirmed in the first instance in order to proceed to higher truth. Nirvana is the highest truth, but relies on common

truth.[17] In this sense the present world is prior to Nirvana. Therefore, it must be real, although its reality is obviously of lower value.

B. THE AFFIRMATION OF THE WORLD IN THE CH'AN THOUGHT OF HUI-NENG

1. The Concept of Self Nature (*tzu-hsing*)

In the two schools discussed above the theoretical background for Ch'an had been prepared. Ch'an was built on the conclusion reached by the Buddha Nature School, it also adopted the negative dialectical method of the Emptiness School in a simplified form. With Ch'an, Mahayana Buddhism had reached its highest stage; what is of interest is no longer extensive knowledge or detailed argument, but rather the essence of the scriptures. The following story shows that precisely this interest was the starting point of the religious exploration of Hui-neng (638-713), the Sixth Patriarch (though in fact the real founder) of Ch'an. At the age of twenty-four, a stranger he came across told him that the Fifth Patriarch had encouraged people to recite the *Chin-kang ching* [the *Diamond Sutra*], saying that thereby they could see into their own Nature (*hsing*) and that through such direct apprehension they could become Buddhas. Hui-neng then went to the Fifth Patriarch to pay reverence. When asked his purpose, he replied, "I am seeking no particular thing, but only the Buddha Dharma."[18] Obviously what he sought was an understanding of the spirit of Buddha. Another story tells us that his teaching was based upon his insight into the spirit of the scriptures. A priest by the name of Fa-ta, who had been reciting the *Fa-hua ching* [the *Lotus Sutra*] continuously for seven years without discovering where the true Dharma lay, came to question him. Hui-neng said, "I have never in my life understood written words, but if you bring a copy of the *Fa-hua ching* and read it to me, on hearing it, I will understand it at

once." Fa-ta brought the *Fa-hua ching* and read it through to the Master. Hearing it, the Sixth Patriarch understood the Buddha's meaning, and then discoursed on the *Fa-hua ching* for the benefit of Fa-ta.[19] In my opinion, it is likely that Hui-neng's illiteracy was merely a legend, but it has the symbolic significance that Buddha Dharma lies not in the text of the scriptures but in their spirit.

For the purpose of gaining insight into the spirit of the scriptures, the Buddha Nature School, which proposed that our Original Mind is the same as the Buddha Nature, had provided a suitable theoretical basis. Thus, Hui-neng found the essential import of Buddhas' teachings within the Self: "The Buddhas of the three worlds and all the twelve divisions of the canon are from the beginning within the Nature of man."[20] With regard to the fact that there are differences, even contradictions, within the scriptures, he could also answer by reference to the Nature of man. He says:

> In the (Buddha) Dharma there is nothing sudden or gradual, but among people some are keen and others dull. The deluded are to be instructed gradually, and the enlightened achieve cultivation suddenly. To understand your own Original Mind is to see into your own Original Nature. Once enlightened, there is from the outset no distinction between these two methods.[21]

The scriptures, divided into Sudden and Gradual Schools, use different methods appropriate to people at different levels of understanding. But in essence they are one, just as underlying different levels of understanding there is only one Original Mind, or one Original Nature. Therefore once a man is elightened he will know that differences among methods (in different scriptures) make no difference in the essence.

The concept of Self Nature is the basis of Hui-neng's doctrine. He claimed it to be the central point of

the sayings of all the Buddhas, and for that reason he argued in favour of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment. In order to see how, based on Self Nature, Hui-neng contrasted this doctrine with the gradudal method and then incorporated the latter into his own method, it is useful to consider the following verses. The first of these is by Shen-hsiu, a fellow student of Hui-neng and the founder of the Gradual Enlightenment School of Ch'an. The verse of Shen-hsiu which was regarded as unenlightened is:

> The body is the Bodhi tree,
> The Mind is like a clear mirror.
> At all times we must strive to polish it,
> And must not let the dust collect.[22]

Against this we have two verses by Hui-neng:

> Bodhi originally has no tree,
> The mirror also has no stand.
> Buddha Nature is always clean and pure;
> Where is there room for dust?
>
> The Mind is the Bodhi tree,
> The body is the mirror stand.
> The mirror is originally clean and pure;
> Where can it be stained by dust?[23]

Both verses reveal Hui-neng's concept of Self Nature, but it seems more convenient to start from the second.

The first two lines of Hui-neng's second verse and of Shen-hsiu's verse are concerned with Self Nature and virtually identical, but Shen-hsiu's verse was regarded by the Fifth Patriarch, their common teacher, as "not having reached true understanding," and Shen-hsiu was advised to "endeavour to see his own Original Nature."[24] The two lines of Shen-hsiu in themselves grasp the meaning of Self Nature theoretically, but fall short of an enlightened understanding. Comparing his last two lines with those of Hui-neng, he fails to achieve the insight of Hui-neng, because he sees Self Nature as requiring to be kept clean,

whereas Hui-neng has understood the truth that Self Nature cannot become polluted.

Here I shall examine the significance of the discipline of "polishing Mind" in Shen-hsiu's doctrine. Shen-hsiu seems to mean that Self Nature provides the basis for the purification of Mind, which is the method of ethical cultivation. He also implies, however, that Self Nature, as ultimate truth, can only really exist and be realised in this world by ethical cultivation. The question, it seems to me, consists in whether ultimate truth can be reached through ethical cultivation. According to the Fifth Patriarch the answer is negative. It seems to me that the following interpretation of his answer is plausible. Ch'an, as a religion, pursues the only and eternal metaphysical reality, but its uniqueness and eternity consists in its neither affecting, nor being affected by, ethical cultivation, the purpose of which is the creation, realization, or modification of truth. Therefore Shen-hsiu's attempt to arrive at ultimate truth by ethical cultivation is futile. If ultimate truth is eternal and singular, he will not reach it. If he reaches something, then either what he has reached is not ultimate truth, or ultimate truth is not eternal and singular. The Fifth Patriarch therefore pointed out that Shen-hsiu would achieve some other kind of result: "If they practise in accordance with it (ethical cultivation), they will not fall into the three evil ways. Those who practise by it will gain great benefit."[28] But this is not the realization of, nor access to, the one and eternal ultimate truth.

However, for a religion to establish itself, its ultimate truth must be accessible in some way. In my opinion Hui-neng's method offers a significant solution to this problem. He avoids the above dilemma by proposing that ethical cultivation is unnecessary. In this way he

cuts the link between metaphysics and ethics, and attains ultimate truth directly through sudden-enlightenment. A question may arise in this connexion, namely, since ultimate truth is transcendent, can it be realised, and of benefit to, this world? We shall look at Hui-neng's reply later. We are only concerned here with the fact that he severed the direct link between metaphysics and ethics.

Now we return to the first verse by Hui-neng. In my opinion this verse is significant for distinguishing the character of Hui-neng's metaphysics. The first two lines, "Bodhi has no tree and mirror has no stand," do not mean that Self Nature has no existence, because the third line, "Buddha Nature is always clean and pure," affirms its existence. They rather mean that Self Nature is a subjective faculty, not an object. Therefore it cannot be found by applying an objective method. It can only be reached by self-enlightenment. Self Nature, which is the same as Buddha Nature, is the sole metaphysical reality. Therefore, Hui-neng's metaphysics may be properly called Subjective Idealism.

2. The Negative Method of Metaphysics

To achieve an enlightened understanding of Self Nature is the only way to attain metaphysical truth. But what are the characteristics of such enlightenment? It is interesting that for his answer Hui-neng appealed to a relationship of identity between enlightenment and the present world. The question of the possibility of metaphysics in the present world which was raised above may also be answered in this way. For his answer Hui-neng adopted the negative method of the Emptiness School, but simplified it to a great extent. He says:

> From ancient times to the present, all have set up no-thought as the main doctrine, non-form as the substance, and non-abiding as the basis. Non-form is to be separated from form even when associated with form. No-thought is not to think even when involved in thought. Non-abiding is the original nature of man.[25]

The negative concepts in this passage refer to the same thing; their differences reflect only differences in point of view taken. No-thought refers to the method of enlightenment; non-form to the object of enlightenment; and non-abiding to the enlightened subject. In order to understand the characteristics of enlightenment, it is sufficient to examine his explanation of no-thought.

Hui-neng says:

> To be unstained in all environments is called no-thought. If while you have your own thoughts, you are separated from the environment, then no thoughts regarding things are produced.

In other words, by "no-thought," he means remaining unattached amid thoughts and the world which is their environment, but does not mean "ceasing to think of the myriad things and cast aside all thoughts." "No-thought" is his negative method to free thoughts from attachment to this world:

> Because man in his delusion has thoughts regarding his environment, heterodox ideas stemming from these thoughts arise, and passions and false views are produced from them.

If the above faults are avoided, the metaphysical truth can be reached in this world. In that case, "no-thought" can be given a positive interpretation:

> The "no" is the separation from the dualistic world of suffering. "Thought" means thinking of the original nature of True Reality. True Reality is the substance of thoughts; thoughts

> are the function of True Reality. If thoughts arise from your Self Nature, then, although you see, hear, perceive, and know, you are not stained by the manifold environment, and are always free.[37]

The negative method is a means of escaping from attachment both to the external environment and to one's self. In the state of non-attachment, the true Self expresses itself freely in the external world and the external world becomes brightened by the illumination of the true Self. It is through this relationship that Hui-neng answers the question concerning the characteristics and the application of enlightenment. In the quotation discussed in the preceeding paragraph this is expressed in terms of that between True Reality and thoughts. To use another pair of terms, this relationship may also be expressed in terms of meditation (*ting*) (of the self) and wisdom (*hui*) (of the world). The impossibility of the separation of this pair is exemplified by the following metaphor:

> If there is a lamp (i.e., meditation of the Self) there is light (i.e., wisdom of the world); if there is no lamp there is no light. The lamp is the substance of light; the light is the function of the lamp.[38]

3. The Relationship Between Self Nature and the Ten Thousand Things (*wan-fa*)

We have seen that in the doctrine of Hui-neng, Self Nature, that is, Buddha Nature, is the ultimate metphysical truth, and that by the negative method, Self Nature is enlightened amid the Ten Thousand Things and is related to them as substance to function. But one may

still ask why such a negative method is adopted, and why after enlightenment, the Ten Thousand Things remain as they were and become the manifestations of Self Nature. The answer is simple. The Ten Thousand Things, although not ultimately real, have in themselves an independent reality. That is why they exist both before and after the enlightenment of Self Nature.

Although in metaphysics Self Nature has priority, in temporal sequence the Ten Thousand Things are what we first meet. Ch'an fully acknowledges this fact and gives them a relatively independent place in its system. Therefore the realization of Self Nature must start from non-attachment to, rather than from simple negation of, the Ten Thousand Things. After enlightenment, Self Nature still expresses itself through those pre-existent things.

The substance-function relationship between Self Nature and the Ten Thousand Things is therefore of an unusual kind. Substance does not create function, it throws light upon existent things which then become its function.[29] Hui-neng's own saying is evidence of this:

> Self Nature contains the Ten Thousand Things, in this it is "great." The Ten Thousand Things are all in Self Nature. To see all men and non-men, evil and good, evil things and good things, and not throw them aside, nor cling to them, nor be stained by them, but to be to them as the empty sky, this is called "great."[30]

In this passage, the Ten Thousand Things exist together with Self Nature which embraces them with its limitless capacity. It therefore seems proper to say that Self Nature is the ultimate existence whereas the myriad things also have some form of independent existence. The Ten Thousand Things are illumined by Self Nature, which embraces them as its function in the sense of the analogy of the lamp.

The idea of the existence of things is a development of Chi-tsang's doctrine that common truth is methodologically prior to the higher truth. However, in Hui-neng's theory, things have existence in their own right; Self Nature only contains and illuminates them, but is not a condition of their existence. Therefore we may say that although his metaphysics is Subjective Idealism, his world-view is almost totally realistic.

C. THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF CH'AN

1. Ch'an as a World Orientated Movement

We have seen that although Hui-neng accepted the fundamental Idealism of the Buddhist tradition, he departed from this tradition in certain important ways, namely in his realistic world-view, his independence of the received scriptures, and in his direct method of enlightenment. This departure represented, in fact, a turning-point in the history of Buddhist thought in China, in so far as it led to the recognition of the important role of mundane life in religious development. Hui-neng's *Liu-tsu t'an ching*, in effect, advocates a major reform which leads Buddhism out of the cloister into society.

This book re-interprets the religious practices of the monastery and re-defines their objects. For expample, "sitting in meditation" is diverted from its original sense of a formal private activity and is presented in terms of one's orientation in this world. Hui-neng says:

> With this method, there are no obstructions. When outwardly with respect to things, thoughts do not arise, it is "sitting." When looking inward, Original Nature is not disturbed, it is "meditation."[91]

Another example is the re-interpretation of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of the "three refuges," namely Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Hui-neng advocates "the formless precepts of the three refuges":

> People should take refuge in the three treasures of their Self Nature, enlightenment (the Buddha), truth (the Dharma), and purity (the Sangha).[92]

What's more, the ultimate destination, the other shore, is moved to the present world. In the interpretation of *pâramitâ*, the Sanskrit term for "other-shore-reached," Hui-neng described it as merely a state of not being attached to the environment. In that state man is no longer agitated like a wave up and down, but like water smoothly flowing with the current.[33]

All of the above examples show that Hui-neng attempted to bring people from institutional religion back to their Self Nature, from seclusion back to common life, and from the other world to this world. He preached lay Buddhism, saying:

> If you wish to practise, it is all right to do so as laymen; you don't have to be in a temple. If you are in a temple but do not practise, you are like evil-minded people of the Western Land. If you are a layman but do practise, you are like people of the East, who practise the good. If only you practise purity yourselves, then this would be the Western Land.[34]

The theoretical construction of Ch'an was laid down by Hui-neng. The subsequent Ch'an Masters, although asking the same question proposed by Hui-neng, namely, "What is the basic idea of the Dharma preached by the Buddha?"[35] were even more radical than he. They tended to find the answer in themselves rather than in the spirit of the scriptures. Therefore in their hands institutional religion was further damaged. Some Ch'an Masters pushed the negative method to the extreme and became very rebellious, especially those in the Lin-chi School. Yi-hsüan (? -866), the founder of this school, says:

> If you want to have the right understanding, you must not be deceived by others. You should kill everything that you meet internally or externally. If you meet Buddha, kill Buddha. If you meet the Patriarchs, kill the Patriarchs... Then you can gain your emancipation.[36]

Although these killings are for the purpose of returning to one's Self Nature, which is no other than Buddha Nature, at the same time it indicates the irrevelance of the religious life, and the primacy of common life.

To sum up, Ch'an urged the return to ordinary life. Although it did not negate religion itself, it did negate religion as a seclusive practice. Fung Yu-lan puts this position very clearly:

> Spiritual cultivation does not require special acts, such as the ceremonies and prayers of institutionalized religion. One should simply try to be without a purposeful mind or any attachments in one's daily life; then cultivation results from the mere carrying on of the common and simple affairs of daily life.[87]

2. Ch'an and the Great Social Change During T'ang and Sung

This approach of Ch'an to the practice of Buddhism in the world is worth examining further with particular regard to the historical background.

In Ch'an, the novel and unconventional techniques of enlightenment were developed and vigorously applied from the ninth century to the eleventh.[88] This was the time from the mid-T'ang to the late Northern Sung - one of the greatest revolutionary periods of social and political construction in China. In politics, before the mid-T'ang there were aristocracies, while during the Northern Sung there developed a centralized bureaucracy. In connexion with the political change, a new landowning class arose in place of the old aristocracy. The details of the new social system will not be treated here. We need only note that the development of Ch'an took place in parallel with

drastic social changes. In Early T'ang, when the aristocracy reached its last stages, all other schools of Mahayana Buddhism achieved their apogees. Ch'an, whose beginnings were in the early T'ang dynasty, developed its radical methods from the mid-T'ang. This was a time when the aristocracy was disintegrating rapidly, and the new landowning class and bureaucratic politics were beginning to take shape. It seems proper to say that the earlier schools of Mahayana Buddhism were in line with the ideology of the old aristocracy, whereas Ch'an met the spiritual needs of the changing period, when despite the collapse of the aristocracy, the newly appearing bureaucracy had not yet been consolidated. But as the new socio-political structure gradually stabilised during the Sung dynasty, Neo-Confucianism in its turn appeared and took the place of Ch'an.

How did Ch'an fit into this changing period? I would like to propose a hypothetical answer. In my opinion, in an era of upheaval, not only do the socio-political institutions fall to pieces, but the spiritual institutions also suffer disintegration. While the bonds of society and ideology are loosening, the individual may feel anxious and indecisive; on the other hand he may draw strength from inner spiritual values. In this way, Ch'an, which advocated self-reliance and a spirit of individualism was able to play an important role. In fact, the orientation of Ch'an towards the acceptance of the world and the individual which was embodied in the teaching that every individual, regardless of his social status, has the capability of attaining Buddhahood, provided a basis for the regeneration of the social order.

Let us look at a few examples. The story of Hui-neng is symbolic. He was illiterate and in his youth sold firewood for a living. When he went to the Fifth Patriarch for Buddha Dharma, he was dismissed as a "barbarian" and

was sent to the threshing room to tread the pestle. But he knew that he had the same Buddha Nature as anybody else.[39]

In his refutation of Ch'an, Chu Hsi once discussed one of its teachings:

> They say that things like earning a living and running a business are not opposed to the Real Form (i.e., Truth). Among the fifty-three sources of learning of the Good-Fortune-Boy, the following are all included: gods, ghosts, immortals, scholars, peasants, workers, merchants, and artisans. . . . The original teaching of Buddha is not so inclusive. But afterwards Ch'an, ashamed of its narrowness, overturned the original doctrine, preaching that pointing to one's Mind to see one's Nature will make one a Buddha.[40]

This is further evidence that Ch'an fitted into the spirit of popular culture.

Chu Hsi also once said:

> I have seen pictures of some patriarchs. They all look awesome. That is why Tsung-kao has said that if Lin-chi had not been a monk, certainly he would have been a big bandit. I have also seen the picture of Kuei-tsung in Mount Lu, which is especially horrifying. If he had not become a monk, surely he would have become a great robber.[41]

This illustrates that at that time when the social order was disintegrating, persons of very strong characters might either go astray and become bandits, or realise and search for spiritual values on their own. In this connexion Ch'an was able to provide spiritual guidance.

3. The Nature of the Dominant Class in the New Socio-Political Structure

Although it represented popular culture, from the beginning Ch'an had attracted the interest of the intelligensia and officials, both because those of higher status were also part of the mundane world to which Ch'an was preaching, and because it had been a tradition for men of letters to believe in and to patronize Buddhism. During the Sung dynasty, while the new socio-political structure was consolidating, the Lin-chi School, the most radical branch of Ch'an, outdid the other branches and gradually won the greatest popularity among men of letters. Ch'an was also welcomed by the emperors, especially Jen-tsung (r. 1023-1063), Kao-tsung (r. 1127-1162), and Hsiao-tsung (r. 1163-1189).[43] Chu Hsi also enumerated many prominent scholar-officials of his dynasty who were devoted to Ch'an.[45]

But while Ch'an was flourishing in the dominant class, Neo-Confucianism began to emerge, and developed by way of criticising Ch'an. This, in my view, is because Ch'an, as a belief of scholar-officials, had difficulties in trying to cope with the new socio-political situation. For this reason it could not stop the emergence of its philosophical rival. Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the doctrine of Ch'an for the new dominant class, I should first like to examine the characteristics of that class itself.

The formation, the position and the purpose of this class is clearly depicted by Yamanoi Yô as the following:

> First, the aristocratic polity, which started in the late Han, collapsed during the mid-T'ang. After the warlord regimes of the late T'ang and the Five Dynasties, there arose, in the Sung dynasty, a new monarchial autocratic government founded upon a new bureaucratic system. Secondly, as regards the class basis of Neo-Confucianism, with the decline of the earlier aristocratic class, a new landowning class[44], whose lands were tilled by tenants, came to take its place. This class furnished the bureaucratic stratum, which is the so-

> called scholar-official stratum or the literati stratum. Commerce and manufacture also progressed; prosperous cities emerged; people running business in the cities became rich. Some of them ascended to the landowning class by purchasing land, and endeavoured to squeeze into the stratum of the scholar-officials. Thirdly, throughout the Sung dynasty, China was under threat from states established by northern peoples such as Liao (the Tartars), Hsi-hsia (the Tibetans), and Chin (the Jurchens), and was forced to sign unequal treaties after disgraceful defeats. Sung not only gave up half of its territory to Chin, but finally perished in the hands of Yüan (the Mongols). In the Sung dynasty, China was constantly subject to ethnic crises.[45]

How did this socio-political environment on the one hand enhance the popularity of Ch'an, and on the other hand provoke the development of Neo-Confucianism? In my opinion, the fundamental change from aristocracy to bureaucratic-and-landowning-class consisted in the centralization of political power. Local governments were demoted to the position of merely administrative branches of the central government; their powers were delegated at the discretion of the ultimate authority, the autocratic monarch. In connexion with this, the family lost its political function and became merely an economic unit. Before the T'ang dynasty, aristocrats dominated the peasants on their desmesne as lord over serfs; but in the Sung dynasty, no matter how rich a landowner was, his relation to tenant peasants was founded upon contracts. The lord was as much a subject of the emperor, as his tenants were. Moreover, he was not a ruler in his own land. Although he was independent in the economic sense, he was not in the political sense. The safeguard of each family was in the power of the state, which in the final resort was the power of the monarch. People became politically dependent when power was centralized in the monarch. Under such circumstances, people tended,

voluntarily or involuntarily, to pay more attention to the world outside their family. Their spiritual orientation consequently became external and mundane, rather than internal and transcendent.

The elites of the landowning class, when they passed the civil examinations and joined the government, were called "scholar-officials" (*shih-ta-fu*); and when they stayed at home and managed local affairs, "scholar-gentry" (*shih-shen*). Whether they were scholar-officials in the government or local leaders in the country, they were engaged in mundane affairs in a complex world. Under these circumstances both Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism were able to meet their spiritual needs.

4. The Significance of Ch'an to the Dominant Class

What were the advantages and disadvantages in the practice of Ch'an by the dominant class in this new socio-political structure?

Ch'an in the Sung dynasty was a form of Buddhism which emphasised the significance of everyday life. From the doctrine that the world of Buddha is here in the present world, and that Self Nature encompasses the Ten Thousand Things, Ch'an was able successfully to combine a transcendent ideal with mundane life. The negative method, besides being a means to the metaphysical truth, was at the same time a way of approaching mundane affairs. By the practice of no-thought amid the existing thoughts, everything would be exalted under the illumination of Self Nature. One may therefore find complete equality, peace, freedom and harmony while engaged in even the most complicated worldly affairs. For the scholar-officials who had social and political burdens upon their shoulders, while at the same time aspiring for spiritual

transcendence, nothing would have been more attractive than such a doctrine.

But this method was based upon Idealism and individualism, and would soon find its limitations. Ch'an did not regard affairs of the world as obstacles to emancipation, but its theory did not extend to an account of how to practice such affairs. For it met the world by way of the negative method, not by positive elucidation. The individualistic spirit urged man to seek supra-moral values. But duty and morality, crucial to running an organised society, were not its main concern. This does not mean that Ch'an was wholly irrelevant to community life; on the contrary, the positive role it played in politics and society was acknowledged even by Chu Hsi.

The practice of the negative method involves a broad-minded attitude toward the world. Hui-neng pointed out:

> The capacity of the Mind is broad and huge, like the vast sky. . . . Emptiness includes the sun, moon, stars, and planets, the great earth, mountains and rivers, all trees and grasses, bad men and good men, bad things and good things, heaven and hell; they are all in the midst of emptiness. The emptiness of Self Nature is also like this.[46]

Hui-neng suggests in this passage that the mind should comprehend both good and evil. However, although the doctrine does not advocate the elimination of evils, I can see no reason why an individual who had broadened his mind in this manner should still be thought to persist in the evils of his earlier ways. For in the pursuit of the supra-moral value of emptiness, he would be no longer interested in the worldly pleasure which often causes evil-doing. In the socio-political context, a man with supra-moral values in mind usually became a good man. This is why Chu Hsi says:

> The former eminents who had understanding of Buddhism often stood firm before threat and allurement. This is because of the teaching of Buddhism that one should courageously improve oneself, and should keep to cleaness and firmness. This teaching made them desireless and immovable by external things.[47]

Therefore, despite being a supra-moral religion, and a Subjective Idealism, Ch'an could still encourage its believers to perform their socio-political responsibilities. But it is just here that the limitations of Ch'an are revealed: Ch'an urges men to purify their own minds, but the teaching that Mind is inclusive both of good and evil suggests an attitude of unconcern toward the evil actions of others. The most a believer can hope for then, is, by attending to the purification of his own mind, to unconciously inspire others to do the same.

Here we shall examine a practical principle of the negative method. In a verse by Hui-neng there are the following lines:

> If you are a person who truly practises the Way,
> Do not look at the faults of the world,
> For if you see the wrongs of other people,
> Criticising them, *you* will be evil.
> The wrongs are theirs but you should not blame,
> In blaming them you yourself become guilty.
> Only by removing the antagonism in your mind,
> Disturbances may be crushed and destroyed.[48]

This illustrates clearly that for a scholar-official, Ch'an is enough for his self-cultivation but not for his performance of the leading role in the socio-political context. For as a leader he cannot assign uniform value to people and events in his world. He must discriminate good and evil in others, and by the action of reward and punishment maintain the successful functioning of society and politics. The weakness in Ch'an was that, lacking a workable conception of law and justice, it offered no philosophical basis for such intervention in the world. It

was this lack that opened the way to the rise of its antagonist, Neo-Confucianism.

D. THE RISE OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM

1. The Dawn of Neo-Confucianism

After the foundation of the Sung dynasty and the consolidation of the new socio-political system, men of letters increasingly developed a strong awareness of their social and political responsibilities, and the rise of Neo-Confucianism became inevitable.

Ch'ien Mu ascribes the rise of Neo-Confucianism to two scholars, both of whom came a little earlier than Chou Tun-i. One was Fan Chung-yen (989-1052), a prominent official, and the other a college director, by the name of Hu Yüan (993-1059). They proclaimed the importance of the Confucian Classics and emphasised socio-political responsibility. Fan Chung-yen is famous for the dictum, "The scholar should worry about the world before the world has time to worry about itself; and he should enjoy his own life only after the world is satisfied."[49]

This socio-political duty was felt both by officials and by country gentlemen. Ôtsuki Nobuyoshi examines the biographies of hermits in the *Sung shih* [the *Sung History*], and finds that more than half of them were inclined to Confucianism. "Hermits" here means those landowners who rejected from recruitment into the government, although many of them were still concerned over public affairs. The common tendencies of the Confucian hermits were: 1) emphasis of the importance of the Essential Relationships (*jen-lun*), 2) deep concern in national affairs, 3) studying and writing around the *I ching* [the *Book of Change*], and 4) the practice of quietitude.[50] We may conclude that in the landowning class, many had a sense of commitment to public affairs. The task of Neo-Confucianism was to express this tendency

in philosophical language, and so to provide a theoretical basis for their practical commitment.

But although those precursors were Confucianistic, they were not generally speculative. The philosophy of every age must develop from that of an earlier age. Those scholars capable of speculative thinking were therefore not pure Confucianistic, and should be called Eclectics. In fact the Neo-Confucianists were later to classify them as adherents of Ch'an.

We have seen that for many scholar-officials, the ideal was to engage in social and political affairs on the one hand, and to enjoy spiritual freedom on the other. Eclecticism arose in accordance with this ideal, so that before the rise of Neo-Confucianism it was the most dominant school. The representatives included such eminents as Wang An-shih (1021-1086) and the Su brothers, including Su Shih (1036-1101) and Su Ch'e (1039-1112).

In the next chapter I shall discuss how Chu Hsi criticised this Eclecticism. Here we need only note that it directly combined the metaphysics of either Ch'an or Tao and the political system of Confucianism. Eclecticism played the role of a middle position in the transition from Ch'an to Neo-Confucianism. In Ch'an, as we have seen, the empty substance can embrace the Ten Thousand Things. Eclecticism is formed by the replacement of the Ten Thousand Things with Confucian elements - rites, music, history, the socio-political institutions, and so on. Hence, it may be regarded as the adaptation of Ch'an to the new social and political environment. But it may also be regarded as the first step in the transition to Neo-Confucianism.

2. The New Direction of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism

As Eclecticism developed out of Ch'an, so Neo-Confucianism grew out of Eclecticism dialectically. Neo-Confucianism can be seen to be the direct opponent of Ch'an and Tao, in that the Ch'an and Tao elements of Eclecticism are deliberately picked out and refuted. The rise of Neo-Confucianism was a response to two important needs: 1) for an ideology of the rising dominant social class, aimed at the promotion of morality; and 2) for the rationalisation of the gradually consolidating socio-political structure, incorporating the conception of law in its metaphysics. Therefore, the fundamental philosophical question it faced was the formation of a new world-view in contrast with that of Ch'an.

The earliest of the Neo-Confucianists were chiefly interested in cosmology,[51] because cosmology is the first and most convenient way to display a new world-view. There were three major Neo-Confucian cosmologists, Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung (1011-1077), and Chang Tsai (1020-1077). Chou Tun-i's *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* is a classic of Neo-Confucianism, and may serve as an example of the new direction that Neo-Confucianism took.

The first part of *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* deals with the evolution of the universe since its beginning, and the second part with the emergence of Man. The primordial substance is called the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*). The essay begins with the problematic words "The Ultimate of Non-being (*wu-chi*) and also the Great Ultimate!" which we shall skip temperorarily in order to examine the rest of the essay. From the second sentence onward, the essay is purely Confucian, and may be examined by contrasting it with the viewpoint of Ch'an.

With respect to the movement of the Great Ultimate, there appears Yang or the positive, and with respect to its tranquility, there appears Yin or the negative. Then comes the formation of the world. Chou Tun-i says:

> By the transformation of Yang and its union with Yin, the Five Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth arise. When these five material forces are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course.
> ....
> When the reality of the Ultimate of Non-being and the essence of Yin, Yang, and the Five Agents come into mysterious union, integration ensues. Heaven (*ch'ien*) constitutes the male element, and Earth (*k'un*) constitutes the female element. The interaction of these two material forces engenders and transforms the myriad things. The myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in an unending transformation.[52]

It is at this point that Man enters the stage. This forms the subject of the second part of the essay. Chou Tun-i says:

> It is Man alone who receives (the Five Agents) in their highest excellence, and therefore he is most intelligent. His Physical Form (*hsing*) appears, and his Spirit (*shen*) develops consciousness, The five moral principles of his Nature (Humanity (*jen*), Righteousness (*i*), Propriety (*li*), Wisdom (*chih*), and Faithfulness (*hsin*)) are aroused by, and react to, the external world and engage in activity; good and evil are distinguished; and human affairs take place.[53]

The significance of this cosmology will be clear when constrasted with that of Ch'an. Let us first consider the substance. In Ch'an the ultimate substance is Original Mind. Under its illumination all things become absolute, equal, and empty. Therefore, the world and all things within it are dependent upon my ultimate Self. But in Chou Tun-i's theory the substance is the Great Ultimate, which had existed before all other things, including Mind. As the substance is independent of myself, so all things, being manifestations of the substance, are also independent.

Secondly, we consider the development of the universe. As we have seen, Ch'an already accepts the

independent universe *ipso facto*. But only after the practice of non-attachment from every individual item can the universe exist as truth and exibit its real nature. Thus the true universe still ensues from Original Mind. In contrast, Chou Tun-i's cosmology is totally realistic. The Great Ultimate has independent reality; and as the term *sheng* (giving birth to) suggests that the moving force is vital rather than mechanical, the universe and things within are regarded as born by the Great Ultimate, and share the same independent reality.

The third contrast concerns the different grounds on which each claims the central position of Man in the universe. In Ch'an Man is, as we have seen, the real originator of the universe because he gives it truth by his true understanding. So that ultimately we cannot find a demarcation between the universe and the individual Self. According to this doctrine, one may find peace, equality, and freedom both in oneself and in the external world. It transcends conflicts, so that no social measures to control conflicts are necessary. This theory leads Man to think that the world is composed of individuals, and that each individual is absolute in itself. Therefore in its anthropocentric teaching, Ch'an is advancing an individualistic philosophy.

In the case of Chou Tun-i, Man acquires his central position because he represents the final stage of evolution. In his theory, the universe comes first, then Man. And in Man Physical Form comes before the development of his consciousness. So the distinction between cosmos and Man is clearly drawn. Man is pre-eminent because with consciousness he starts a human world. The Five Agents of the cosmic force, when incarnated, become the five moral principles of his Nature. Parallel to the process of the universe, because of consciousness, these principles are activated, and through them good and evil are distinguished, and subsequently all kinds of human affairs

emerge. In this way Chou Tun-i introduced the conception of society into his philosophy. Society is to Chou Tun-i as realistic as the other stages which follow the Great Ultimate. Good and the evil exist in society and are not illusory. Moral standards become indispensable and so are regarded as rooted in the universe. Instead of Ch'an's individualism, then, in Chou Tun-i's philosophy we have a commitment to the society. If morals are chiefly concerned with the Essential Relationships, then as an individualism, Ch'an is concerned with supra-moral values. The fact that moral values are once again hallowed in Neo-Confucianism reflects its strong social orientation.

The third and last part of *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* is concerned about the method of moral cultivation and the value of morality:

> The sage settles these human affairs by the principles of the Mean (*chung*), Correctness (*cheng*), Humanity, and Righteousness (Chou's own footnote: for the Way of the sage is none other than these four), regarding tranquility as fundamental (Chou's own footnote: Having no desire, there will therefore be tranquility). Thus he establishes himself as the ultimate standard for Man. . . .
> Therefore it is said that "Yin and Yang are established as the Way of Heaven, the Weak (*jou*) and the Strong (*kang*) as the Way of Earth, and Humanity and Righteousness as the Way of Man."[54]

Man is commensurate with Heaven and Earth because his innate moral principles are the same as the principles of Heaven and Earth. Man needs ethical cultivation in order to act according to his Nature. A perfect example is the sage, who has shown us the foundation of, and the means toward, moral being. The foundation is one's own Nature, and the means is "tranquility." In claiming tranquility as the means toward moral being, Chou Tun-i has no doubt been influenced by Taoism and Ch'an, but when adapted to moral practice, it has a different significance. In Ch'an, the

purpose of tranquility is to suspend both affirmation and negation, and to establish an attitude of non-attachment. But according to Chou Tun-i, the practice of tranquility is to eliminate selfish desires which disturb the carrying out of moral behaviour. The practice of tranquility therefore does not aim to cancel the distinction between good and evil, but to support that distinction.

3. Five Types of Metaphysics

Now we go back to the first sentence of *T'ai-chi t'u shuo*, "The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate," which has caused much controversy among later scholars. There is, no doubt, the influence of Taoism and Buddhism in the term "Non-being." If the sentence is understood as saying that the universe emerges from nothingness, the whole essay is given a Taoistic keynote, and consequently Chou Tun-i would have to be regarded as an Eclectic. But Chu Hsi struggled to interpret Chou Tun-i as a pure Confucianist. Chu Hsi insisted that "Non-being" was only an epithet characterizing the transcendence of the Great Ultimate. The beginning of the universe, the Great Ultimate, is called the Ultimate of Non-Being because it is both infinite and non-material.[55]

But my concern here is not to ascertain the real meaning on the part of Chou Tun-i, but rather to show that during the transition period from Ch'an to Neo-Confucianism, there were several conceptions of substance and function. Accordingly, we may enumerate five types of metaphysics which appeared during that transition period, from Ch'an to the establishment of Chu Hsi's philosophy.

The first is Idealism which regards Original Mind or Self Nature as the ultimate substance. This is the view of

Ch'an, and obviously is what Chou Tun-i, and all other Neo-Confucianists fought against.

The second type is that for which I suggest the name "Evolutionary Vitalism." I call this the first kind of Eclecticism. It attempts to combine the Taoist conception of substance and the Confucian conception of function. Its main thesis is that substance is the absolutely void Non-being, but by way of a vitalist cosmology, the function involves the successive emergence of the natural and human worlds. Representatives of this metaphysics are the Su brothers, who were famous men of letters of the Northern Sung. If the Non-being of Chou Tun-i were to be interpreted in the Taoist sense, he too would belong to this group of Eclectics.

The third type may be named "Idealistic Vitalism," and constitutes the second kind of Eclecticism. It involves a combination of the idealistic substance of Ch'an with the vitalist conception of function. Because Ch'an flourished again during the turning period between the Northern and the Southern Sung, many Neo-Confucianists of that time adopted Ch'an Idealism and consequently advocated this type of metaphysics. Chang Chiu-ch'eng (1092-1159) is the principal representative of this school.

The Eclecticism of this period may in general terms be divided into these two kinds, but traditional Chinese scholarship has tended to conflate them into a single phenomenon described as "Ch'an-Tao," or simply as "Ch'an." Chu Hsi though consciously committed to refuting Ch'an, directed his principal attack against these forms of Eclecticism, which he regarded as "the Ch'an of scholar-officials."

The fourth type is the metaphysics of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, which I shall call "Immanent Vitalism." This view regards substance as a permanent living force,

without beginning or end, and function as the natural and human worlds which are its manifestation.

The fifth is the metaphysics which Chu Hsi established in his mature period. Chu Hsi's philosophical enquiry started from Eclecticism, whence he moved to Immanent Vitalism, but later, finding defects in the latter, he struggled to establish his own metaphysics. His final position is characterized by the doctrine of Principle (*li*) and Material Force (*ch'i*). Principle, as substance, is transcendent and non-material, and should be understood as a regulative standard. Material Force is that which actualises (often with limitation) the regulative standard, and is also the reason for the multiplicity of individual lives.

4. The Purpose and the Method of this Thesis

There is a factor common to many Neo-Confucian thinkers, namely, the influence upon them of Buddhism and Taoism. Some of them even indulged in these "heterodoxies" for some time before finally returning to Confucianism. In the development of Neo-Confucianism, this occurs again and again; and the reason for this, I contend, is that these thinkers were not merely solving philosophical problems, but searching for a principle on which to base their lives. Because Ch'an was the dominant metaphysics of that time, it was natural that it should have preoccupied them considerably during their philosophical pursuit. Failing ultimately to find satisfaction in it, philosopher after philosopher returned to Confucianism, absorbing and advancing the views of their predecessors. The development of Neo-Confucianism was the result of this iterative search for a moral basis for life in the "this world" of

Buddhism. Chu Hsi, too, began his research with Ch'an, but it was only after several stages of dialectical development that he was able to establish his own philosophy.

Before he was twenty-four, Chu Hsi's education had been in Confucianism, but at the same time he had been attracted by Ch'an. From twenty-four to thirty-seven, he gradually adopted the Northern Sung tradition of Neo-Confucianism represented by "Immanent Vitalism," and through it finally refuted Eclecticism. From thirty-seven to forty he devoted himself to the attempt to experience this Immanent Vitalism subjectively. The result was that he found Immanent Vitalism inadequate to provide a basis for the morality which was his crucial concern. From the age of forty, he struggled to construct his own metaphysics. In the following years, by self-cultivation and by elaborating the implications of his new metaphysics, he gradually came to revise his theory, and to produce a new version which was eventually completed in his sixties.

But the fundamental questions with regard to both the formation of Neo-Confucianism and of Chu Hsi's metaphysics, concern the concepts of Heaven, of Man, and of their inter-relationship. The difference in world-view between Confucianism and Buddhism was described succinctly by Ch'eng I: "The [Confucian] sages based [their system] on [the concept of] Heaven, and the Buddhists based [their system] on [the concept of] Mind."[56] It is easy to understand that the Buddhist philosophy is based on the concept of Mind. Since the Buddhists hold an idealism, Mind is regarded as substance, and consequently Man is the centre of the world, and can include the world within himself. But the basis of Confucianism is more complicated. The purpose of replacing Mind with Heaven is to support a realistic world-view, and to advocate order

and objectivity. But what is Heaven? "To imitate the Way of Heaven" (fa-t'ien) had been a traditional doctrine in Confucianism and continued to be emphasised in Neo-Confucianism. What was to be imitated was clearly its metaphysical aspect, which may be taken, on the one hand, to be the idea of "law," and on the other, the ideas of "creation" and "constancy."[57] The Northern Sung Neo-Confucianists made use of the conception of creation and constancy in the idea of Heaven in order to developed their philosophy of Immanent Vitalism. It was this Immanent Vitalism that Chu Hsi accepted when he rejected his own Ch'an tendency. However, as will be shown in this thesis, since Immanent Vitalism was not sufficient to provide a basis for the morality and order which was crucial to the historical mission of Neo-Confucianism, it had to be revised by including the idea of law into its metaphysics. Chu Hsi's new metaphysics is significant in completing this final step. Although Neo-Confucianism is based on the concept of Heaven, Chu Hsi's philosophical enquiry started from the problem of Man; and so his reconstruction of the concept of Heaven may also be viewed as the establishment of the place of Man in the cosmos.

This study, as its title shows, deals with the development of Chu Hsi's metaphysics by concentrating on those, for him, most fundamental questions, the concepts of Heaven and of Man. Our focus will be the development of Chu Hsi's own metaphysics; but, as his spiritual journey is virtually a miniature of the history of philosophy from Ch'an to fully-formed Neo-Confucianism, it is hoped that this discussion of Chu Hsi's own development may also throw light on the philosophy of that period as a whole.

Because the concern of this thesis is to give an overview of the development of Chu Hsi's philosophy, all of his important concepts will be discussed, but particular attention will be given to the dating of his

ideas, both with respect to their origin and modification. Emphasis will also be laid on the relationship between these concepts, because his view of Heaven and Man is best shown, not in any single concept, but in the ways he organises them into a total system.

CHAPTER II
THE INHERITANCE OF THE NEO-CONFUCIAN TRADITION

SUMMARY

This chapter presents the process through which Chu Hsi inherited the Northern Sung Neo-Confucian tradition characterized by Immanent Vitalism.

In his adolescence, Chu Hsi, influenced by the scholarly trend of that time, was inclined to an Eclecticism drawn from Confucianism and Ch'an. Because soruces for this period of his life are scanty, it is not possible to provide a very complete account.

From twenty-four to thirty-four years of age, Chu Hsi gradually rejected Ch'an and adopted Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism. This transformation resulted from his experience in political life, his reading of the Confucian Classics, and, most importantly, his discussions with Li T'ung (1093-1163). Through those discussions, Chu Hsi was able to develop the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" (*li-i fen-shu*), which in its turn prepared him for the acceptance of the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism.

In his thirty-seventh year, Chu Hsi wrote the *Tsa-hsüeh pien* [*A Criticism of Eclecticism*], in which he presents his final refutation of Eclecticism. I shall give a brief account of the theories of the principal Eclectics whom he attacks, as well as those of Chu Hsi's. The main controversy here is the relationship between the Way (*tao*) and Concrete Things (*ch'i*), and Chu Hsi attempts to explain that relationship on the basis of Immanent Vitalism.

A. THE ECLECTIC TENDENCY OF THE YOUNG CHU HSI (1130-1153)

Chu Hsi is one of the most important philosophers in the history of China. From his early childhood he showed a considerable inclination towards philosophy. For examples of this we may quote from his own memories of early years. He apparently had a propensity for metaphysics, for he said: "When I was five or six, I was troubled in my mind about the essence of Heaven, and wondered what might exist outside it."[58] The Confucian ideal of life also attracted him: "When I was in my teens, I was glad to know from the *Meng-tzu* that the sages and I belong to the same category."[59] He was inclined to be concerned about understanding ultimate truth and moral principles rather than pursuing particular branches of knowledge. So, despite a great thirst for knowledge,[60] he displayed no interest in history, thinking it dealt with external and trivial affairs.[61]

The sources of Chu Hsi's Eclecticism were Confucianism and Ch'an. He himself says that the common emphasis of these two schools on "self-cultivation" (*wei-chi chih hsüeh*) was an attraction, and that in his youth he preferred to embrace what they had in common to seeking out their differences.[62] First we shall examine the Confucian element in his early learning.

1. His Confucian Education

Between the ages of eight and twenty Chu Hsi's reading included the Confucian Classics and the works of contemporary Confucianists, such as the *Hsiao ching* [the

Book of Filial Piety], the *Lun-yü* [the *Analects*], the *Meng-tzu*, the *Ta-hsüeh* [the *Great Learning*], the *Chung-yung* [the *Doctrine of the Mean*], the *Chou-li* [the *Rites of Chou*], the *Shih ching* [the *Book of Odes*], and the Collected Works of Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), and those of Ch'en Huan (1057-1122).[63] Chu Hsi studied these works, partly because they were the common culture of the literati, but more importantly because they were required texts for the civil examinations. Despite the career orientation of his study, Chu Hsi paid particularly attention to the philosophical import of these texts.[64] Another purpose of the civil examination curriculum, namely, inculcation of the Confucian ideal of socio-political commitment, also had its affect on the young Chu Hsi. This is clear from the remarks of the examining officer at the local level who said of Chu Hsi: "I passed a young man, all three of whose essays proposed great plans for the country. He should amount to something in the future."[65]

2. The Influence of Ch'an on his Thought

Chu Hsi's interest in Ch'an in his youth was encouraged by the spiritual environment of his time. Ch'an flourished during the Shao-hsing period (1131-1162), the second period of Kao-tsung, the founder of the Southern Sung dynasty.[66] It was not only patronized by the emperor but widely accepted among scholar-officials. Under the influence of Ch'an, the Eclecticism of the Northern Sung continued to flourish. The School of Eclecticism which was particularly popular in the Southern Sung was that of the Su brothers, because the School of Wang An-shih had been banned at the end of the Northern Sung under the accusation that it had been responsible for both the

corruption of government, and the consequent inability to resist the Chin invaders.[67] At the beginning of the Southern Sung, the Eclectic tradition of the Su brothers which historically lent towards Taoism was adapted in the direction of Ch'an by Chang Chiu-ch'eng.

Chu Hsi was born in a remote area of Fukien and had many chances to come into contact with Ch'an in his youth. His father Chu Sung (1097-1143), a man with broad historical knowledge and of upright personality, was, according to Chu Hsi, in his youth fond of making friends with Buddhist and Taoist masters.[68] He died when Chu Hsi was fourteen. On the point of death he entreated his friend Liu Tzu-yü (1097-1146) to take care of his family, and commanded Chu Hsi to study with his three other friends, Hu Hsien (1086-1162), Liu Mien-chih (1091-1149), and Liu Tzu-hui (1101-1147).[69] Liu Tzu-yü was a high official and rich landowner, and was at that time staying at home while out of political favour. He provided the Chu family a house and a small estate. The other three were also living in retirement, Liu Tzu-hui being the younger brother of Liu Tzu-yü.

This group had two things in common: they belonged to the landowning gentry and they were philosophically inclined towards Eclecticism.[70] They were Confucianists in that they had studied the Confucian Classics and had a concern and capability for political affairs, even though they refused to seek office for political reasons.[71] The Northern Sung collapsed in 1126; Kao-tsung, the founding emperor of the Southern Sung, fought for his first ten years to check the further invasion of Chin, but thereafter he had no ambition to recover the northern half China. In line with this policy, he appointed Ch'in K'uai (1090-1155) as the prime minister and concluded a peace treaty with Chin in 1140. Ch'in K'uai presided over the government from 1138 to 1155,[72] during which time he banished "upright gentlemen," from the government. This

was the reason for the political exile of Liu Tzu-yü, and part of the reason for the voluntary seclusion of the other three of Chu Hsi's teachers. Chu Hsi was already twenty-six when Ch'in K'uai's premiership ended, so he may be said to have grown up in an atmosphere which, though seclusive, was patriotic.

Ch'an was also an important factor in the spiritual lives of these gentlemen. The case of the Liu brothers is an example. Of all his father's friends, Chu Hsi was closest to the Liu family. Liu Tzu-yü supported him; Liu Tzu-hui, at that time a private tutor, taught him essay writing in preparation for the civil examinations; and the two sons of Liu Tzu-yü were his classmates. Although the Lius, like most of the scholar-gentry, had an eager interest in Ch'an, they did not necessarily have a profound understanding of it. For example, a famous monk Tsung-kao (1089?-1163?) ridiculed them with the words, "Yen-ch'ung (Liu Tzu-hui) is diligent in the cultivation of Ch'an, but does not know it; Pao-hsüeh (Liu Tzu-yü) knows Ch'an, but pays no attention to the cultivation."[73] However, through them Chu Hsi was provided with an environment in which to come into contact with Ch'an. Besides tuitoring him for the civil examinations, Liu Tzu-hui, on learning of Chu Hsi's aspiration for "self-cultivation," taught him "the gate to learning," probably meaning his own introduction to Ch'an.[74] At that time Chu Hsi was fifteen or sixteen. In Liu Tzu-hui's home Chu Hsi had another chance to meet and converse with a Ch'an monk. Later, when he was nineteen and took the civil examination he incorporated the opinions of that monk in his papers and was successful.[75] Another reliable source says that from seventeen to eighteen years old Chu Hsi went to see a famous monk Tao-ch'ien three times.[76] Whether Tao-ch'ien was the monk that Chu Hsi met at Liu Tzu-hui's home or not,[77] he had an important influence on Chu Hsi.

3. His Method of Study

As well as recollecting the readings and interests of his early years, Chu Hsi also tells us of his methods of study. However, since we only know the general trend of his early days, it is difficult to reorganize these fragments into a systematic whole. Two things are worth mentioning here. Chu Hsi recollecting his early education, says: "I studied the *Ta-hsüeh* and the *Chung-yung* while I was seventeen and eighteen. Every morning after I got up, I recited them ten times."[78] This account tells us that, although at that time he was inclined to broad learning and devoured many branches of knowledge,[79] he was also diligently learnt some of the basic Confucian Classics by heart. I believe this familiarity with the Confucian Classics is an important factor, which would later encourage him to return to, and to develop his interest in, Confucian philosophy.

Another noteworthy passage is from the impression of Chu Hsi by Li T'ung. Li T'ung said:

> This man is very intelligent and devoted to practice. His learning hits the subtlest points. All his debates are relevant and start from the essence of things. Therefore it is easy to discuss with him. . . . At first he studied with Tao-ch'ien, so that all his efforts have been from within. . . .[80]

Li T'ung made this remark when Chu Hsi was thirty-one and had already discarded the Ch'an element in his learning. Nevertheless it gives us a clue to Chu Hsi's early efforts. In his admiration of Chu Hsi's ability in philosophical enquiry, Li T'ung ascribed the reason to Chu Hsi's early cultivation of Ch'an. It seems to me that, Chu Hsi's study of Ch'an, especially that with Tao-ch'ien, had enhanced his attention to the "cultivation of the mind." After Chu Hsi returned to the Confucian tradition, his

dedication to self-cultivation continued and became the foundation of his achievements in his objective understanding of both the Classics and the external world. On the other hand, although the Ch'an view of Mind had been rejected, the endeavour to find a proper understanding of it played an important role in the development of his philosophy.

B. CHU HSI'S IMMANENT VITALISM AS A FOLLOWER OF LI T'UNG (1153-1163)

1. The Gradual Abandonment of Ch'an Through Political Commitment

Chu Hsi's Eclecticism in his adolescence constituted the first stage in the development of his thought, and was a reflection of the philosophical trends of the Shao-hsing (1131-1162) period. After this period he rejected these early eclectic tendencies. This important transition took place between 1153 and 1163, that is, between the ages of twenty-four and thirty-four, under the influence of the ideas of Li T'ung.

The Ch'ing scholar Hsia Hsin (1789-1871) categorises the influence of Li T'ung on Chu Hsi under six headings. The first is concerned with the refutation of Ch'an, the next two with study and philosophy, the fourth with politics, and the last two with the method of self-cultivation.[81] Using these categories, I shall attempt to describe Chu Hsi's philosophical position in this period.

The first and most obvious aspect of this period of transition in Chu Hsi's thought is his rejection of Ch'an.

Liu Tzu-hui died when Chu Hsi was eighteen. The only senior he could consult thereafter was Hu Hsien. But the scholarship of Hu Hsien appeared even more meager than that of Liu Tzu-hui. From Chu Hsi's recollection, although Hu Hsien admired Buddhism and Taoism, he had no great understanding of them. Chu Hsi thought that there was little to learn from him, and so, on his way to his first government post at the age of twenty-four, he dropped in to see Li T'ung,[82] a highly praised friend of Chu Hsi's late father. This was the first time Chu Hsi met Li T'ung. When Chu Hsi elaborated his own philosophy, which without

doubt contained many elements of Ch'an, Li T'ung, lacking eloquence in debate, merely told him that it was not right, and suggested that Chu Hsi should study only the sayings of the Confucian sages. At the time, Chu Hsi suspected that Li T'ung did not understand Ch'an at all, but nevertheless, somewhat reluctantly, accepted his suggestion. During his service as the clerk of records (*chu-pu*) of T'ung-an between his twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth year, he put aside his Ch'an books and concentrated solely on the Confucian Classics. Gradually he discovered the significance of Confucianism, and the flaws and defects of Ch'an.[83]

In another recollection of this first meeting Chu Hsi says:

> When I first met Master Li, I expounded a great deal of philosophy. Master Li replied, "You speculate a great deal, but you don't understand the things in front of you. In fact there is nothing *mysterious* in the Way. To be able to see it, you only need to be serious in your daily practice."[84]

This was another way of criticising Chu Hsi's inclination to Ch'an. His return to Confucianism thus took place in two ways: one was through study of the Confucian Classics, and the other was by paying attention to the activities of daily life.

Chu Hsi gradually shifted his interest from Ch'an to Confucianism during the following three years, from the age of twenty-four to twenty-six. His twenty-fourth year was also the first of his official career. As he had been brought up in a peaceful rural area and in an environment which encouraged Ch'an meditation, Chu Hsi found some difficulty in adjusting himself to trivial and tiresome duties. Now and again he craved for seclusion, and sometimes dreamt of leaving his office to pursuit a transcendental style of life. He named his study *Kao-shih*

hsüan [Studio of the Transcendentalist], explaining that although he was toiling through secretarial duties, his spirit was soaring in the state of transcendence. This was an ideal compatible with Ch'an. However, in the following two years complaints of this kind became less and less frequent. It appears that he had found contentment in performing his duties, and came to look on them as valuable in themselves, and no longer dismissed them as merely irrelevant to his transcendental ideals. Perhaps we should attribute this change to Li T'ung's advice to pay attention to daily life.

In those years, besides his normal duties as the clerk of records, Chu Hsi also took charge of the prefectural school. For that task he invited "virtuous scholars" as supervisors, encouraged students to dedicate themselves to learning and moral cultivation, and established a library. It is evident from his writings that he carried out all these works in a spirit of dedication to the Confucian ideal.[85]

2. The Investigation of Things Through Study of the Confucian Classics

The second category, according to Hsia Hsin, of Chu Hsi's thought under the influence of Li T'ung was the Investigation of Things (*ko-wu*). This was developed in response to another piece of advice from Li T'ung, namely, to learn the Way from the Confucian Classics. We shall see how Chu Hsi followed this advice and thereby advanced his philosophy.

It seems that this was the first time that Chu Hsi was confronted with the idea of discriminating between Confucianism and Ch'an. This advice inspired him to read again the Confucian Classics which he had been studying

since boyhood and had continued to study on his own. What was required was a change in his habits from broad and rapid reading for general ideas, to a close and thoughtful study which allowed him to reach deeper levels of understanding. There are sources which deal with the nature of his studies at this time. Once in the autumn of his twenty-seventh year, while he went to the neighbouring county on an official errand, for three or four nights in a monastery he thought over a section of the *Lun-yü*.[86] In the winter of the same year, while he was waiting for the order of retirement he borrowed a copy of the *Meng-tzu* to study. He devoted himself to the section on "nourishing strong moving force" until he understood its meaning.[87] Another source tells us that in his twenty-eighth year, when he had already retired from his official duties and was living alone in T'ung-an, for the period of about a whole year he read only ten chapters of the *Lun-yü*.[88]

This very careful study of the Confucian Classics, and his positive involvement in his official duties, were the two practical routes through which Chu Hsi returned to the Confucian tradition. These two routes have in common the fact that both may be regarded as daily disciplines. But as will appear below, these daily disciplines were themselves seem to have a philosophical basis. While it is true that in his first official post Chu Hsi returned to the practice of Confucianism, it was only when he had clarified for himself the philosophical basis of that practice that he could be said to have adopted the tradition of Northern Sung Neo-Conficianism. In other words, he had to reflect upon his practice in order to reach its philosophical significance. This insight was to be reached through further discussions with Li T'ung. This is the subject of the following section.

3. The Philosophy of One and Many

Hsia Hsin's third category was the philosophy of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" (*li-i fen-shu*) which represents the conclusions Chu Hsi drew from reflecting on his experience of daily disciplines.

Chu Hsi's first official post ended in the autumn of 1156, when he was twenty-seven. While waiting for his successor's arrival, he lived alone in T'ung-an for nearly the whole of the next year. In the January of 1158, Chu Hsi was free to leave and for the next twenty years enjoyed the freedom of a sinecure. His first act was to visited Li T'ung again. Thereafter he visited Li T'ung several times until the death of the latter in 1163. Each time he did so he stayed for a few months to discuss new philosophical insights. Furthermore during those periods when he was not in direct contact with Li T'ung he continued to correspond with him. This correspondence was later collected by Chu Hsi into a book, called *Yen-p'ing ta-wen*.

While Chu Hsi was carrying out the duties of his official post on the one hand, and studying the Confucian Classics on the other, he already regarded these two types of activity as similar kinds of moral discipline. The common element they shared was that both were related to daily life. His official duties could be regarded as the daily regimen of moral practice in the socio-political sphere, just as after his retirement there would be the daily regimen of moral practice in the family environment. As regards study, in the period under discussion, Chu Hsi concentrated on the *Lun-yü* and the *Meng-tzu*, both of which are concerned primarily with practical and daily affairs rather than with abstract speculation. It was natural that a study of these works should lead to the attempt to find truth in daily life and to put it into practice there.

This devotion to daily life was an extension of the orientation of Li T'ung. Li T'ung leading a hermit's life, was able to dedicate himself completely to the practice of ordinary life. He was not a man of erudition, and limited himself to a few Confucian Classics including the *Lun-yü*, the *Meng-tzu*, and the *Tso-chuan*, which are concerned mainly with concrete facts. He was "as plain as an old farmer, writing neither books nor essays."[88] What was of importance to him was to study the sayings of the sages in great detail and to actualise them in daily life. Another aspect of this tendency was his lack of interest in abstract thinking. This is why Li T'ung did not like his students to study such speculative works as the *Cheng-meng* [*Correcting Youthful Ignorance*] of Chang Tsai and the *Chih-yen* [*Knowing Words*] of Hu Hung (1105?-1161).[89]

From his discussion with Li T'ung we can see how Chu Hsi developed his philosophical foundation for moral practice. He used the phrase "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" (*li-i fen-shu*). This term was originally invented by Ch'eng I, and was elaborated considerably further by Chu Hsi. And, because this elaboration is in the direction of Immanent Vitalism, it therefore became the means through which Chu Hsi adopted Northern Sung Neo-Confucian philosophy.

Chu Hsi made a clear exposition of this concept in a piece of correspondence preserved in the *Yen-p'ing ta-wen*. Concerning "the oneness of principle," he says:

> All creatures come from the same source. All men, animals, and plants possess this source as their principle. This is the reason why they perfectly form one body with all other creatures, and they can continue their living breath. (Chu Hsi adds a footnote: "The master comments here: 'You mentioned only living creatures, but there are also lifeless beings.'") This is Humanity.[91]

It seems clear that by "principle" Chu Hsi means the principle of life, and by "the oneness of principle" he is

referring to "a singular cosmic life-principle," of which all the variety of creatures are "the distinctive particulars." Even lifeless things, as suggested by Li T'ung's comment, should be interpreted as latent lives and thus included into this living totality. At this point we should take notice of the relationship between the one and the many. Although each individual derives its particular life from the cosmic life-principle, it does not share the cosmic life as a part, but contains in itself the completeness of the life-principle, just as the tree bears seeds, and each seed contains, no less than the mother tree, the fullness of life.

It now becomes clear that in the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" Chu Hsi inherited the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism. This concept was essential to discovering the crucial significance of the particular, and in Chu Hsi's case it may explain the meaningfulness of the practical details of daily life. For instance, in the correspondence cited above, Chu Hsi went on to expound the significance of particulars. He says:

> The concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" justly describes the real nature of principle. . . . The universe as a whole is no more than this principle, however, the universe contains all of the separate things and thus all of the differences. Turning to the numberless separate and interwoven things, enumerate any two tiny bits, and they manifest at one instant their sameness and their differences. This is "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars."[92]

Thus for Chu Hsi, while the multifarious world is regarded as the realization of the singular cosmic life-principle, the distinctiveness of each individual must at the same time be fully acknowledged. The whole and its parts exist interdependently. Neither can claim its authenticity by obscuring the other.

After the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" is formulated, morality may also be defined. According to Chu Hsi, awareness of this Immanent Vitalism is the beginning of morality. The knowledge that every individual thing possesses the same principle and forms one body with all others is the necessary condition for the practice of Humanity (*jen*). The knowledge that each thing remains particular, and is distinct from the others, is the necessary condition for the practice of Righteousness (*i*). Humanity and Righteousness are moral principles, but they are based on the understanding of Principle (*li*) and its particulars.[93]

4. The Political Practice

Hsia Hsin's fourth category refers to Chu Hsi's political ideas. Li T'ung was a typical Confucian hermit in that, being disillusioned with an age in which frank and upright men were rejected, he chose to live a poor and a secluded life, without ever losing his concern for society and public morality.[94] In 1162, Hsiao-tsung (r. 1163-1189) succeeded to the throne. Hsiao-tsung was ambitious to recover the territory lost to the Chin invaders, and so rehabilitated many officials banished in the previous regime. Chu Hsi approved of this new policy and submitted, in 1162 and 1163, two memorials to the throne, which he had composed in consultation with Li T'ung. These memorials, therefore, represented the political ideas of both thinkers. I shall consider only those ideas in them which related to their philosophy.

Both memorials contain three proposals: in both cases, the first concerned the education of emperors; the second, the determination to retaliate against the Chin

invaders and to recover the lost territory; and the third, the employment of upright and capable officials. The third set of proposals will not be discussed here. In the first set Chu Hsi says that despite Hsiao-tsung's interest in literature and Ch'an, Confucianism alone should be the basis of the education of emperors. The essentials of Confucian learning are the Investigation of Things (*ko-wu*) and the Extension of Knowledge (*chih-chih*). According to Chu Hsi, it is through the practice of these that the ancient emperors obtained knowledge. Only thereby was the significance of the things of which they became aware perfectly illuminated, so that, of themselves, their wills became pure, their minds freed from error, and their management of affairs of the world became as easy as counting and as discriminating between black and white.[25] It is noteworthy that in the above argument Chu Hsi is applying his understanding of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" to politics. The particulars here are concrete political affairs, which should be studied in order to discover the oneness of principle. And when by such investigation an understanding of both oneness and distinctiveness is attained, that is, when knowledge of correct moral behaviour is acquired, it then becomes easy both to cultivate personal morality and to settle political problems.

In the second set of proposals, the renunciation of peace with the Chin invaders, Chu Hsi emphasises once again that knowledge of principle is the prerequisite of moral practice. He says that if an emperor understands the principle, he will do what he should and reject what he should not, magnanimously following the natural course, without any selfish intentions and expectations. But how does knowledge of principle apply to the situation of avenging the Chin invaders? Chu Hsi quotes the *I ching* and the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* which say that the Way of Heaven is Yin and Yang, the Way of Earth is the Weak and the Strong,

and the Way of Man is Humanity (*jen*) and Righteousness (*i*). He points out that in Humanity nothing is more important than the attachment between father and son, and in Righteousness the relationship between sovereign and subjects. The attachment springing from these principles is the most real and universal. This proves the moral necessity of retaliation against Chin, who were guilty of capturing Hui-tsung (r. 1101-1125) and Ch'in-tsung (r. 1126), the last two emperors of the Northern Sung.[96]

From the above description we know how Chu Hsi applied the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" to politics. It may be noted that Chu Hsi's reasoning in this period was from the "Investigation of Things" to the knowledge of both oneness and distinctiveness, and then application of that knowledge to moral practice. And with regard to morality, Chu Hsi was most concerned with those of the Essential Relationships (*jen-lun*).[97]

Hsia Hsin's fifth category is Li T'ung's method of Self-cultivation (*hang-yang*); his sixth and last category is meditation or "quiet sitting" (*ching-tso*). These two doctrines influenced Chu Hsi only after the death of Li T'ung, and thus will be dealt with in the next chapter.

C. CHU HSI'S CRITICISM OF ECLECTICISM (1166)

1. The Relationship Between the Way and Concrete Things

We have seen that through his extension of the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" (*li-i fen-shu*), Chu Hsi placed himself in the tradition of the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism. But, although this concept expresses the essential characteristics of Immanent Vitalism, it needed to be expressed in more general terms in order to satisfy the requirements of an all-embracing metaphysics. We find that after Chu Hsi accepted Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, he often used a pair of general terms very common in the metaphysical tradition, namely, the pair: "the Way" (*tao*) and "Concrete Things" (*ch'i*). It is with these two concepts that he consolidates his metaphysical position in the first period after his acceptance of Neo-Confucianism.

I shall now give a brief account of the metaphysical issues faced, and the solutions proposed, by Chu Hsi in this and his later periods. It may be noted that both the concept of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars" and the doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things" are composed of pairs of contrasting terms. This binary structure would appear to originate from the fact that the basic problem of metaphysics, for Chu Hsi and for most other Chinese philosophers, concerned the relationship between the metaphysical and the empirical worlds. The term, "the oneness of principle," refers to the metaphysical foundation, while "the distinctiveness of particulars" refers to things in the empirical world. And since Chu Hsi

maintains that the oneness of principle is the cosmic life-principle which creates and permeates the particulars, I shall call his metaphysics at this stage Immanent Vitalism. His doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things" may be understood in a similar fashion. The Way, as the metaphysical foundation, only exists in, and is manifested by, Concrete Things. And since Chu Hsi regards the metaphysical and empirical worlds as identical, the Way should be regarded both as the totality and as the cause of the existence of the Concrete Things, while the existence of the Concrete Things is partial, and conditioned upon, the Way.

Beyond this point the development of Chu Hsi's metaphysics goes through two further stages. In the first of these (from the age of forty to about sixty), he inclined towards explaining the Way through the idea of "law." In the second, after the age of sixty, his metaphysics was developed to its final stage, in which the doctrine of "Principle (*li*) and Material Force (*ch'i*)" replaced the doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things" as his central organising concept.

In the history of Chinese philosophy, Chu Hsi is famous for his doctrine of "Principle and Material Force." Although he did not devise these two terms, he was the first to use them conjointly, and in doing so he summed up the theories of his predecessors. Within the concept of Principle (*li*) (first used by the two Ch'engs and Chang Tsai), Chu Hsi included Chou Tun-i's concept of "the Ultimate of Non-being and the Great Ultimate" (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*), Chang Tsai's concept of "the Great Void" (*t'ai-hsui*), and Shao Yung's concept of "the Way." The concept of Material Force (*ch'i*) is more traditional and had been widely used by Chang Tsai and the two Ch'engs; Chu Hsi used it to include Yin and Yang, and the Five Agents.

However, Chu Hsi himself did not use these two concepts in this way until his sixties. Comparing his late

metaphysics with those of the earlier two stages, we find that the concept of Principle may be identified with that of the Way, but the concept of Material Force has acquired a different import from that of Concrete Things. The concept of "Concrete Things" (*ch'i*) is mainly one of empirical things, while the concept of "Material Force" (*ch'i*) refers to the material basis of Concrete Things. It seems natural, therefore, that his concept of "Material Force" should have grown out of the earlier concept of "Concrete Things." This distinction between Material Force and Concrete Things seems rarely to have been understood by contemporary scholars, but I believe to be of crucial importance for a proper understanding of the development of Chu Hsi's metaphysics.

In this section my main concern will be Chu Hsi's early doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things." As Chu Hsi formulated this doctrine in the process of his renunciation of Ch'an, analysis of his position in this period requires an understanding of his criticism of the theories of contemporary Eclectics. We shall approach his critique by analysing the relationship between the Way and Concrete Things in the theories of a number of prominent Eclectics.

2. The Criticism of the Theory of Su Shih

At the age of thirty-seven Chu Hsi wrote his *Tsa-hsüeh pien* in which he criticised four Eclectics, whose theories were characterized by a conjunction of the Taoist or Ch'an conception of substance with the Confucian conception of function.

Chu Hsi's first target is Su Shih's *I chieh* [the *Commentary on the Book of Changes*]. The cosmology of Su Shih is a combination of the *Lao-tzu* and the *I ching* and

so is an "Evolutionary Vitalism" according to my classification. His concept of the Way derives from the *Lao-tzu*. Although it is the primodial substance and the origin of the world, it is in itself absolutely mysterious and unknowable. This is evident from his commentary on the following text of the *I ching*: "The state of one Yin and one Yang is called the Way." According to Su Shih, "one Yin and one Yang" indicates the state wherein Yin and Yang, the two formative principles of the world, have not yet interacted. Hence it is a state of non-being. But he goes on to say that even such a state of one Yin and one Yang is merely "similar to" the Way, meaning that, strictly speaking, the Way is utterly beyond description or imagination. As for the process of creation, "the myriad things" are born as the result of the interaction of Yin and Yang. Of these the first is water which comes at the brim of non-being and being, the other categories of things then follow. After things have been created, Yin and Yang, the principles of creation, become imperceptible. Therefore, Yin and Yang may be said to transcend things, as the Way itself transcends Yin and Yang.[99]

Criticising this theory, Chu Hsi argues that Yin and Yang have never existed in isolation; they have always been in constant interaction and circulation, and are immanent in the things they create. Chu Hsi says further that, as Yin and Yang, the principles of creation, are immanent in things, so the Way as the cause of the interaction and circulation of Yin and Yang is also immanent in those two principles. He even asserts that the Way is nothing other than the totality of this interaction and circulation. This critique reveals clearly the immanent nature of Chu Hsi's metaphysics. In Chu Hsi's system, Yin, Yang, and the myriad things fall under the concept of "the Concrete Things." Therefore, one and the same universe, when considered as a whole, is called "the

Way," while from the partial and individualised point of view, it is called "the Concrete Things." From the standpoint of this Immanent Vitalism Chu Hsi attacked Su Shih for separating the Way from Yin and Yang merely on the grounds that he did not know what the Way was, and accused him of merely playing with the concepts of Nothingness and Nirvana.[99]

But what Chu Hsi is most concerned about is Su Shih's ethical theory, which is analogous to his metaphysics. Su Shih regards Nature (i.e., Human Nature, *hsing*) as the direct receptacle of the Way for Man, and therefore as equally mysterious and intangible as the Way itself.[100] As a consequence, he dismisses Mencius's saying that "Nature is good" as superficial, because Nature will be lost after goodness is produced.[101] Accordingly, in his view the position of goodness in the world will be as follows: "When goodness is established in this world, the Way is lost, just as after things have been created Yin and Yang are hidden."[102] Goodness is therefore not only worldly but also exists by sacrificing the Way. Su Shih's theory is also evident from his interpretation of another text from the *I ching*:

> The man of Humanity sees it (the Way) and calls it Humanity, the man of Wisdom sees it and calls it Wisdom, and the common people act according to it daily without knowing it.[103]

Su Shih reads this text to mean that a man looking into nothingness sees no more than the reflection of what he has in his own mind. Although the Way is in itself nothingness, the man of Humanity regards it as Humanity because of his own concern with Humanity, and the man of Wisdom regards it as Widom because of his own concern with Wisdom. Su Shih then goes on to say that since the wise have a vision of the Way obscured by their intentions, and since the foolish know nothing of it, even though they act

according to it everyday, so very few can ever realise what the Way really is.[104] From Su Shih's interpretation of this text, it seems clear that he is inclined to regard "the good" in this world, that is to say, Humanity and Wisdom, as debased coinage in comparison with the Way. Consequently, his method of self-cultivation relies not on the practice of moral discipline, but on transcending morality. He expounds this idea in a complicated interpretation of yet another *I ching* text, "The way of *ch'ien* is to change and to transform, so that everything will comply with its correct Nature and Destiny (*ming*)".[105] Su Shih explains this by saying that although things flourish under the influence of "the way of *ch'ien*," nevertheless, their goal should be to return to the correctness of their Nature (i.e., their natural state) and further to that inexplicable origin of their Nature, namely, their Destiny.[106] From this we can see that for Su Shih the goal is not morality, but the state before morality appears.

Chu Hsi, in his refutation of Su Shih, argues for the value of the good in this world. While Su Shih's negation of the good is based on his Evolutionary Vitalism, Chu Hsi's affirmation is founded on his Immanent Vitalism. In Chu Hsi's view, goodness does not merely mean morality in the human world, it is itself also the life-principle of the universe. That is why he says that goodness is the process of "continuation" (*chi*) of the Way, and that because things emerging from this process of continuation acquire goodness, they have latent within each of them the correctness of their Nature and Destiny. According to Chu Hsi, this continuation is the thread linking Heaven and Man, the hidden and the manifest.[107] The Way is thus present in Nature, so acting according to Nature may be looked upon as the manifestation of the Way. It is because of this continuation that the human "goods" - Humanity and Wisdom, which arise out of human Nature, cannot be the

result of obscured vision.[108] In addition to asserting the reality of the human "goods," Chu Hsi goes on to deny Su Shih's claim that one must cultivate a "return to the mysterious Nature." Nature is immanent in every creature and is not mysterious. Since every creature is the manifestation of the Way, it contains the correctness of its Nature and Destiny within itself, and therefore preserves the great harmony. It follows therefore that there is no necessity, as Su Shih proposes, to strive for the goal of returning to Nature.[109]

3. The Criticism of the Theory of Su Ch'e

The second target of Chu Hsi's criticism is Su Ch'e's *Lao-tzu chieh* [the *Commentary on the Lao-tzu*]. Su Ch'e's thought also belonged to Evolutionary Vitalism, although he had a more positive attitude toward the World.

Su Ch'e quotes from the *I ching* two sentences which he believes can exemplify the difference between Lao Tzu and Confucius. He regards the first sentence, "What exists before Physical Form [and is therefore without it] is called the Way," as the focus of Lao Tzu's teaching; and the second, "What exists after Physical Form [and therefore has it] is called a Concrete Thing," as expressing what Confucius is devoted to. According to Su Ch'e, these two schools represent different but valuable points of view. Confucius orders the world with such Concrete Things as Humanity, Righteousness, Ritual, and Music. He shows people Concrete Things but hides the Way from them, since mediocre men may still become Gentlemen by devoting their attention to Concrete Things without being confused by the Way. But Lao Tzu aiming at the Way was eager to enlighten their minds, and shows people the

Way by despising Concrete Things. Thinking that the mere knowledge of Concrete Things makes the Way invisible, Lao Tzu expounds the Way by means of the rejection of the Confucian world of Concrete Things.[110]

From this description, we see that by "Concrete Things" Su Ch'e means human morals and social norms, whose social value he fully acknowledges. This is an advance on Su Shih's theory, which tends to negate them. However, Su Ch'e still divided the Way and Concrete Things into two levels, obviously placing greater value on the former, thinking the latter beneficial only to the worldly order. Su Ch'e did, however, recognize the ideal of combining these two levels. He said that although there is only one Way, in order to govern the world other things are required, such as rites and laws, without which there would be disorder between sovereign and subordinates, and fathers and sons. He then distinguished two kinds of wisdom. Those scholars are worthless who, though they have a thorough knowledge of the rites and laws, yet know nothing of the Way. But those who lead the life of a recluse and have attained to the highest Way are also insufficient, because though capable of teaching Men and Spirits, they would bring chaos to the world if assigned political duties. Su Ch'e concludes that only the ancient sages combined both kinds of wisdom, practising the Way within their minds while not destroying the worldly law.[111]

Chu Hsi's criticism of Su Ch'e's separation of the Way and Concrete Things is similar to his criticism of Su Shih's separation of the Way and the good, and need not be repeated here in full. But Chu Hsi makes the point that Su Ch'e's manner of combining the two levels is incorrect. He says that although Su Ch'e proposes only one Way, in the differentiation between the highest Way and the worldly law, he has in fact advocated two ways. And because there

are two ways, the Way is useless to the world, in so far as the world follows its own way, taking nothing from the Way.[112]

4. The Criticism of the Theory of Chang Chiu-ch'eng

Chu Hsi's third critical target in his *Tsa-hsüeh pien* is the *Chung-yung chieh* [the *Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean*] by Chang Chiu-ch'eng, who was the outstanding representative of Eclecticism in the Southern Sung, just as the Su brothers had been in the Northern Sung. Chang Chiu-ch'eng studied both with Yang Shih and with Tsung-kao. The former was a disciple of Ch'eng I, while the latter was a leading Ch'an master in the beginning of the Southern Sung. Chu Hsi accused Chang Chiu-ch'eng of being inclined to Buddhism and charged him with secretly smuggling Ch'an ideas into his Confucian exegesis, on the instructions of Tsung-kao.[113] But it seems to me fairer to say that Chang Chiu-ch'eng owed a primary debt to the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, to which he tried to graft the Ch'an conception of Nature. This tendency is an indication of the strength of Ch'an in the early Southern Sung. Chang Chiu-ch'eng was, according to my classification, an Idealistic Vitalist. I shall analyse his ideas concerning the relationship between the Way and Concrete Things.

The *Chung-yung* opens with the words:

> Heavenly Destiny is called Nature. To follow Nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called Education.[114]

Chang Chiu-ch'eng interprets the first sentence as merely admiring the excellence of Nature before Man's participation in it. The second sentence, he says, refers

to Man's own experience of Nature and his entry thereby into the Way of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom, before he has yet put the Way into practice. At this stage there is as yet no discrimination between fathers and sons, sovereign and subordinates, and so on. The third sentence, in his view, indicates the final step, in which Humanity functions in the relationship between fathers and sons, Righteousness between sovereign and subordinates, Propriety between hosts and guests, and Wisdom is practised by the virtuous. So it is not until the third stage that the distinctions of the Way emerge.[115]

Based on this text of the *Chung-yung*, Chang Chiu-ch'eng formulates three stages of development from Nature, through the Way, to Education. His Ch'an Idealism is evident from his description of the first stage. For in treating the term "Heavenly Destiny" as a mere epithet for the excellence of Nature, he is considering Nature as substance of the first order, and is rejecting the objectivity of Heaven. Though he is Confucianist in deriving the Way from Nature, and Education from the Way, yet even here the Ch'an influence can be detected in his devaluation of morality as mere expedient. It seems clear that for him Nature, which is amoral, is prior to the moral principle, namely the Way, and to the Essential Relationships (*jen-lun*) in the sphere of Education.

There is another passage in Chang Chiu-ch'eng's work on the *Chung-yung* which demonstrates his linking of Ch'an and Confucianism. In contrast to Su Ch'e's view that different disciplines are needed to satisfy the requirements of the Way and of the worldly law, Chang Chiu-ch'eng proposes a single discipline containing different stages. According to Chang Chiu-ch'eng, Man should initially approach his Nature through the techniques of caution and apprehension, so that he may penetrate deep into the source of Nature and thus be at

one with his Heavenly Destiny. Thereafter he can move to the stage of benefiting the world by ordering the relationships between sovereign and subordinates, fathers and sons, brothers, and husbands and wives. At this point he is able to perform the functions of the sages.[116] In addition to this, Chang Chiu-ch'eng also believed that there was a mysterious connexion between substance and function. He maintained that the successful practice of "returning to Nature" would simultaneously produce moral effects. The singleness of this mystical discipline appears in his interpretation of another *Chung-yung* text:

> Love of learning is akin to Wisdom (*chih*). To practise with vigour is akin to Humanity. To know shame is akin to Courage (*yung*). ... There are nine standards by which to administer the empire, its states, and the families.[117]

Chang Chiu-ch'eng says that in this text what is important is not the endeavour "to love learning," "to practise vigorously," or "to know shame," but the consciousness of the underlying real self performing these three kinds of activities. Through consciousness of the real self, one will naturally possess the virtues of Wisdom, Humanity, and Courage. It is the same he says with the nine standards of socio-political activity. We do not have to make special effort to act in accordance with these nine standards; the acquisition of the virtues of Wisdom, Humanity, and Courage will by itself result automatically in their successful application.[118]

Chang Chiu-ch'eng is Confucianist in advocating a single discipline of self-cultivation and in maintaining a direct connexion between substance and function, but in both these aspects of his philosophy there remains an esoteric Ch'an element. In his critique Chu Hsi points out the error of Chang Chiu-ch'eng's connexion between substance and function. According to Chu Hsi, Chang Chiu-ch'eng still separates Nature and Education when he says

that after Man arrives at the source of Nature, at his Heavenly Destiny, he benefits the world by Educating people in the Essential Relationships. Chu Hsi remarks that by this saying Chang Chiu-ch'eng implies that until the sages arrive at their Nature there can be no Education in the Essential Relationships, and also that the sages do not arrive at their Nature through the means of the Essential Relationships. Chu Hsi concludes that this is Buddhistic nonsense rather than the Confucian truth.[119]

5. The Criticism of the Theory of Lü Pen-chung

In the last part of the *Tsa-hsüeh pien* Chu Hsi refutes Lü Pen-chung's (1084-1145) theory of the Investigation of Things (*ko-wu*). The relevant text in the *Ta-hsüeh* reads: "The Extension of Knowledge consists in the Investigation of Things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended." Lü Pen-chung, a Neo-Confucianist also influenced by Tsung-kao, interprets this passage in the following manner. "Knowledge" means a degree of enlightenment equal to that of the ancient Emperors Yao and Shun. When the principle of things is investigated, this enlightenment reveals itself in a sudden intuition, to which we yield wordlessly.[120]

Chu Hsi makes the criticism that the method of Extending Knowledge and Investigating Things is for novices. It is a gradual practice in that investigating one thing merely results in one piece of knowledge. The far-reaching penetration into the Principle can result only after a gradual accumulation of knowledge. Only then can a man be confident of his moral position, and then "his Will will be Purified and his Mind Rectified" (*i-ch'eng hsin-cheng*). Given this fundamental Confucian principle of the gradual accumulation of knowledge, how is

it possible, he asks, that while studying a single "thing," we may suddenly achieve enlightenment equivalent to that of Yao and Shun? This is the nonsense of Buddhism that "a single hearing results in a thousand understandings," and that "a single jump leads directly to the substance."[131]

Since the Investigation of Things is a Confucian method of learning, in the sense that the Way is only approachable through Concrete Things, it was necessary for Chu Hsi to isolate the Ch'an element involved in Lü Pen-chung's interpretation. In the above criticism, what Chu Hsi points out is that the Investigation of Things not only starts from Concrete Things, but also investigates them from both the objective and the moral points of view. The real connexion between the Way and Concrete Things can be established only in this way. And only with such a connexion may Concrete Things, including natural phenomena and human morals, be regarded as the manifestation of the Way.

From the above description of the basic ideas of Eclecticism and Chu Hsi's criticism of them, it should be clear that Chu Hsi's metaphysics in this period was a form of Immanent Vitalism, in which substance and function are directly connected. The Way, as substance, functions through the "Concrete Things." Morality is conceived as the most important of these Concrete Things, and the Way can be achieved by no other means than through a life-long dedication to morality.

CHAPTER III
THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW METAPHYSICS

SUMMARY

This chapter presents Chu Hsi's philosophical development from the age of thirty-seven to forty-four (1166-1173), during which period he gradually abandoned the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, and eventually constructed the basic doctrines of his own metaphysics.

Chu Hsi's so-called "old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony" [*chung-ho chiu-shuo*] represents his philosophy in the years 1166 and 1167, when he attempted a subjective, introspective approach to the Way. But this approach, still based on Immanent Vitalism, resulted in the neglect of the self and of self-cultivation. Therefore, in his fortieth year, after a year's transition period, Chu Hsi propounded his "new theory" of Equilibrium and Harmony.

In this new theory, Chu Hsi claimed that Man as a conscious subject was not merely a function of the Way as the cosmic life-principle, but also a microcosm of the Way which possessed its own substance and function. Given this understanding of Man, the rationale is provided for moral self-cultivation.

In the following four years Chu Hsi engaged in two kinds of work. He applied the new substance-function (*t'i-yung*) pattern which he had developed for Man, as microcosm, to Heaven, as macrocosm. At the same time he also devised categories for the contents of substance and function, both with respect to Heaven and with respect to Man. His two most important conclusions are 1) that Heaven and Man are now seen to stand in a parallel relation, and 2) that the idea of law takes precedence over the concept of life.

A. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE WAY (1164-1166)

1. The Influence of Li T'ung's Method of Self-Cultivation

According to Hsia Hsin, the fifth category of Chu Hsi's thought developed under the influence of Li T'ung is concerned with Inner Cultivation, and the sixth category with the technique of "quiet sitting" by which this cultivation is practised. These two categories evince the subjective approach to the conformity of substance and function, and I shall discuss them together, emphasising their philosophical significance. (By "subjective approach" I mean the method in which Man, regarding himself as a function of the cosmic life-principle (i.e., the substance, the Way), experiences the latter through some introspective cultivation, and thereby achieves a conformity between substance and function.)

But before discussing these two categories, we must examine Li T'ung's inclination toward the subjective method. Although Chu Hsi followed Li T'ung's advice to read the Confucian Classics and to pay attention to daily life, his approach originally differed from that of his teacher. Chu Hsi's approach was objective, regarding the Classics and daily life as of value in themselves. For Li T'ung the important thing was that these activities could lead to cultivation of the mind, and development of character within daily life. With regard to book study Li T'ung was neither interested in speculative thinking, nor in broad reading, but was eager to follow the example of the sages as set out in the Classics. Li T'ung, as is evident from his comments on the *Lun-yü*, reported in the *Yen-p'ing ta-wen*, regarded the sayings and the actions of

Confucius as manifestations of a moral mind. The purpose of studying the *Lun-yü* is to so immerse oneself in its sayings that one will reach into the mind of the sage, Confucius, and to attain the wisdom he manifested. This approach is advantageous in coping with ever-changing problems within society, for it is not always right simply to stick to moral rules without considering the particular conditions of individual cases. The correct way of living, as is suggested by Li T'ung's comments on the *Lun-yü*, is neither to follow blindly the actions and words of the sage, nor to induce moral rules from them, but to raise one's mind to the level of the sage's. In such a state one's heart will be magnanimous and one's mind all-comprehensive, and one's practical behaviour will become the manifestation of the moral principle.[122] In his letter to Chu Hsi, Li T'ung referring to the sage's effect on human problems frequently uses such terms as *jung-shih, ping-chieh tung-shih* ("dissolution or disintegration like melting ice"), and describes the manner of the sage in such terms as *sa-luo, sa-jan* ("casual but elegant").[123] What Li T'ung tries to convey is that by achieving the mind of the sage, which is the state of perfect conformity between substance and function, one can deal with the affairs of the world correctly and fluently.[124]

Now we return to those two categories defined by Hsia Hsin, namely, Inner Cultivation, and the technique of "quiet sitting." It seems correct to say that while Li T'ung felt both the cultivation of the mind (substance) and the proper conduct of daily life (function) were important, he gave priority to the former. In addition to the cultivation of the mind through book study, Li T'ung strongly believed in the practice of meditative discipline.

Li T'ung was a disciple of Lo Ts'ung-yen (1072-1135), and since studying with him in his youth Li T'ung had devoted himself to self-cultivation through quiet sitting.

The significance of this method was described by Chu Hsi in his informal biography of Li T'ung:

> The master (Li T'ung) studied under Master Lo. Besides discussing and reciting the Confucian Classics, he (Li T'ung) spent hours in the practice of quiet sitting. His purpose was to search for Equilibrium (*chung*) by experiencing the spiritual state before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused. He practised for such a long time that he truly comprehended it (the state of Equilibrium) as the great foundation of the world. For, it is the source whence all the principles of the world flow out. Because he was able to reach the source, he could take hold of all the matters flowing from that source, however complicated and changeable they were, and dissolve them gradually, and put them into order and harmony, as in a drainage basin each stream follows its natural course. All the matters in the world, from the magnificence of Heaven and Earth, to the minuteness of the birth and growth of creatures, from the implications of the sages' scriptures, to the trifling affairs of daily life, all these matters, he could assess by the source, and grasp their proper measure. With this method he cultivated himself to a high level. His mind was purified and illuminated. He comprehended whatever he encountered, and responded to each matter with propriety.[125]

Li T'ung's wisdom as described here is almost a copy, or better, a realization, of the following principles from the *Chung-yung*:

> The state before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused is called Equilibrium (*chung*). When these Feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called Harmony (*ho*). Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and Harmony its universal path. When Equilibrium and Harmony are realised to the highest degree, Heaven and Earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.[126]

Both passages deal with the conformity of substance and function. In the universe this conformity is natural,

for the Way (which is the substance) manifests itself without difficulty in the creatures of the universe (which are the function). Consequently no effort is needed. But in the human world, in order to guarantee this conformity, it is necessary either to cultivate the mind which is the realm of substance, so as to experience the original state of mind, or to exercise in the realm of function, so as to arrange properly the daily affairs. Li T'ung chose the former kind of practice through quiet sitting, in the hope of experiencing the original state of the mind. By such an experience the function in daily life will automatically be accomplished. It is needless to point out that such conception springs from Neo-Confucian Immanent Vitalism, in which the Way as the cosmic life-principle is already present in the mind of the individual.

The subjective approach to the conformity of substance and function on Li T'ung's part had little influence on Chu Hsi until after the death of the former. Li T'ung died in the winter of the year when Chu Hsi was thirty-four. The informal biography quoted above would have been written by Chu Hsi shortly thereafter. In my opinion the writing of this biography was the occasion for an assessment by Chu Hsi of the philosophy of his mentor, through which he realised the importance of the subjective approach. But whatever the effect on him of this assessment, there is evidence that he was beginning to become dissatisfied with objectively oriented approach which he had previously followed. This anxiety was expressed in a letter, written when he was thirty-seven, in which he recollected Li T'ung's advice that "if one experiences the original state of the mind by oneself, one can easily manage things and respond to affairs in proper measure." He then went on to regret that at that time he had rather been greedy for theoretical discussion, and fond of interpreting the Classics.[137] This letter was written during the period when Chu Hsi had adopted

Immanent Vitalism, and was engaged in his critique of Eclecticism, and shows that he already recognized the need to find a subjective method of experiencing the Way, over and above his theoretical approach to the conformity of the Way and Concrete Things.

But Chu Hsi differed from Li T'ung's in his understanding of the subjective experience of the Way. Although Chu Hsi felt the importance of experiencing the "state of Mind before Feelings emerged," he felt that there was no practical way of separating the Mind from Feelings, just as in his metaphysics of that period, there was no theoretical means to separate the Way from Concrete Things. Therefore Chu Hsi found difficulty in understanding what Li T'ung really meant by "seeking for the Unaroused Equilibrium." Consequently, he turned to the philosophy of the Hunan School, in order to solve the problem of the subjective approach to the Way, and the theoretical problem of interpreting the concept of Unaroused Equilibrium.

2. The Reaction to the Method of Chang Chiu-ch'eng

From his thirty-seventh year Chu Hsi endeavoured to figure out the meaning of the "Unaroused Equilibrium" (*wei-fa chih chung*) and the "Aroused Harmony" (*i-fa chih ho*), a pair of terms in the *Chung-yung*, because their correct interpretation would result in the correct subjective approach to the Way. But there seems to be another motivation underlying this endeavour: that is, through it Chu Hsi intended to refute the subjective method proposed by Chang Chiu-ch'eng.

We have seen that Chang Chiu-ch'eng's *Chung-yung chieh* is based on a combination of Ch'an substance and Confucianist function. His method of approaching

Equilibrium and Harmony is therefore based on the supposition that Mind is the ultimate substance.

Chang Chiu-ch'eng consequently regards the "caution and apprehension" (*chieh-sheng k'ung-chü*) of mind as a necessary effort to achieve the Way. In interpreting the text: "Before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called Equilibrium," he says:

> Before these Feelings are aroused, be cautious and apprehensive so that there is not a bit of selfish desire,

to which Chu Hsi adds the criticism:

> Before they are aroused, there is only the Heavenly Principle (*t'ien-li*) complete and intact. If there is caution and apprehension, then Feelings have already been aroused.[128]

Elsewhere Chang Chiu-ch'eng says:

> We cultivate pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy by means of caution and apprehension, making them Equilibrial and Harmonious, so that Heaven and Earth will be properly placed and all things will be cultivated.

Chu Hsi comments:

> Before pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, there is natural Equlibrium. When these Feelings are aroused and attain due measure and degree, there is natural Harmony. They are not of our making. And it is according to Principle (*li*) that Heaven and Earth attain their proper order and all things flourish. His interpretation is not right.[129]

And as to Chang's saying that "The superior man with caution and apprehension slowly brews the 'Way of the Mean,'" Chu Hsi criticised that:

> The Way of the Mean is a Principle of Nature; it does not result from fermentation, like wine.[130]

The reason that Chang Chiu-ch'eng adopts mental activities of caution and apprehension as his method is that he has an idealist view of ultimate substance. He believed that the application of this method could give full scope to substance and function, at all levels from the appropriate adjustment of the Feelings, to self-examination before the rise of Feelings, even to the proper ordering of Heaven and Earth. Chu Hsi's criticism is directed entirely against the idealistic basis of this position, in so far as he says that Chang Chiu-ch'eng is making an *artificial* Equilibrium and Harmony, and has reversed the true direction of the *Chung-yung*. For Chu Hsi, as an Immanent Vitalist, the universe has objective reality, independent of our moral effort. Therefore the subjective approach to the Way should be an effort to reflect its objectivity, without, as is implied in Chang Chiu-ch'eng's method, distorting it by subjective intention. To challenge Chang Chiu-ch'eng's subjective approach, Chu Hsi had to discover the correct method to experience the Way, which he believed to be natural and objective. He presents this method through his interpretation of the meaning of "Equilibrium" and "Harmony."

B. THE OLD THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM AND HARMONY (1166-1167)

1. Hu Hung's Theory of Nature and Mind

Corresponding to his subjective approach to the Way, Chu Hsi formulated a theory of Mind, which took shape during the period from the autumn of his thirty-seventh year to the summer of his thirty-eighth,[130] and which he was to abandon when he was forty. He himself called it "the old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony" [*Chung-ho chiu-shuo*].

Through pondering Li T'ung's teaching Chu Hsi discovered the importance of the subjective approach, but he made little use of Li T'ung's methods whether ofInner-cultivation or of "quiet sitting." This may have been because he thought that since the Way is the cosmic life-principle itself and is embodied in Concrete Things, it would not be appropriate to leave Concrete Things and to retreat to quiet sitting. But the method of Chang Chiu-ch'eng was, for him, still worse, for it proposed an artificial approach through caution and apprehension, and so tampered with the natural progression of the Way. It would appear that the only alternative open to Chu Hsi whould be a theory in which, the Mind, without any intention, can both reflect the natural progression of the universe, and be at one with the natural feelings arising from its own nature. It was precisely such a theory propounded by Hu Hung which came to have an important influence on Chu Hsi at this period of his life.

This influence was first felt through Chang Shih (1133-1180), whom Chu Hsi first met in the autumn of 1164, the year after the death of Li T'ung, at a critical moment in his transition to the subjective approach. Chang Shih,

who had been a disciple of Hu Hung, discussed with Chu Hsi his understanding of philosophy, won Chu Hsi's admiration and became a close and lifelong friend.[132] In the years to follow Chu Hsi kept in correspondence with Chang Shih and studied the works of Hu Hung, in the hope that the philosophy of Hu Hung would help him to understand the "original state of the Mind," and consequently the teaching of Li T'ung.[133] "The old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony" which I shall discuss below grew out of this exercise and is preserved in a group of letters to Chang Shih written between the autumn of 1166 and the summer of 1167. In order to grasp the gist of this theory it is helpful to look first at the philosophy of Hu Hung.

According to Hu Hung, the "subject" consists of Nature and Mind, enabling it to embrace, reflect, and dominate the objective world. He offers definitions of these two concepts, Nature and Mind. Nature is the principle of existence:

> That which exists and cannot not exist, is what is meant by Nature![134]

So he sees the Nature of the subject as simultaneously embracing the whole objective world. Therefore he says:

> All things are in Nature. The sage fully exerts his Nature, so that he neglects nothing.[135]

Mind is the subjective faculty, but expresses itself in the objective world:

> That which is living and which dominates things, is what is meant by Mind![136]

Elsewhere Hu Hung states that the Mind possesses a mirror-like reflectiveness like water, so his use of "dominate" must mean that in the act of reflecting the Mind masters external things according to their own nature.[137]

But what of the moral life of the subject? Morality does not consist in adhering to one's own subjectivity, but, because of the reflectiveness of Mind, it must rather consist in the knowledge and practice of the *objective* Way. He makes a distinction between things and the Way: things (including Man) are those which have finite form, and which will come to an end, but the Way, having no finite form, is that which creates and is endless.[138] Obviously he is suggesting that the Way, as transcendent life-principle in which all created things find their proper place, should be the objective standard which the Mind of Man reflects in his moral practice. He also defines two virtues of Mind - Humanity (*jen*) and Wisdom (*chih*). When the Mind, in quietitude, learns the *principle* of all things, and is filled with joy, it is called "Humanity"; when in activity the Mind responds to *things* as it should, this is called "Wisdom."[139] The latter virtue is difficult to attain, because it lies in knowing the contexts of things in the objective world: an illumination of the relationship of particulars to the whole. The Buddhists miss this point, so although they pacify their minds, their actions are often inappropriate. But Confucianists can both settle their minds and manage affairs properly, so that they have the capacity to participate in the creation of Heaven and Earth.[140] Times and situations are everchanging, but the man of Humanity (embued also with Wisdom), can both be in accord with the Way and successfully respond to the world.[141]

2. The Concepts of Nature and of Mind in the Old Theory

Now we turn to Chu Hsi's "old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony." Literally, this theory was intended to interpret a pair of concepts, the "Unaroused Equilibrium" (*wei-fa*

chih chung, literally, not-yet-aroused Equilibrium) and the "Aroused Harmony" (*i-fa chih ho*), whose *locus classicus* is the passage in the *Chung-yung* quoted earlier, and which I repeat here:

> The state before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused is called Equilibrium. When these Feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called Harmony.

According to Li T'ung, the attainment of the Unaroused Equilibrium is crucial to the correct understanding of the sayings of the sages, and to right behaviour on our part, therefore we should "seek for" it.[143] But for Chu Hsi this state is impossible to "seek," because in his view at that time the Mind was merely a constant flow of consciousness, just as in the objective world there was only a succession of Concrete Things. In this critical period through consulting the philosophy of Hu Hung and Chang Shih, Chu Hsi developed his "old theory of Equililbrium and Harmony." The main point of this theory is that there is a living force, of which the substance (the living force itself) is the Unaroused Equilibrium, and of which the function (the created concrete things) is the Aroused Harmony. The significance for Chu Hsi of this conception of the "living force" was that it provided him with a means of unifying substance and function, thereby allowing access to the Equilibrium through the Harmony. The formation of his "old theory" was the result of a combination of theorethical exploration and practical engagement. He appealed to his own experience of the inner life to serve as an exemplification of the living force, and of the unity of substance and function. He believed that if an enlightened understanding of such a unity was reached, then, the state of the Unaroused Equilibrium would be attained, to the great benefit of the moral life.

The "old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony" is set out in four letters written to Chang Shih.[143] The first two were written in the autumn of 1166 when Chu Hsi was thirty-seven. In the first letter, Chu Hsi says that from the moment of our birth to the moment of our death, we are busy responding, by some faculty of knowledge, to the affairs which incessantly throw themselves upon us. Therefore throughout our lives, our consciousness is in constant flux. Where can we find the Unaroused Equilibrium which is essential to our moral life? The answer lies in the fact that since we feel, perceive, and are aroused by, things without effort; there must be in us a "wholeness" (*hun-jan ch'üan-t'i*) which ceaselessly responds to the clamour of affairs. That "wholeness" is "the natural unfolding of Heavenly Destiny" (*t'ien-ming liu-hsing*) and of "the perennial living force" (*sheng-sheng pu-i chih chi*). The still substance of that "wholeness" is always still, even though the "wholeness" consists of a perpetual flux of emerging and submerging objects of consciousness. This substance is the Unaroused Equilibrium. This "wholeness" manifests itself in its interaction with the endless round of affairs, but it cannot be stopped by them. Therefore no selfish desire *attaching to* some particular affair can completely block or extinguish it. Beneath such selfish desires the "wholeness" continues to exists and to put forth new sprouts of moral consciousness. Moral effort consists in finding and cultivating these sprouts of moral consciousness, through which the original "wholeness" may be recovered.[144]

The second letter immediately followed the first. In it Chu Hsi attempted to define Mind and Nature in terms of these new concepts. The outline of the letter is as follows. The whole world is nothing but a single unified living force, which is ceaselessly issuing forth and manifesting itself in Concrete Things. In this living force, Mind (*hsin*) is the Aroused (manifestation,

function), and Nature (*hsing*) is the Unaroused (living force in itself, substance). That is why Mind and Nature contain everything. Mind and Nature do not refer to particular things restricted to certain times and places, but to the complete and endless "wholeness" which is revealed in daily life, and sweeps along like the flow of a river and the evolution of heaven. Therefore there is not the least gap between substance and function, subtleness and crudeness, quietude and activity, and root and tips.[145]

In the autumn of his thirty-seventh year, perhaps immediately after the second letter, Chu Hsi composed two poems to express his understanding of Nature and Mind, and of how they related to daily life.[146] The first is concerned with a pond, and may be paraphrased as follows. A small pond is as open as a mirror, in which one can see reflected the brightness of heaven, and the shadows of wandering clouds. Why is the pond so clear? Because it contains not dead water but a living spring. The second poem is a description of a river. It says that last night the spring flood inundated the river, and the great stranded ships now float and drift light as feathers. Those ships had been difficult to move even by dragging and pushing, but now they glide freely out in mid-river. In these two poems the spring and the flood are the metaphors of the living force, of which the substance is Nature, and the function (reflecting and responding to external things) is Mind. The other images are the metaphors of daily affairs. These two poems evoke Chu Hsi's ideal of the living force. The first poem focuses on the capacity of Mind to reflect the objective world, the second on its capacity to carry out daily affairs effortlessly. Both poems make it clear that this capacity is rooted in the living force.

In the third letter Chu Hsi attempted to give an even greater role to the living force. This opinion was

reinforced by Chang Shih's reply to Chu Hsi's first letter. Chang Shih pointed out that, in his first letter, Chu Hsi had failed to unify substance and function completely. I suggest that Chang Shih meant that Chu Hsi's concept of "wholeness" was inadquate for this purpose, because his usuage of the term "wholeness" implied a reference to *existing entities*, for which substance and function are two aspects. My interpretation is based on the fact that, in the third letter, Chu Hsi avoids the term "wholeness," rather he offers an example of a small period of the living force, in which substance and function are unifiable. In this letter he says:

> In a flash of thought there is contained substance and function. The Aroused passes by and the Not-*yet*-aroused is coming forward. There is no interval separating them. ... The word "not-*yet*" expresses life. There is no stopping, even in a breath. Because there is the ceaselessly coming forward, there is the Not-*yet*-aroused.[147]

In these sentences Nature or substance is regarded as the living force, and function as that which it creates. The unity of substance and function consists here in all thoughts of Mind being the created crystallizations of the living force.

The most characteristic feature of the above quotation is the emphasis on the term "yet." The Chinese word *wei* literally means "not-yet," but in the earlier letters Chu Hsi had not exploited the potential of this "yet." In this letter, Chu Hsi's notice of this word reflects the fact that he now defines "substance" directly and emphatically as the living force, without the intervention of the concept of "wholeness." This substance is regarded not only as existing in the created, but also as the creating force itself. It is the Not-*yet*-aroused which must unceasingly issue forth.

At the age of forty-seven, when Chu Hsi had already abandoned his "old theory" for some time, he read the following passage in the *Lieh-tzu*:

> In the stream of life (*sheng*), the created things (*suo-sheng-che*, literally, that which is born) are dead, but the creating force (*sheng-sheng-che*, literally, that which gives birth to the living) will never come to an end. In the concrete world (*hsing*, literally, forms), the particular things (*suo-hsing-che*, literally, the formed) are materialised, but the particularizing principle (*hsing-hsing-che*, literally, that which forms the forms) never has existence.

To this passage he adds the note that this creating force, or particularizing principle, corresponds with his earlier understanding of the Not-*yet*-aroused.[148] In his note, the Not-yet-aroused is treated exclusively as the creating force, which is yet to come, and will bring out all new things. This incidentally shows that the "old theory" had been fully developed in the third letter.

But when the "old theory" had reached its full development, its deficiency was also revealed. In the fourth letter, although his ideas remained generally unaltered, he managed to make up the deficiency in a way which would, a year and a half later, lead him to forsake the old theory.

The fourth letter was probably written in the summer of 1167 when he was thirty-eight, just before he was leaving for T'anchou (in Hunan province) to visit Chang Shih.[149] In it he pointed out the difficulty in the "old theory": the problem did not consist in theory itself, but in practice. The theory left no room for self-cultivation. In adopting this theory, he says, his daily life took on the form of a scene in a deluge or tidal wave gushing forth from the great living source. In daily life he felt himself driven along by the great force, caught up in the furious waves, without possibility of respite. In his

response to daily affairs, he found himself becoming more brutal and crude, but totally lacking in magnanimity and graciousness. Chu Hsi suggests that this fault was a result of his failure to grasp the importance of the phrase "actualise Equilibrium and Harmony" (*chih-chung-ho*) in the *Chung-yung*. "Actualise" refers to an act of self-cultivation on the part of the self as *subject*. By emphasising the importance of this cultivation, Chu Hsi gradually became aware that the individual subject should occupy an independent place in the cosmic living force. The former view of Mind as a group of thoughts in the flux of the living force came to appear inadquate. Chu Hsi then concludes that there should be a sanctuary (that is, the Mind itself) for each person in the constant flux of the great force. It is where the subject rests itself, acknowledges Heavenly Destiny, and achieves a mastery over consciousness. It is the essential point where the great foundation is established and the starting point of the great journey. Only here may we find the unity of substance and function, of the hidden and the manifest.[150]

The significance of the fourth letter consists in the discovery of the *subject*. With it the "old theory" is completed, but at the same time it is about to be superceded. While Chu Hsi was under the tutelage of Li T'ung, he began to pay attention to the Confucian Classics and to daily affairs, and looked on them as part of the sphere of moral practice. He began to develop the "old theory," which was a subjective approach to the metaphysical foundation of moral practice, after the death of Li T'ung. In his "old theory" Chu Hsi was deeply influenced by Hu Hung and Chang Shih, whose view regarded Mind as an agent reflecting the Way, or more concertely, as knowing and responding to the objective context of the world. Though accepting their philosophy, Chu Hsi differed slightly from them in that he emphasised the "living force" in which he searched for the foundation of moral

practice. Chu Hsi tried to immersing himself in the Way, that is, the living force. The result, however, turned out in effect to be a cancellation of one's *subjectivity*, for one would feel oneself carried away by the great flood of the living force. Therefore, one may say that the subjective approach to the Way resulted in the sacrifice of the subject. But at this moment Chu Hsi's original motive of searching for a foundation for moral practice asserted itself again. The result was that at the culmination of the "old theory," in the third letter, Chu Hsi still was not completely satisfied. The moral ideal of magnanimity and graciousness, found in the Confucian sages, could not be achieved through submerging oneself in the movement of the living force. Therefore, in the fourth letter, Chu Hsi affirmed the *subjective* endeavour, and proposed the importance of Mind. In the third letter, the unity of substance and function was exemplified in a "flash of thought," but in the fourth letter it was rather to be found in the Mind as such. This insistence on the role of the Mind reflected Chu Hsi's awareness of the importance of Man as *subject*. Chu Hsi had discovered that the commitment to moral practice required that Man should regard his own *subjectivity* as a unity of substance and function, rather than merely as a reflection of the cosmic living force.

C. SELF-CULTIVATION BY MEANS OF EXAMINING THE SUBSTANCE (1168)

In August of 1167, Chu Hsi, at the age of thirty-eight, visited Chang Shih at T'anchou. He stayed for three months, and returned home at the end of that year, the journeys there and back taking one month each.[151]

One of the reasons for this visit was to discuss the difficulty with regard to moral cultivation which he encountered in the philosophy of Hu Hung and Chang Shih. As a result of this meeting they reached a compromise. Chang Shih, while confirming that substance is the living force itself, pointed out its implied moral character, and Chu Hsi emphasised the necessity of subjective effort. Based on their common understanding, they proposed a method called self-cultivation by Examination (*ch'a-shih*) of Substance. Chu Hsi held to this new theory and practice for about a year until the spring of 1169, when he developed a "new theory" of Mind. This position, work out with Chang Shih, is therefore significant as a transional link between his old and new theories.

In the "old theory," Nature, the substance, was regarded as the living force itself. But there was always the problem of its moral character. Chu Hsi was more inclined to regard Nature as moral, while Hu Hung tended to view it as supra-moral. In his first letter setting out the "old theory," Chu Hsi described the function of the living force in contrast to the selfish attachment to particulars as "the burgeoning of conscience." And in the second letter, when he described the living force itself as Nature, he revealed his suspicion of the opinion of Hu Hung and Chang Shih that Nature cannot be defined either as good or as evil.[152]

The main achievement of his meeting with Chang Shih was in the clarification of the moral implication of the substance. Substance in itself should be regarded as supra-moral. In the poem he composed for Chang Shih on his departure, Chu Hsi describes the Great Ultimate (substance) as an invisible mystery, revealing itself only in the response to daily affairs. The Great Ultimate is therefore the starting point for the multifarious world, and the common fountain of virtue for the thousand sages. In its function it reaches the farthest places, yet as source it is the purest and therefore the simplest.[153] In this description, the substance is the great living force which is supra-moral. But this great living force is also the source of morality from the point of view of Man. This conception can be found in another piece of literature. At about that time Chang Shih wrote a piece, called *Gen-chai ming* ["the Gen-chai Inscription"], which was praised by Chu Hsi and adopted by him as an aid to self-cultivation.[154] It begins with the following words: "The Mind of Heaven is pure, and contains the fullness of morality." The concept "the Mind of Heaven" must not be identified with the concept of God, for the Neo-Confucianists were never theists. It refers, rather, to the constant and creative living force, which is regarded and received, by its creatures, as a benevolent force. In this sense, though the living force remains supra-moral in itself, it appears as "containing the fullness of morality" from the point of view of creatures. The method of self-cultivation consists in recognizing and developing the moral revelation of this substance.

The following is an outline of the ideas in Chang Shih's Inscription. The Mind of Heaven is the highest good and the fountain of the multifarious world. Since it already exists within myself, I should not seek for it externally. Rather, in the course of responding to daily affairs I should simply Examine the four moral Feelings

through which it is revealed.[155] I should not only examine those Feelings, but also encourage their growth in the context of my daily life. If such practical application is diligently performed, my Mind, which is the same as the Mind of Heaven will be illuminated. This process is not one of acquisition of external things, but a natural growth like that which takes place in the spring. Since knowledge of these moral Feelings is so important, all moral cultivation must start from it. I must be alert at every moment, in order to maintain this moral knowledge. With such cultivation, the affairs of my daily life, though manifold and diverse, will all follow their due order. This order is none other than the reality of my Nature.[156]

Chu Hsi recommended the method suggested in the "Gen-chai Inscription" to his friends. In other letters he wrote in this period we also find descriptions of the method of Examining Substance:

> Only when one devotes oneself to moral cultivation, can one find in the course of walking, staying, sitting and lying, "the minute revelation of substance;" this is what one should hold fast to and preserve to the utmost. Only then may one really possess the substance.[157]
>
> In daily life, inspect the ceaseless unfolding of the substance: this is how to start moral cultivation.[158]

This method of Examining Substance is coherent with Immanent Vitalism, and also does justice to Chu Hsi's emphasis upon moral cultivation by the subject. Although the method advocates adhering to the natural expression of the living force, to follow it as a constant discipline implies that Man occupies a distinctive moral position in the universe. This must have played some part in influencing Chu Hsi to accept Chang Shih's basic ideas of Examining Substance. It should, however, be noted that

where Chang Shih stresses the achievement of an "enlightened" understanding of the substance, for Chu Hsi the importance lies in the moral effort which this method demands. For example, in a letter to Chang Shih believed to be of this period, Chu Hsi said:

> Feelings are rooted in Nature and are controlled by Mind. While Mind is in control, the activity of the Feelings follows in due course, and there will be nothing like selfish desires. Only those Feelings which operate on their own without the supervision of Mind easily cross over into selfish desires.[159]

In this paragraph Chu Hsi points out the danger of the natural expression of Feelings without the control of Mind.

In another letter to Chang Shih, in contrast to the opinion of the latter that the selfish Human Mind (*jen-hsin*) may itself become the Moral Mind (*tao-hsin*) when it is enlightened, Chu Hsi suggests that there must be an effort "always to be doing something" to reach the Moral Mind. This effort refers to the effort of the Mind to cultivate itself and to develop its knowledge of substance. He says that since effort is involved, the process is not natural and and takes place at the level of the Human Mind, but that it is nevertheless the only way to approach the Moral Mind.[160] It may therefore be concluded that for Chu Hsi, the method of Examining Substance involves subjective endeavour rather than a mere enlightened understanding of substance.

Chu Hsi's emphasis on moral effort was to be developed even further under the concept of Attentiveness (*ching*), which eventually was to replace the idea of Examining Substance in the method of moral discipline. In a letter to another friend written at about this time, he says that the importance of Examining Substance lies in

its ability to improve the quality of the practice of Attentiveness.[161]

From the above, it may be concluded that the method of Examining Substance is a combination of the supra-moral living force and the subjective moral effort, and that Chu Hsi was primarily influenced by the latter in his adoption of this method. In the following sections we shall see that he continued to affirm the importance of the *subject*, and indeed the discipline of Attentiveness, until he realised that some modification of Immanent Vitalism, his metaphysical foundation of moral cultivation, was necessary.

D. THE NEW THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM AND HARMONY (1169)

1. A New Explanation of the Aroused and the Unaroused

In the Spring of 1169, when Chu Hsi was forty, he revised his explanation of the Unaroused Equilibrium and the Aroused Harmony of the *Chung-yung*. According to his own account, his friends had difficulty in understanding the "old theory." In the Spring of that year, while he was explaining it to his friend Ts'ai Chi-t'ung, he was overcome by the doubt that his entire understanding might be wrong. He felt that this distinction between the Aroused and the Unaroused which was an authoritative statement from the Classic ought not, if properly understood, to be so difficult and obscure. He confessed that he then reread the relevant interpretations made by Ch'eng I, which helped him to resolve his doubts, and to understand the reality of Man and the secrets of the Sages.[162]

This new understanding was incorporated in his essay "*I-fa wei-fa shuo*" ["An Explanation on the Aroused and the Unaroused"], which he wrote the same year. In it Chu Hsi says:

> As to the meaning of the Unaroused and the Aroused in the *Chung-yung*, I used to be content with the explanation that Mind is the Aroused and Nature is the Unaroused, for I had recognized the "flowing substance of Mind" (i.e., Nature), and in addition Master Ch'eng had said that Mind signifies the Aroused. But recently I have found inconsistencies in many of Master Ch'eng's works. After careful consideration, I realised that in my earlier explanation, although the reality of Mind and Nature was apprehended correctly, the denomination of the Unaroused and the Aroused was inappropriate, and that no provision was made for the fundamental techniques of self-cultivation in

> daily life. This lack, I realised, was not merely a matter of textual exegesis....
> The state of unaroused pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, refers to the time before there is any sign of thought and deliberation, and also before the encounter with external things. At that time, it is the state of absolute quiet and inactivity in the constant flux of the substance of the Mind. In it the Nature which is endowed by Heaven is completely manifest. Because this state is neither excessive nor insufficient, neither unbalanced nor one-sided, it is called Equilibrium. Nevertheless, because this Equilibrium is seen in the flux of the substance of the *Mind*, we cannot simply call it Nature.[163]

To summarise, in the "old theory," Chu Hsi ascribes the Unaroused Equilibrium to Nature (regarded as substance), and the Aroused Harmony to Mind (regarded as function), but in the "new theory" he associates Equilibrium and Harmony with the tranquil and active states of Mind respectively.

In the development of both the old and the new theories, Chu Hsi claims to have found support in the sayings of Ch'eng I. In my opinion this is because Ch'eng I himself was ambivalent with regard to the concept of Mind. Chu Hsi's "old theory" received some support from some of Ch'eng I's sayings in which Nature and Mind are identified. For instance, Ch'eng I says:

> Mencius said, "He who exerts his Mind to the utmost knows his Nature." Mind is Nature. That which is in Heaven is called Destiny. That which is in Man is called Nature. And in the sense of being the master it is called Mind. In reality they are [different names of] one Way.[164]
>
> The origin of Nature is called Destiny. The naturalness of Nature is called Heaven. The concrete aspect of Nature is called Mind. And the active aspect of Nature is called Feelings. All of them are one.[165]

Therefore for him Mind is the aspect of Nature from the concrete point of view, and is thus related to the latter

as the physical to the metaphysical. Chu Hsi's conclusion in his "old theory" that Mind and Nature should be designated the Aroused and the Unaroused respectively, could easily have been directly influenced by these views. On the other hand, in the process of establishing his "new theory," Chu Hsi also could find support from some other sayings of Ch'eng I, to the effect that the Mind has an Unaroused state in the temporal sense. For instance, Ch'eng I says:

> Someone said: Before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, would you call it active or quiet? He said: You could call it quiet, but you must allow that there is something in the quietness.[166]

> The Mind is originally good. As it gets aroused and expresses itself in thoughts and ideas, there is good and evil. When the Mind has been aroused, it should be called Feelings, and can no longer be called Mind.[167]

It should be noted that in the first saying, Ch'eng I is reluctant to admit that there is a temporal quietness, and in the second saying, the originally good Mind (which is unaroused) may only have metaphorical meaning. However, it makes sense of these sayings to maintain that there is a state of the Mind before Feelings are aroused. It was from such an interpretation that Chu Hsi developed his new theory. But why did Chu Hsi choose to bring out this view which at best is only implicit in Ch'eng I's thought? In my opinion the reason lies in the fact that Chu Hsi was more concerned than Ch'eng I with the problems of Mind, the subject, and moral practice.

2. Moral Practice Based on the New Theory

Perhaps the most important reason for this theoretical revision was the need to find a satisfactory method of moral cultivation. The formulation of Chu Hsi's whole philosophy, like that of all other Neo-Confucianists, was based on his understanding of the Confucian Classics. But his interpretation of the Classics in turn depended on the moral image he had of the Confucian sages. Chu Hsi was not satisfied with his "old theory," because it could not sustain a moral regime through which one might develop the traits of magnanimity and graciousness. He therefore combined it with the method of Examining Substance, thinking that the latter put more weight on subjective moral practice. But before long Chu Hsi found that that method was effective only in encountering external affairs (when the "sprouts" of substance first emerge). One is then led to be concerned merely about external activity, and in consequence Inner Cultivation (*han-yang*) will be lacking, and one will lose the qualities of depth and purity. When expressing oneself in conversation and in affairs, one will always be hurried and superficial, without "the air of the ancient sages."[168] It may therefore be concluded that Chu Hsi's image of the sages was the motive force towards the formulation of a new theory, which might provide the foundation for an adequate method of moral cultivation.

In the "new theory," since the Unaroused is regarded as the tranquil state of Mind, the Aroused has to be the active state of Mind. The Mind is therefore regarded as in alternating between the state of tranquility and activity, depending on whether it is left to itself or is responding to external affairs. The most important consequence of this theory is that it enhances the necessity for Inner Cultivation. Since the Unaroused is the state of Mind before interacting with external affairs, there should be a moral discipline corresponding to this state. The relevant practice then is Inner Cultivation, aiming at the

state of Equilibrium. The deficiency of the Substance-Examining method, which starts from the interaction with the external world and encourages haste and superficiality, may therefore be avoided.

But the discipline which the "new theory" suggests is more than a set of practices suitable for the tranquil period of Mind. It aims rather at establishing a completely new method called Attentiveness (*ching*), which is applicable to both states of Mind, and is intended to replace the method of Examination of Substance. Chu Hsi says in the "*Yi-fa wei-fa shuo*":

> The Unaroused Equilibrium is the natural state of substance, and does not need to be sought. In that state the only effort required is Attentiveness which will preserve (or contain, *ts'un*) that atmosphere. If this is done, the Aroused starting from there will certainly attain due measure and degree. Therefore, this is the essential task in everyday life. As to [Master Ch'eng's] saying, "Examine the Aroused," he meant by that to examine the activity of the sprouts of substance and to extend them. For if they don't attain due measure and degree, the original Nature cannot remain, and the Way of Mind will almost be extinguished. Therefore Master Ch'eng always described that effort as "Attentiveness without negligence."[69]

Thus Attentiveness becomes the only method. If, through Attentiveness, Equilibrium is preserved, the Aroused will achieved Harmony naturally. Although the discipline of Examination is not abolished, it is reinterpreted as constant Attentiveness during the period of the Aroused.

3. A New View of Nature and Mind

The "new theory" in the beginning was intended only as a redefinition of the Unaroused and the Aroused in order to

provide the framework for a more concrete and comprehensive method of moral cultivation. But while trying to clarify his understanding Chu Hsi gradually changed his conception of the Mind.

From this period we have three documents written by Chu Hsi in close succession, which supply important evidence for these changes in his thought. These documents in the order in which they were written are 1) "*I-fa wei-fa shuo*," 2) "*Yü Hunan chu-kung lun chung-ho ti-i shu*" ["The First Letter to the Hunan Gentlemen on Equilibrium and Harmony"], 3) "*Ta Chang Ch'in-fu*" ["Reply to Chang Ch'in-fu"]. By examining the slight differences existing between these three documents, we find that Chu Hsi attempted to show the independence of "Man as *subject*" from the constant flux of the cosmic living force. As a result, in his "new theory," Man as *subject* is no longer regarded merely as reflection of the living force alone, but as containing substance and function in his own right. The construction of a metaphysical basis for morality, which began with the philosophy of Chou Tun-i, reached its conclusion only with this proposal.

Chu Hsi's descriptions of the state of the Unaroused differ slightly between these three documents. The following passages are taken in order from each of the documents respectively.

> (1) At this time, it (the Unaroused) is a state of absolute quiet and inactivity in the constant flux of the substance of the Mind. In it the Nature which is endowed by Heaven is completely manifest.[170]
>
> (2) At this time, it (the Unaroused) is the absolutely quiet and inactive substance of the Mind. In it the Nature which is endowed by Heaven is completely manifest as substance.[171]
>
> (3) In the tranquility of the Mind, things have not entered and thinking has not begun, yet in it is present the whole of undivided Nature, containing the totality of moral principles.[172]

In the first document, the concepts of Nature and of Mind remain the same as in the "old theory." Therefore in it the substance of Mind is the underlying "constant flux", and Mind is the totality of function. The difference merely consists in the ascription of the Unaroused Equilibrium and the Aroused Harmony to the two states of Mind. However, in the second document, Chu Hsi no longer speaks of the substance of Mind as "constant flux", on the contrary, he described it as "absolutely quiet and inactive." This change, in my opinion, has no ontological significance. Chu Hsi never denied that the universe is constituted by a creative living force and is in constant flux. The point is that, in the first document, the "substance" of Mind is the same as that of the universe, but in the second, it is indifferent to the "substance" of the universe. The substance and function of Mind have become independent of the universal flux and are related to Man alone. There is still a connexion between Man and the universe. But the connecting point is the "Nature which is endowed by Heaven;" it is no longer the substance of Mind. The advantage of this independence in terms of moral cultivation is that the Mind now wins a position of self-determination. It is no longer subordinate to the universe, no longer a stream of thoughts reflecting the constant cosmic flux. The sentence "in it the Nature which is endowed by Heaven is completely manifest as substance" indicates that the "substance of Mind" and Nature are no longer the same thing, as they were in the "old theory." Although Nature is the endowment of Heaven, the Mind is self-determining, and so has the capacity to possess Nature. The Mind in tranquility expresses its own substance, which naturally possesses the Heavenly Nature, and can Contain (or preserve, *ts'un*) it with the practice of Attentiveness. In other words, in the sphere of Man, Mind can play a positive role in nourishing its own

metaphysical ground. Provided with this ground, Man can claimed himself as an independent subject in the universe. This is the contribution of the "new theory" to metaphysics.

Now we turn to the third document. What is characteristic of Chu Hsi's formulation there is the idea that in the tranquility of the Mind "the totality of moral principles" is embodied within "undivided Nature." I think the development of this idea is as follows. Because of the independence of the *subject*, the tranquility or activity of the Mind is no longer interfered with by the universal flux, but rather depends on whether the Mind encounters external things or not. While it responds to the external world, it must behave in accordance with moral principles in order to achieve Aroused Harmony. Since Chu Hsi has said that the Unaroused Equilibrium results from the practice of Attentiveness, and that this is the necessary condition of Aroused Harmony, he would naturally infer that in Nature, which is manifested in the Unaroused Equilibrium, all the seeds of morality are contained. The development from the Unaroused Equilibrium to Aroused Harmony, or in other words from the substance of Mind to its function, is no more than the unfolding from the moral seeds to moral behaviour. Although Nature is the representative of the cosmic living force, and therefore the metaphysical ground for Man, it must be contained and activated by the subjective capacity, the Mind. This constituted a great advance for Neo-Confucianism, for although all of Chu Hsi's predecessors had attempted to establish the foundation of morality, they had always proposed the cosmic living force, or, at best, Nature. Only with Chu Hsi is this foundation to be placed within the Mind of "Man as *subject*."

In his "new theory" of Equilibrium and Harmony, Chu Hsi established the independence of Man. Morality had found a new foundation in Man as subject, and in place of

Examination of Substance the method of Attentiveness was adopted. We may therefore say that with his "new theory" not only did Chu Hsi establish his own philosophy, but Neo-Confucianism itself, had advanced to a new stage.

E. A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WAY AND CONCRETE THINGS (1170-1173)

1. From Subjective Approach to Objective Enquiry

The "old theory" was an attempt to approach the Way subjectively, and the "new theory" was its unexpected ontological result, revealing a new relationship between Mind and Nature. In this section we shall see how the ontological reasoning of the "new theory" was extended to the objective world, until a new relationship between the Way (*tao*) and Concrete Things (*ch'i*) was reached.

In his first letter setting out the "old theory," Chu Hsi quotes the following passage from Chou Tun-i's *T'ai-chi t'u shuo*: "The Five Agents constitute a single system of Yin and Yang, and Yin and Yang constitute one Great Ultimate. The Great Ultimate is fundamentally the Non-ultimate." He also cites the following from the *I-t'ung* [*Comprehensive Treatise on the Book of Changes*, commonly called *T'ung-shu*] by the same author: "Tranquility is the state of non-being, and activity is the state of being." Chu Hsi uses these quotations to justify his opinion that what we reveal to ourselves by the subjective approach is a constant flux, and in that flux the substance is the living force itself. This relationship between substance and function, he suggests, is that of a unity, just as that between the abstract "Great Ultimate" and the concrete "Yin, Yang, and Five Agents."

The "new theory" implies a new understanding of Mind and Nature, and of Attentiveness as the method of self-cultivation. But in order to legitimate this new understanding, Chu Hsi had to look beyond Man as subject.

When Chu Hsi was forty and shortly after formulating his "new theory," he says in a letter to Lin Tse-chih:

> The Mind includes the Aroused and the Unaroused, just as the Great Change, the creative living flux embraces the movement between activity and tranquility.[173]

It is evident that Chu Hsi, hitting on his new concept of Mind, sought support from a parallel view of the natural world. In the "*I-fa wei-fa shuo*" we see that, in order to argue that the Unaroused is not "Nature" but rather "Mind in tranquility," Chu Hsi supported the idea that Nature in itself is unknowable by citing Chou Tun-i's saying "The Ultimate of Non-being is also the Great Ultimate!" together with Ch'eng Hao's saying that "It is impossible to speak of the quietness before Man is born."[174] The point here is not whether he understood the earlier Neo-Confucianists correctly, but rather that he needed some cosmological conceptions to consolidate his "new theory" which had been derived from his experience of moral life. It is clear that in order to establish objective reality in this theory, he had to extend the role of Man into the sphere of Heaven.

2. The Reappraisal of the Relationship Between Heaven and Man

After proposing his "new theory," Chu Hsi was faced with the problem of the relationship between Heaven and Man. In his "old theory," Chu Hsi not only presupposed the unity of Heaven and Man, in which Man as creature is the manifestation of, and is infused with, the cosmic living force, but he also took that unity as an ideal for self-cultivation: Man should seek to identify himself with the natural order of Heaven. But the "new theory" demanded a reappraisal of that relationship. Once Man is aware of his

position as subject, he can no longer unite with Heaven through a complete compliance with the cosmic living force. Thus, Chu Hsi felt it was necessary to establish a new mode of unity between Man and Heaven. In order to do so, he first compared the similarities and differences between Heaven and Man.

From the time of his "new theory" Chu Hsi's philosophical writing was dedicated primarily to commentary. His output included commentaries on Chou Tun-i's *T'ai-chi t'u shuo* and his *T'ung-shu*, and on Chang Tsai's *"Hsi-ming"* ["Western Inscription"]. The first two commentaries were completed in April 1173 when he was forty-four. The third was finished earlier, in October 1172 when he was forty-three.[175] The works of these two scholars were significant to Chu Hsi because both Chou Tun-i and Chang Tsai, like other Northern Sung Neo-Confucianists, examined Man and Man's role from the cosmological point of view. Hence, Chu Hsi appealed to their theories at a time when he was eager to extend his understanding of Man and to enquire into the relationship between Heaven and Man. But these commentaries are not wholly reliable for the purpose of studying Chu Hsi's philosophical development in this period, because he had the habit of continually revising finished works. These commentataries remained in manuscript for many years, the first editions not appearing until February 1188, when he was fifty-nine.[176] Fortunately another relevant work survives, the *"T'ai-chi shuo"* ["On the Great Ultimate"], which Chu Hsi intended as preliminary notes to his commentary to the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo*. I shall use this dateable material in my discussion of Chu Hsi's treatment of the relationship between Heaven and Man.

The first point Chu Hsi makes in the *T'ai-chi shuo* is the parallel between the Way of Heaven and that of Man, in terms of the relation to tranquility and activity. The Way of Heaven consists in the constant alternation of

tranquility and activity, the perpetual interchanging of Yin and Yang, without beginning or end. But the Way Man takes is different. First, speaking of his creation, Yang (the flow of the cosmic living force) is his beginning, and Yin (the crystallization of the cosmic living force into the individual spirit and body) is his completion. Secondly, as subject, he is embedded in tranquility (i.e., the Unaroused) and is inclined toward activity (i.e., the Aroused). This is the Way of Man. But however different the individual person may be from Heaven, Yin within him animates Yang, and activity again brings out tranquility. Therefore in Man also there is the constant alternation between tranquility and activity, the perpetual interchanging of Yin and Yang. Here we find the similarity between Heaven and Man.[177]

The unity between Heaven and Man, is reached through a comparison of their similarities after they have been distinguished. Consequently, although this relationship is one within the cosmic living force, the unity is sought for not in the cosmic living force itself, as it was in the "old theory," but rather in the resemblances between the *patterns* of Man and of Heaven: the dynamic alternation between Yin and Yang, tranquility and activity. In this way Chu Hsi gradually departed from the Immanent Vitalism of the Northern Sung. Another noteworthy point is that the achievement of this unity requires effort on Man's part. Man must bring his tranquil state into Equilibrium and his active state into Harmony, thus ensuring the fluent alternation between these two states. Mind, as the moral capicity of Man, is in this way elevated to an unprecedented position.

With this new conception of Man, Chu Hsi was in a position to interpret Chou Tun-i's saying that "The sage, regarding tranquility as fundamental, establishes himself as the ultimate standard for Man." Chu Hsi suggests that Inner Cultivation of the tranquil state is fundamental.

The following is a summary of his comments on this passage. In the sphere of Heaven, there is the virtue of Constancy (*chen*). This is a natural virtue of Heaven's tranquil state, and it is due to this virtue that the myriad creatures are crystallized out of the cosmic life, and are given the potential of subsequent activity. So, from the perspective of Man, the ultimate standard must also be established in tranquility. Man should give priority to his tranquility and exercise Inner Cultivation. His activity will then attain due degree and measure.[178]

Since Man's unity with Heaven requires self-cultivation during tranquility, it is Mind, as the dominant element in Man, that carries out this task. In the "new theory," Chu Hsi had touched on the point that tranquility is the substance of Mind and activity its function, and that Nature is revealed in the substance of Mind, and Feelings in its function.[179] In the "*T'ai-chi shuo*," Chu Hsi clarified again the relationship between Nature, Feelings, and the Mind. There he describes Nature as the Unaroused Feelings, the Equilibrium, the great foundation of the world, while characterizing Feelings as the Aroused Nature, the Harmony (as long as they attain due measure and degree), and the true process of the world. By this description it is clear that Nature and Feelings are the *natural* alternation between tranquility and activity in Man, corresponding to that of Heaven. But he also says that Mind is the master who realises and controls this natural alternation - Mind is that which realises Equilibrium and Harmony, establishes the great foundation, and carries out the true process.[180]

3. A New Concept of the Relationship Between the Way and Concrete Things

I hope the above description has made clear that Heaven and Man are alike in their pattern of alternation between tranquility and activity, but different in that Man as subject must make a moral effort in order to secure his unity with Heaven, and that therefore in Man Mind has a predominant place. Now Chu Hsi's theory of the metaphysical structure of Heaven may be investigated by considering what we know of the Nature of Man as an analogy. In this consideration we must omit Mind, which is specific to Man in so far as its essential purpose is the focussing of moral effort.

At first we find that Chu Hsi, in his concentration on the concept of Nature, has advanced his understanding of it in terms of a two-dimensional substance-function relationship. This may be seen in his interpretation of the opening phrase of the *Chung-yung*, "Heavenly Destiny is called Nature":

> Tranquility is that which occurs when Nature establishes itself, and activity is that which occurs when Destiny moves along (i.e., is carried out). But in fact tranquility is the cessation of activity. Therefore the whole process of the alternation of activity and tranquility may be regarded as the moving along of Destiny, and the truth of Nature may be regarded as that which travels along with activity and tranquility. Therefore we say that Heavenly Destiny is called Nature.[18]

In the beginning of this paragraph Chu Hsi associates tranquility with Nature and activity with Destiny. In this context Destiny is equivalent to "Feelings." But he goes on to say that since tranquility is no more than the cessation of activity, the alternation of these two states in itself may also be called Destiny, and that its metaphysical aspect (i.e., that which "travels" along with this alternation) may be called Nature. Now we have two simultaneous kinds of substance-function relationship between Nature and Destiny. One is that between

tranquility and activity, the other that between the metaphysical and the physical.

Now, by substituting the terms "Great Ultimate" for "Nature," and "Yin and Yang" for "tranquility and activity," we uncover the metaphysical structure of Heaven as expounded in Chu Hsi's *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh* [*Commentary on Chou Tun-i's T'ai-chi t'u shuo*]. In it Chu Hsi interpreted the relationship between the Great Ultimate and Ying and Yang as follows:

> The Great Ultimate is the original wonder;[182] Yin and Yang are the vehicles[183] on which it rides. The Great Ultimate is the Way above Physical Form; Yin and Yang are Concrete Things with Physical Form. Therefore, from the viewpoint of manifestations, although activity and tranquility emerge at different times, and Yin and Yang are located at different positions, the Great Ultimate is in each of them. And from the viewpoint of the hidded, even while no sign exists in the void, there is already the totality of principles for activity and tranquility, for Yin and Yang. Nevertheless, however far back one searches, it is impossible to find the time when the Great Ultimate and Yin and Yang began to combine. And however far forward one peers, it is impossible to see their division.[184]

There is striking similarity between this quotation and the preceding one. Therefore, although the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh* might subsequently have been revised, this passage must have remained as it had been written in his early forties.

In this passage the Great Ultimate (corresponding to the "Nature" in the earlier quotation) is regarded as an "abstract regulative principle," and "Yin and Yang" (corresponding to "Destiny") as "actuality proceeding in accordance with the principle." In this sense the Great Ultimate is the reason both for the existence and for the movement of Concrete Things. The Great Ultimate, as the fundamental law, is the reason for the perpetual alternation of Yin and Yang, or of tranquility and

activity. It is not a concrete thing and therefore is neither tranquility nor activity. However, as the abstract principle it dwells in both tranquility and activity simultaneously, and contains in itself the potential to bring about their alternation. That is why Chu Hsi calls the Great Ultimate "the original wonder." But because the Great Ultimate is no more than the reason for the existence and the alternation of Yin and Yang, it has no other abode than in Yin and Yang. That is why Yin and Yang are called "the vehicles" on which the Great Ultimate rides.

Since the Great Ultimate dwells in tranquility and activity (that is, in Yin and Yang), it may be examined in the alternation of the latter. Activity is the operation of the Great Ultimate, and is also the process in which the Great Ultimate creates the myriad things. Tranquility is the self-preservation of the Great Ultimate, and is also that within which the myriad things are crystallized and acquire their Nature.[185] In this way, tranquility (Yin) manifests "the Great Ultimate in itself" and activity (Yang) manifests "the Great Ultimate in operation." Therefore it is proper to say that on the level of Concrete Things, tranquility may be regarded as substance, and activity as function.

The life of Man, in the context of the universe, may be interpreted as follows. In the Tranquil state (Yin) of the cosmic porcess he is created, and his Nature (which is the same as the Great Ultimate) is then complete. After his creation, his Activity (Yang) is the functioning of his Nature, as Feelings, in his actual life. Man's superiority to other creatures consists in his having Mind, allowing him to nourish his Nature in Tranquility and control his Feelings in Activity.

In this way, Chu Hsi discovered a new relationship between the Way and Concrete Things. If we compare this theory with his earler Immanent Vitalism, we see that both

maintain a permanent combination between the Way and Concrete Things, but that they differ in their account of the manner of this combination. In the earlier theory the manner was a vitalistic one; the Way is the cosmic life-principle itself and Concrete Things are the manifestation of the cosmic life-principle. But now Chu Hsi describes their relationship in terms of law. This relationship contains within itself two further levels of relationship between substance and function. The first level is that between "the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang," in which the metaphysical Way activates the whole world of Concrete Things. The second level is that between Yin and Yang, in which the Concrete Things are created, acquire and fulfill their Nature.[186] The most significant point at this second level is that a creature is no longer regarded merely as a *function* of the Way, but also contains within itself both *substance* and *function*. It is needless to emphasise that the independence of Man as *subject*, which Chu Hsi reached in the "new theory" by reflection on his moral life, is confirmed by this metaphysical structure. A comparison of this two-dimensional substance-function relationship with that in the "old theory" may be facilitated with the aid of the following diagram.

The "old theory" - the substance-function relationship in terms of life



T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh - the two-dimensional substance-function relationship in terms of law



F. THE CONTENT OF SUBSTANCE AND FUNCTION (1170-1173)

1. The Means of Acquiring Humanity: Observing Faults or Self-Cultivation?

From the time of the formation of his "new theory," one of Chu Hsi's philosophical projects was to enquire into the meaning of, and the method of acquiring, Humanity (*jen*). His views on this subject are expressed in a number of letters and in two treatises, called the "*Jen shuo*" ["On Humanity"] and the "*Kuan-kuo shuo*" ["On Observing Faults"]. Although a number of studies of this aspect of Chu Hsi's thought have been written,[187] it is hoped that the present contribution will be useful by putting Chu Hsi's view on this subject into the context of his philosophical development and by relating it to other important theories in his work.

In general terms, this enquiry took shape through his debates with the Hunan School in 1172 and 1173, when Chu Hsi was forty-three and forty-four, and was completed in the "*Jen shuo*," in the winter of 1173.[188] It takes the achievement of the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh* a step further by showing how the Great Ultimate and Nature may be absolutely good, and by comparing them at the cosmic and human levels seeks to establish the fundamental similarity of Heaven and Man.

The concept of Humanity had always had an important role in Chu Hsi's moral philosophy. Humanity was taken by him as the chief human virtue, rather than as trait of character, so that its significance varied with the development of his metaphysics. Before the formation of his "new theory," Chu Hsi had taken this virtue to represent Man's attainment of Substance. When, for

instance, he first developed the conception of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars," in his discussions with Li T'ung, Chu Hsi regarded knowledge of the "oneness of principle" as the beginning of Humanity, in contrast to knowledge of the "distinctiveness of particulars" which was the beginning of Righteousness. This approach may be characterized as an objective enquiry into the relationship between Humanity and Righteousness. Later when working on his "old theory," he regarded his subjective pursuit to the cosmic life-principle as "Seeking for Humanity" (*ch'iu-jen*), and his whole scheme of moral discipline at that time he described as "Seeking for Humanity and Investigating Things."[189] (The latter half of this slogan shows that Chu Hsi never abandoned the habit of objective study that he had established.) In both of these stages of his thought, Humanity was thought of as related to the attainment of the cosmic life-principle, but when in his "new theory," Man as subject was made independent from the cosmic life-principle, his chief virtue, Humanity, required a new interpretation.

This new enquiry into Humanity started from a debate on the exegesis of a passage in the *Lun-yü*. When Chu Hsi was forty-three, he argued against the Hunan School, the followers of Hu Hung,[190] on the interpretation of this problematical text:

> The Master said, "The faults of men are characteristic of the category to which they belong. By observing a man's faults, it may be known that he is Humane (*jen*)."[191]

The Hunan scholars interpreted these "faults" as the faults of the observer himself. Therefore their interpretation was as follows:

> No sooner is a man able to reflect upon his own moral faults, than he has in his breast the growth of the sprouts of goodness. Confucius

> points this out in order to urge man to reflect upon what he already has in himself. Man must have such consciousness and knowledge as a prerequisite before he is able to practice Humanity.[192]

Chu Hsi's interpretation is different. He regards "observing faults" as observation of the failings of others. In order to support his interpretation, Chu Hsi quotes Ch'eng I, "The faults of man are different with the type of man: the superior man is too lenient and the inferior man is too acrimonious;" as well as Yin Ch'un, "Observing this, you can judge whether he is Humane."[193]

At first their controversy was only on the correct interpretation of Confucius' saying, but it soon developed into a debate on the means of acquiring Humanity.

According to Chu Hsi, the Hunan School devoted themselves only to knowledge (i.e. observation) of Humanity, but were lacking in its cultivation. Arguing that their emphasis on observation would increase the instability of Mind, Chu Hsi says in his "Ta Wu Hui-shu":

> The Mind has already committed a fault. Instead of discarding the fault, that Mind causes another Mind to observe that fault. Having observed that fault, there emerges another Mind which knows that the observing Mind is Humane. If the explanation is that there are three Minds observing one another, then this is confusing and makes no sense. If there is only one Mind which emerges with three functions in an instant, this would result in a disturbed and hasty Mind.[194]

In this argument Chu Hsi's main point is that *mere knowledge* of one's own faults does not enhance one's Humanity, and may even result in its destruction.

In the "Kuan-kuo shuo" where he addresses this question directly, Chu Hsi argues the inefficacy of the method of "cultivation by knowing one's own faults." He says that if one observes after one has committed a fault,

the fault is already there. All one feels is remorse which is harmful to the *cultivation* of Mind. If one observes one's tendency to faults before the fault is committed, one loses the opportunity to *cultivate* the Mind in tranquility. The sages never taught such a method for *cultivate* the Mind or acquiring Humanity.[195]

In order to follow this debate, it is helpful, I believe, to look at how Mou Tsung-san defends the doctrine of the Hunan School. Mou Tsung-san contends in his *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i* [Mind Substance and Nature Substance] that the Hunan School successfully sustains a concept of the moral mind. His argument is as follows. In the theory of the Hunan School there are two minds, the realistic mind and the moral mind, not three, as Chu Hsi alleges; and the observation of faults by the moral mind is not a cold-hearted look, as Chu Hsi suggests, but includes the power to correct those faults. The concept of the moral mind is significant for moral practice. We as creatures are supported by a constant flow of the cosmic living force, yet we tend to degenerate because of the harmful influence of our "sensibility," by which Mou Tsung-san means the tendency toward self-interest. If we want to practise morality self-consciously and autonomously, we must realise that we also have a moral mind rooted in the cosmic living force. For the discovery of this inherent moral mind, it is sufficient to reflect upon the sense of anxiety which we may have in response to our fallible existence. If we pursue this sense, we will eventually experience and recognize the moral mind which exists within us. But we should note that knowing of its existence is in itself no more than prerequisite for moral behaviour. A positive effort is required to actualise that moral mind through correcting and improving our behaviour in real life.[196]

To summarize, Mou Tsung-san defends the Hunan School by interpreting their doctrine as follows: 1) everyone has

an inherent moral mind; 2) the observation of one's own faults can evoke the self-awareness of this moral mind; and 3) this moral mind can correct those faults and become actualised in real life. If we compare Chu Hsi's criticism of the Hunan gentlemen with Mou Tsung-san's defense, I suggest that Chu Hsi may have been wrong in accusing them of proposing three minds, and in denying the relevance of the awareness of the moral mind to the correction of faults. But from this comparison it should in fact be evident that Chu Hsi maintained the existence of a single Mind, concrete and actual, which until it is well-cultivated, cannot be called the moral mind. Therefore moral discipline should be a cultivation of this actual mind, including Inner Cultivation during its tranquility and correction of moral faults during its activity.

We can see then that Chu Hsi's proposal that there is only one actual Mind is related to the practice of *cultivation* which he advocates. For if there is in addition to the actual Mind there is a moral Mind, one can become aware of the latter only through some kind of *enlightenment*.

These two views of Mind are related to different kinds of moral discipline. Chu Hsi insisted that there is only *one* actual Mind, and so he advocated the *cultivation* of that Mind. The Hunan School proposed an inherent moral Mind as the condition for moral practice, so that they focussed on its *enlightenment* through observation of their own faults. Once again we see how Chu Hsi's theoretical investigation and moral practice work together. Chu Hsi's criticism of the method of "observing one's own faults" is in reality an opposition to the practical method of "enlightenment." He admitted that one should know one's own faults, but insisted that the practice of the cultivation of Mind, which includes the correction of faults, is crucial to the acquirement of Humanity. In his "Ta Hu Po-feng" Chu Hsi says:

> It is right to say that having consciousness and knowledge provides us with the ground for moral cultivation. "Consciousness and knowledge" may be either shallow or deep. When shallow, it is consciousness of the distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desire. It is right to say that after one is conscious of the distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires, one has the basis for "mastering oneself and returning to propriety."[197] It is with such knowledge that one cultivates Humanity. ... But now what you mean by "consciousness and knowledge" is that one has *already* acquired Humanity in oneself. In that case "consciousness and knowledge" is of a deep kind, which in fact can be acquired only after long-term practice. It cannot be that one, suddenly and effortlessly, acquires such a consciousness. Nor could it be that it is only after one has acquired this consciousness, that one has the pre-condition for moral practice.[198]

This paragraph shows that Chu Hsi acknowledges only actual Mind, whose "consciousness and knowledge" is that of the distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires, and is the starting point for the cultivation of Humanity. Chu Hsi's purpose, needless to say, was to replace the impractical *enlightenment* (i.e., consciousness and knowledge of a deep kind) with *moral cultivation*, which he believed to be the right way to acquire Humanity.

2. The Content of Substance and Function

In 1172 in a letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi attempted to define Humanity in terms of love. This was a return to the generally accepted Confucian definition prior to the two Ch'engs. In this letter Chu Hsi says:

> Before the two Masters, scholars, not understanding Humanity, simply interpreted "Humanity" in the sayings of the sages as

> "love." But after the two Masters,[199] they began to question the meaning of Humanity, and no longer dared to regard it merely as love. Nevertheless, there emerges another error. They ponder too much, and so neglect the necessary practices of self-containment (*ts'ao-ts'un*) and inner-cultivation (*han-yang*). In their behaviour they do not display "elegance and contentment," nor do they show "mastery over themselves and a return to propriety."[200]

In this passage, Chu Hsi is, as he had done in the past, criticising the moral method of the Hunan School, and he proposes that Humanity can be achieved only through moral practice rather than through knowledge. But now in addition, he ascribes their error to a misunderstanding of Ch'eng I's comment on Humanity. In order to interpret Ch'eng I correctly, and to emphasise the importance of practice, he feels an accurate definition of Humanity was necessary. Therefore, Chu Hsi continues:

> If one wishes to understand the definition of Humanity, the best way is to infer from love. If one can see that love derives from Humanity and yet is not the whole of Humanity, then one will see clearly the meaning of Humanity.[201]

Here Chu Hsi is making use of the substance-function pattern, in which Humanity is substance, and love is its function. In my opinion, two factors contributed to this definition. The first was the authority of Ch'eng I. Because Ch'eng I had said that Humanity was Nature and love Feeling, it was not contradictory to link them in this pattern, and so to find a proper definition of Humanity. The second factor was that it could provided a basis for self-cultivation. Because if one recognized that the function of Humanity was a kindness and concern for others, one would pay more attention to cultivating one's own mind and to eliminating Human Desires (*jen-yü*).

In another letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi points out that the Hunan School failed to discriminate between

Humanity and Wisdom. He also says that although "knowledge of goodness" (Wisdom) is conducive to Humanity, it does not constitute the meaning of that concept, and this explains why Confucius often contrasted Humanity with Wisdom. Chu Hsi goes on to say that the confusion of these two Virtues by the Hunan School has not the least similarity with the usage of Confucius.[203]

Sometime after the writing of this letter Chu Hsi worked on the "*Jen shuo*," in which the substance-function pattern is fully extended to the definition of the human virtue. In the "new theory" Chu Hsi reached the conclusion that while the Mind is in tranquility, all moral principles are contained in, and are identified with, Nature, and while Mind is active, Nature develops into Feelings. Now because he had established the link between Humanity and love, and had distinguished between Humanity and Wisdom, Chu Hsi regarded Humanity and Wisdom as the Virtues (*te*, the fundamental moral principles of Nature), and love as the Feeling corresponding directly with Humanity. Chu Hsi found it necessary to add several more categories in order to complete a system of corresponding Virtues and Feelings. Chu Hsi appealed to Mencius and proclaimed as the Four Virtues, Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom, of which Humanity, being the most fundamental, embraces the other three. As for the functions of these Four Virtues, he also adopted Mencius' Four Feelings, namely, compassion (love), shame and disgust, respect and reverence, and right and wrong, of which compassion encompasses the other three.[204] The two Ch'engs regarded Mencius as the inheritor of Confucius, but it is Chu Hsi who elevated Mencius' Four Virtues to the level of substance. These Four Virtues satisfied Chu Hsi's requirements both by providing a table of the fundamental moral principles and so concluding the construction of the "new theory," and by defending his own

position against the Hunan School through matching different Virtues to their corresponding Feelings.

In this theory of Virtues and Feelings, Chu Hsi both maintained the distinction between substance and function, and emphasised the link between them.[204] His conception of this relationship can be seen in the "*Jen shuo*" where in explaining the Confucian axiom "master oneself and return to propriety" he offers in effect a new formula for moral cultivation. This passage from the "*Jen shuo*" goes as follows:

> Therefore Confucius required students to seek for Humanity assiduously. Confucius has said, "master oneself and return to propriety," meaning that if one can overcome and eliminate selfishness and return to the Heavenly Principle, then the substance of one's Mind will be always present and its function will always be operative.[205]

What Chu Hsi implies in this passage is that substance and function, although distinct, have a natural and dynamic link between them. Therefore when the obstruction of selfishness is removed, the Virtues will necessarily manifest themselves as Feelings. Chu Hsi knows that self-cultivation is a constant self-restraint, so that in his discussion he mentioned no expansion of the Feeling of compassion. Nevertheless through self-cultivation positive results are brought out, because the removal of selfishness enhances the natural process of the moral principles inherent in Mind.[206]

As against the Hunan School, who "explained Humanity in terms of the possession of consciousness by Mind," Chu Hsi contended:

> From what they call the Mind's possession of consciousness, it can be seen that Humanity includes Wisdom, but that is not the reason why Humanity is so called.[207]

That Humanity includes Wisdom, is based on Ch'eng I's teaching that Humanity, when spoken of separately, is one of the Four Virtues, but when spoken of collectively, embraces the other three.[208] We shall discuss later how Chu Hsi interpreted this relation. "To regard Mind's possession of consciousness as Humanity" is the doctrine of Hsieh Liang-tso, a prominent disciple of the two Ch'engs. Chu Hsi understood consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. Although it is a "characteristic of life," it is "cold-hearted" rather than "gentle-hearted."[209] As regards the meaning of consciousness, in his "Ta Chang Ch'in-fu" Chu Hsi says:

> By "consciousness" Shang-ts'ai (Hsieh Liang-tso) means that which knows cold, warmth, surfeit, and hunger. It is still the same consciousness while extending to the practice of social life and sacrificial ceremony. ... It is the function of Wisdom. In the sense that only the man of Humanity can have Wisdom, we say that his mind possesses consciousness. But we do not define Humanity in terms of the possession of consciousness.[210]

In this way, to regard consciousness as Humanity is not only a mismatch of a Feeling with an irrelevant Virtue, but also an error in taking function to be a substance. The result is more a moral defect than a mere theoretical error, for in the "*Jen shuo*" Chu Hsi makes the accusation that the method of "seeking for Humanity in consciousness" will "lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of any quality of depth, and even to regard desire as principle."[211] Chu Hsi means by this that Feelings can never be prerequisite for moral cultivation.

Shortly after, Chu Hsi, in his reply to Hu Kuang-chung, clarifies this position. The Four Feelings are good, but Feelings in general may be either good or bad. This is because the arising of Feelings from Nature, being a natural process, has the tendency of becoming

uncontrollable. Therefore a mastery of them by some subjective capacity is necessary. Such capacity is the Mind. The Mind comprises both Nature and Feelings, and so is characterized as "through the hidden and the manifest, across the above and the below, existent everywhere, and confined to neither place nor shape."[212] On the other hand, it is that which in its tranquility masters Nature, and in its activity masters Feelings.[213] The cultivation of Mind with a view to increasing its capacity, is therefore fundamental to moral life.

3. The Parallel Between Heaven and Man

Having ascertained the range of meanings of both substance and function in Man, Chu Hsi then engaged himself in a search for their conterparts in Heaven. He fulfilled this task easily by appealing to the *I ching*. He listed the Four Qualities (*ssu-te*), Generation (*yüan*), Flourishing (*heng*), Advantage (*li*), and Constancy (*chen*), of which Generation embraces the other three. For their functions Chu Hsi assigns the Four Seasons in which the living force of Spring penetrates the other seasons.[214]

Chu Hsi took this parallelism a step further by reinterpreting the cosmic life-principle as the "Mind of Heaven and Earth." This parallel is made from the point of view of life. The Mind of Man shows the sign of life in its being perceptive, active, dominant, and intentional. The cosmic living force is a pure intention to create beings, so that it can be regarded as "the Mind of Heaven and Earth." In fact, such terms as "the Mind of Heaven" or "the Mind of Heaven and Earth" were frequently used by former Neo-Confucianists.[215] But Chu Hsi, of course, had new reason for developing this parallelism as a response to his post "new theory" identification of the cosmic

living force with the totality represented by the Four Qualities and the Four Seasons.

The following is a putative reconstruction of the line of thought which led to the formulation of Chu Hsi's concept of "the Mind of Heaven and Earth." In the "old theory," Chu Hsi regarded the universal living force as Substance, and all beings and affairs as Functions. This was a continuation of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism.[216] In the "new theory," Man as subject acquires independence from the cosmic living force, and establishes in himself the substance of the Four Virtues and the functions of the Four Feelings. The Mind of Man is that which embodies the Four Virtues and the Four Feelings. This new pattern was then extended to Heaven, and Chu Hsi devised as the content of the substance and function of Heaven, the Four Qualities and the Four Seasons respectively. According to this pattern, the original cosmic living force is identifiable with the totality embodying the Four Qualities and the Four Seasons, and so became the counterpart of the Mind of Man. Therefore it may be properly called "the Mind of Heaven and Earth."

I shall now discriminate between the various role played by the concept of life (*sheng*) at different stages of Chu Hsi's philosophy. Both before and after the "new theory," the concept of life was that by which Heaven and Man were united. The Chinese word *sheng* may be used to refer to that which gives lives, or that which lives, therefore this concept may serve to unite creative Heaven and created Man. The opening passage of the "*Jen shuo*," reads as follows:

> The Mind of Heaven and Earth is to "produce" (sheng) things. In the "production" (sheng) of Men and things, these things receive the Mind of Heaven and Earth as their Mind. Therefore, with reference to the character of Mind, although it embraces and penetrates everything and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless,

> one word will cover all of it, namely, Humanity.[317]

The unity of Heaven and Man under the concept of life in this passage is compatible with his "old theory." but it seems to me that their manner of unification is different. In the "old theory," (based on Immanent Vitalism,) the cosmic living force is *substance* and therefore is the dominant concept. Man as creature is a *function* and therefore his Way (Humanity) consists in experiencing, and merging with, the cosmic living force. But in the "*Jen shuo*," since Man as subject is independent from Heaven, his Mind has its own *substance* and *function*, just as the "Mind of Heaven and Earth" has its own. Therefore Heaven and Man are involved in a parallel relationship, and not simply a substance-function relationship. It follows then that although the concept of "life" still plays a role in uniting Heaven and Man, the attention is drawn to the similarity of the "pattern" for Heaven and Man respectively

The basic pattern which Chu Hsi proposes is one in which life is seen as a circulating process of opposing forces. First we see the life of Heaven, which is expressed in the function of the Four Seasons. It is a continuous process, alternating between opposites. The life of Heaven grows from Spring to Summer, and dwindles from Autumn to Winter. But this growth is at the same time an emission of energy which entails the subsequent period of dwindling; while the dwindling is at the same time a conservation of energy which prepares for the next period of growth. Only by the alternation of opposites can Heaven have a constant life. The Four Seasons constitute a model for the concept of life. The other categories may be understood in the same manner. The Four Qualities are the cosmic principles and the *reason* for the circulation of the Four Seasons. These Four Qualities are a set of

opposing-circulating principles. The life of Man may be analysed in the same way. The Virtue of Humanity and its corresponding Feeling of compassion, and the Virtue of Propriety and its corresponding Feeling of respect-and-reverence, are the substances and functions in the *growth* phase. The Virtue of Righteousness and the corresponding Feeling of shame-and-disgust, and the Virtue of Wisdom and the corresponding Feeling of right-and-wrong, are the substances and functions in the phase of *limitation*.

Thus, Chu Hsi viewed the basic pattern of life as a process of the circulation of opposites. Substance constitutes the fundamental principle of this pattern, which I have called "the abstract regulative principle." In Heaven it is the Great Ultimate which is composed of Four Qualities, while in Man it is Nature which is composed of Four Virtues. Function is the actual process of that pattern: in Heaven it is the Four Seasons, and in Man it is the Four Feelings. It seems that Chu Hsi derived this pattern from observing general phenomena of life, that is, life as a process from birth to death; and that although all kinds of death form the *limitation* of life, they themselves are the condition of *subsequent lives*. Only by including the negative element (i.e. limitation of life), can the circulation of life be complete and eternal.

Since Chu Hsi took this circulation of opposites as a *living* process, the positive element (the growth of life) can represent the orientation of the whole process. Therefore, Generation (*yüan*) as the first Quality of Heaven is regarded as embracing the other three Qualities, and represents the character of Heaven; Humanity (*jen*) as the first Virtue of Mind emcompasses the other three Virtues, and represents the character of Man.

In this chapter, we have seen how Chu Hsi gradually established the independence of Man as subject, reinterpreted Heaven to parallel Man, and systematized the

basic pattern of life. The final outcome of his philosophical enquiry in this period was his total abandonment of Immanent Vitalism, and his increasing concern with the concept of an "abstract regulative principle."

4. Why Nature is Good

Although Mencius had been greatly admired by Neo-Confucianists, his doctrine that "Nature is good," had received little support before Chu Hsi's composition of the *Jen shuo*.

The question whether Nature is good was a source of controversy between Chu Hsi and the Hunan School. Hu Hung, the founder of this school, said in his *Chih-yen* that Nature cannot be defined either as good or as evil. This book had a great influence on Chu Hsi in the period of his "old theory," but even at that time Chu Hsi was not satisfied with the concept of Nature in the *Chih-yen*. He discussed this with Chang Shih in the second letter of his "old theory" period. Hu Hung's argument, according to Chu Hsi, is that Nature is that which has the capacity of liking and disliking, whereas goodness consists in likes and dislikes following the right course.

How should we understand Hu Hung's concept of Nature as described by Chu Hsi? It seems to me that Hu Hung regarded Nature as identical with the cosmic living force itself, that, as a pure capacity, transcending moral value. Goodness was the evaluation of things in the actual world, and so did not belong to Nature in itself. Now, since morality for Hu Hung consisted in compliance with the natural flow of the cosmic living force, that "liking and disliking" may be called good which follows the right (i.e., natural) course of the cosmic living force.

During the period of his "old theory" Chu Hsi accepted Hu Hung's metaphysics, so what he questioned was limited to Hu Hung's definition of "good." Chu Hsi proposed that "good" means "having no evil." His argument is that Nature can like and dislike, only because it likes the good and dislikes evil. Therefore Nature, having no evil, can be called good. Chu Hsi also argued that Hu Hung made an unnecessary distinction between Nature and the right course. He quoted the *Chih-yen* to the effect that the Mind of Heaven and Earth is the pure and contains the fullness of morality. - Why, then, should it not be called good?[218] We see, then, that Chu Hsi at that time, though an adherent of Hu Hung's metaphysics, differed from Hu Hung in characterizing Nature as good.

While working the "*Jen shuo*," Chu Hsi engaged in several debates with the Hunan scholars about the moral value of Nature.[219] But it was not until he had completed the "*Jen shuo*" that he had a metaphysical solution to this question. In his "Ta Hu Po-feng" Chu Hsi explained Mencius' teaching about Nature as follows:

> Mencius' teaching of the goodness of Nature is about Substance, meaning Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom before the Arousal of the Feelings. His other saying that "[If you let people follow their Feelings,] they will be able to do good," is about Function, namely, the Four Feelings aroused and attaining due measure and degree. For, although Nature and Feelings differ in regard to either the Unaroused or the Aroused, in respect of goodness they are continuous and therefore the same. This is what Mencius meant when he said that Nature was good, and is what was transmitted without change by the Ch'eng School.[220]

Chu Hsi's point here is that Nature is good because it consists of the Four Virtues. These are the substance of the Four Feelings, through which men can do good. Chu Hsi's criticism here is that the good should not be

ascribed only to the Aroused Feelings, but should also be ascribed to their root, the Four Virtues of Nature.

Not until Chu Hsi had arrived at this conclusion, was the Neo-Confucian enterprise, which aimed at providing a metaphysical basis for social and moral values, complete. From the beginning of the Sung dynasty, scholars had been eager to reconstitute Confucian morality and the Confucian social order, and at the same time to provide for it a metaphysical basis. Succeeding to the Taoist and Buddhist traditions of the earlier period, the first form of this attempt was made by the Eclectics, who combined directly Tao or Ch'an substance with Confucian function. But their conclusion was that substance is transcendent and natural, while morality and social order are secular and artificial. In opposition to them there arose the Northern Sung Neo-Confucianists, who taught an Immanent Vitalism. By applying the substance-function pattern to the relation between Heaven and Man, they were able to supply a metaphysical basis for morality. They regarded the cosmic living force as substance, and human society as function. Morality found its basis in the cosmic living force, and its practice enabled Man to transcend his particularity in order to unite with the cosmic living force. Notwithstanding their efforts, the difficulty of Eclecticism could not be avoided, because Heaven, as well as Nature, was regarded as supra-moral, while morality was regarded as merely *a posteriori*. That is why, in Hu Hung's theory, Nature transcends goodness, while the latter belongs merely to the level of function. Morality then has no sufficient reason in substance, and merely has a worldly value. Chu Hsi had been unsatisfied with this theory for a long time, but he was unable to solve the problem until he defined Substance as an "abstract regulative principle," in such a way that Substance itself became a moral concept, rather than a supra-moral one.

In addition, another factor in Chu Hsi's conception of Substance helped to provide a metaphysical foundation for social and moral values. His "abstract regulative principle" governed a process of the circulation of opposites. In this process the "negative" or "limiting" elements functioned as restraints. In personal cultivation this restraint was interpreted as "mastery of oneself," and in social practice as "execution of law or justice." In the philosophy of the earlier Neo-Confucianists, because their Immanent Vitalism did not include this negative element, these restraints which were essential underpinnings of a responsible ethis and social philosophy were seen merely as contingent functions. At this stage in Chu Hsi's philosophy they were given sufficient reason in substance and finally provided the justification for morality which Confucianists have been seeking.

CHAPTER IV
THE RESHAPING OF THE NEW METAPHYSICS IN TERMS OF PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE

SUMMARY

This chapter describes the process through which Chu Hsi's doctrine of "the Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin and Yang (Concrete Things)" became the doctrine of "Principle (*li*) and Material Force (*ch'i*)." The reason for this transformation will also be investigated.

I interpret this transformation in general terms as the process by which Chu Hsi modified his conception of Man. He recognized that Man had to be regarded as a *creature*, in addition to being treated as a *subject*, because Man, however superior to other creatures, is ultimately limited. Chu Hsi then emphasised that Man should strive to transcend these limitations and reach universality.

Section A describes how Chu Hsi adopted and modified the traditional concept of Material Force.

Section B describes the development of Chu Hsi's two methods of moral cultivation. These were Attentiveness, a discipline aimed at the "containment" (*ts'un*) of Mind, and the Investigation of Things, a technique designed to aid the quest for universality and to extend the capacity of the Mind.

Section C describes Chu Hsi's development during his fifties. The interaction with Lu Chiu-yüan and Ch'en Liang forced Chu Hsi to reflect on his own position, as a result of which he elevated Principle to be the universal moral standard.

A. MATERIAL FORCE AS THE BASIS OF CONCRETE THINGS (1172-1174)

1. Chu Hsi's Adoption of the Concept of the Body

The concept of the Body (*shen*) or Physical Form (*hsing*) entered into Chu Hsi's philosophical system after his debate with the Hunan scholars during 1172-1173, his forty-third and forty-fourth year.

Earlier in his "new theory," Chu Hsi incorporated Ch'eng I's suggestion that Mind is the master of the Body,[221] but his purpose was rather to explore the character of Mind than the concept of the Body.

During the debate between Chu Hsi and the Hunan scholars, their attention turned to the problems of interpreting such terms as Nature, Feelings, tranquility, and activity as they occurred in Ch'eng I's treatise "*Yen-tzu suo-hao ho-hsüeh lun*" ["On What Yen-tzu Loved to Learn"] and in the "*Yüeh-chi*" ["A Treatise on Music"] of the *Li-chi* [the *Records of Rites*].[222]

The relevant paragraph in Ch'eng I's treatise is:

> From the essence of life accumulated in Heaven and Earth, Man receives the Five Agents (Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth) in their highest degree. His original Nature is pure and tranquil. While unaroused, its five moral principles, Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, Wisdom, and Faithfulness, are all present. As his Physical Form also appears at his birth, external things may stimulate it, through which his Nature is aroused from within. As it is aroused from within, the seven Feelings, pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, love, hate, and desire, ensue. As Feelings become strong and increasingly reckless, Man's Nature becomes damaged.[223]

Chu Hsi argued in his "Ta Hu Kuang-chung" that what Ch'eng I meant was the same as the paragraph from the "*Yüeh-chi*" quoted below:

> Man is born with tranquility, which is Heavenly Nature. Provoked by things he is active (aroused), as is the inclination of Nature. In confrontation with things the faculty of consciousness is aroused, and responds with like or dislike. If there is no regulation of like and dislike from within while consciousness is lured by things without, such a lack of reflection will result in the extinction of Heavenly Principle.[224]

Both treatises are concerned with the tranquility of Nature, and the possibly damaging activity of Feelings. In Ch'eng I's treatise the concept of Physical Form is important in explaining the arising of Feelings. Although Chu Hsi did not elaborate this concept in that letter, from that time the concept of the Body and of Physical Form was to attract Chu Hsi's increasing attention. This attention is seen in his "*Yüeh-chi tung-ching shuo*" ["On Tranquility and Activity in the Treatise on Music"], which appears to have been composed shortly after the controversy with the Hunan School. In this work he incorporates this concept into his system. He writes:

> Man is born with the essence of Heaven and Earth. While he is not aroused, he has the pure goodness and in that goodness all the principles (*li*) are present. That is what we call Nature. But as he has Nature, so he has Physical Form. And as he has Physical Form, so he has Mind, which cannot but be aroused by external things. When it is aroused by external things and moved, the inclinations of Nature emerge and the good and the evil flow apart. The inclinations of Nature are called Feelings.[225]

It is interesting to see how Chu Hsi introduces the concept of the Body into his system. Nature has the metaphysical priority, the Body is secondary. But Nature

does not create the Body. Just as the Great Ultimate is actualised only in Concrete Things, so wherever there is Nature, the Body must also exist. In this passage, the concept of Mind is introduced after the Body, and is regarded as arising with the Body. At the same time it is identified with Nature and the Feelings, of which it is also master.

The implication in Chu Hsi's formulation of the relationship between Nature, the Body, and the Mind is that Man, although he may be an independent *subject*, is still a *creature* among others in the universe. The development of Chu Hsi's thought in the following years was to focuss on this aspect of Man and was to lead to a revision of his metaphysics in terms of "Princeple (li) and Material Force (*ch'i*)".

2. The Mortality of the Individual Mind

After the establishment of the "new theory" Chu Hsi discussed the faults in the philosophy of Hu Hung with Chang Shih and Lü Tsu-ch'ien. Their discussions were recorded in a long essay, "*Hu-tzu chih-yen i-i*" ["Critique of Hu Tzu's *Knowing Words*"], completed in 1172, when Chu Hsi was forty-three years of age.

One of Chu Hsi's concerns in this essay is the status of the individual Mind. In Hu Hung's *Chih-yen* there is an argument that for the Mind there is neither birth nor death. Hu Hung's initial argument is that because Man can think of his death, his thinking Mind must extend beyond death. This reasoning develops thereafter to the contention that, if the Mind is considered not from the aspect of Physical Form, but from the aspect of Mind, its permanence will be apparent.[226] It seems to me that the argument implied here is as follows. Hu Hung's method of

self-cultivation, based on Immanent Vitalism, is aimed at cancelling the individuality and immersing the self into the cosmic life-principle. Such a method may succeed only on condition that the Mind is as reflective as a mirror, not attached to the self but reflecting the objective unfolding of the cosmic life-principle. Hu Hung would then be led to think that the reflectiveness of the Mind is due to its springing from a source different from the individual Body. In that case the individual Mind is derived from, and is in fact identical with, the Mind of Heaven and Earth. Therefore it neither comes nor goes with the individual corporeal life.

Chu Hsi's critique is as follows:

> To say that the Mind has neither birth nor death is almost the doctrine of Buddhist transmigration. Heaven and Earth give birth to the myriad creatures. Man is the most favoured of these, and has the capacity for intelligence and awareness, just as the ears and eyes have the ability to see and hear. The Mind of Heaven and Earth may exist throughout the past and present, without growing or perishing. But the Mind of Man and Creature following their Physical Form and Material Force has beginning and end.[227]

Whatever superior qualities the Mind may have, Chu Hsi is saying, it still arises from the Body. Therefore, just as the reason that the Mind of Heaven and Earth may exist without growing or perishing is that the Body of Heaven and Earth is eternal, so the reason that the Mind of Man must have beginning and end, is that Man has a limited Body.

The reason for Chu Hsi's careful separation of the individual Mind from the Mind of Heaven and Earth, evident from this criticism of Hu Hung's theory, was to avoid the position of Buddhist Idealism. There is no doubt that Hu Hung was in favour of Confucianism, or that what he advocated was a merging of one's self with the great cosmic life-principle, yet in so far as he maintained that

the individual Mind was subject to neither birth nor death, he was in danger of elevating the status of that Mind to the level of Ultimate Principle, and to that extent appearing to be something of a Buddhist Idealist. In order to distinguish his own doctrine, then, from that of Buddhist Idealism, Chu Hsi was obliged to propose his concept of the Body, and to concede the nature of Man as *creature*.

Although this was, I believe, one motive for Chu Hsi's adoption of the concept of Man as creature, his underlying motivation was undoubtedly his deep concern with morality. Those who raise Mind to the level of eternal Substance, tend in their moral practice to pursue the goal of enlightenment. Buddhism in China is a conspicuous expample of this tendency. One who wishes to promote a practical discipline of moral cultivation needs a theory of a finite Mind whose very limitations supply the necessity for the discipline. This finitude is supplied by the dependence of the Mind on the Body as *creature* among the *myriad things* of the Universe.

It should be noted that this explanation of Man as *creature* requires the complementary docrine of Man as *subject*, because it is only by being a creature with the special endowment of subjectivity that ensures to Man the capacity as well as the necessity of engaging in the pursuit of morality.

3. The Introduction of the Concept of Material Force in the *T'ai-chi T'u Shuo Chieh*

The concept of Material Force (*ch'i*), as the material foundation of Concrete Things (*ch'i*), was adopted by Chu Hsi in his *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh*, which was written in 1172. In the previous chapter, I discussed the two-

dimensional substance-function relationship, between the Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin and Yang (Concrete Things), which is presented in the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh*, and compared it with that of his earlier Immanent Vitalist conception. Although in the new pattern the idea of abstract law has replaced the idea of life, it is still the same as the old pattern insofar as the Great Ultimate is completely immanent in Yin and Yang and in the things they generate. Therefore the old relationship between the One and the many remains. But since the Great Ultimate is no longer regarded as the cosmic life-principle itself, comprising and generating all of the separate lives, this immanent relationship requires another explanation.

The new metaphysics is characterized by the fact that the Great Ultimate is an abstract regulative principle, and is the reason for the existence and movement of Yin and Yang, whose interaction produces the myriad things. The indivisible Great Ultimate is therefore simultaneously immanent both in the totality of Yin and Yang and the myriad things, and in each of them individually. But this kind of One-many relationship is possible only on condition that there is another source for the many. In the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh*, in reference to Chou Tun-i's text, "When the reality of the Ultimate of Non-being and the essence of Yin, Yang, and the Five Agents come into mysterious union, integration ensues", Chu Hsi wrote the following commentary:

> Under Heaven nothing is beyond Nature (i.e., the Great Ultimate), and Nature is in everything. Therefore we say that the Ultimate of Non-being (an epithet of, and so here equivalent to, the Great Ultimate) mixes completely with Yin and Yang and the Five Agents. This is "mysterious union". "Reality" describes Principle (i.e., the Great Ultimate), because of its non-illusoriness. "Essence" describes Material Force, because of its substantiality. "Integration" means gathering together. Material Force gathers itself together and becomes Physical Form. It seems that under

> the dominance of Nature, Yin and Yang and the Five Agents enter into a complicated process of mixture, and, according to each species, they integrate and become Physical Form.[228]

In this paragraph the concept of Material Force is introduced. It seems to me that Chu Hsi's reasoning is as follows. While the one Great Ultimate (Nature, which may also be described as the Ultimate of Non-being) causes the existence of Concrete Things, there has to be another source, that is, Material Force, to provide the matter for their formation. Yin and Yang, and their myriad offspring, exist owing to the Great Ultimate, but their actualisation into Concrete Things is due to Material Force. Only with such a proposal, does it make sense to say that the same Great Ultimate may both be in each and in all Concrete Things. The Great Ultimate, as the reason for the existence of Concrete Things, projects itself in its entirety onto the other source, Material Force, and then Concrete Things are actualised. Under these circumstances, the Great Ultimate may exist in completion not only in the totality of Concrete Things, but separately within each individual. A metaphor Chu Hsi often used is that of the one moon, becoming ten thousand moons when reflected in ten thousand rivers.[229] This metaphor reveals to us that there must be a separate material source for the many, just as in order to reflect one and the same moon there must first be water to form the ten thousand rivers. In short, with the concept of Material Force, not only the source of matter for Concrete Things, but also the relationship between the One and the many, may be satisfactorily explained.

4. The Change of Meaning in the Concept of Material Force

We have seen how Chu Hsi added into his system the concept of Material Force during the development of his thought. Material Force is a concept he adopted from the Chinese philosophical tradition, but in his usuage he had given the term a new meaning. In order to understand this new meaning it will be necessary to trace that concept back to the tradition before Chu Hsi.

Gotô Toshimizu, in his *Shushi no hontairon* [*Ontology in the Philosophy of Chu Hsi*], at first studied the ontologies of earlier Confucianists and Taoists. The following is an account of the conclusions of his study. He finds that philosophical Taoism consistently reveals a monistic materialist ontology.[290] The religious branch of Taoism from its beginnings appealed to the *Lao-tzu* and the *I ching*, and dedicated itself to the search for the elixir of life which would enable men to return to the *yüan ch'i* (primitive undivided ether). Its practices presupposed a monistic materialism.[291] With regard to Confucianism, he claims, the ontology of the *I ching* is a monism of the Great Ultimate. As to the nature of the Great Ultimate, Confucianists before the Sung dynasty, such as Cheng Hsüan and K'ung Ying-ta, thought of it as *ch'i*. According to these Confucianists, from the monistic *ch'i* of the Great Ultimate, the two *ch'i* of Yin and Yang evolved, and from them the myriad creatures were born.[292]

Gotô also studied the concept of "order" and "law" in these branches of traditional Chinese thought. He maintained that the concept of a monistic materialistic substance was in neither of these schools purely material, but also contained within it the causal elements of law and of order. Nevertheless, as the materialistic character was the fundamental element for these schools, they were, after all, never able to escape their materialism. Traditional Chinese belief was therefore essentially materialist, though it allowed for a conception of law and of order. Differences among the schools merely reflected

differing emphases on various aspects of the same kind of materialism. For example, religious Taoism pursued corporeal immortality by seeking for the elixir of life. As the *yüan ch'i* was for them the fundamental element of life, they were inclined to emphasise the material aspect. On the other hand, the Confucianists were devoted to morality and politics, as well as the ideal of unifying with Heaven by following the law and the order of the latter. Naturally, they were inclined to emphasise the aspects of order and law. When we reach the Sung dynasty, the challenge of Ch'an Idealism entered the philosophical arena, and so encouraged a rethinking of the traditional materialism. Chu Hsi inherited traditional Confucianism, after having had a profound interest in Ch'an, so it was predictable that he would be inclined to emphasise the non-materialistic aspects.[223]

Gotô's study is very useful for a background to the ontology of Chu Hsi, but some revision is required. In the first place, to regard Taoism as materialistic is problematic. Gotô believes that since "Non-being" in Taoism means "without form," it should be regarded as pure matter, whether considered as the primordial substance or as the origin of the universe. However, "Non-being" in Taoism is commonly interpreted as the "absolutely void." If this is correct, Taoism is ultimately not materialistic. But the second and more important question is that of the significance of the term "materialism." Gotô is correct in maintaining that the ontology of both schools was based on the concept of *ch'i* (ether) or *yüan-ch'i* (primitive ether), but he is too hasty in categorizing it as materialism. For that reason, although in Chu Hsi the concept of *ch'i* was used in a materialistic sense, this is not the case with regard to its use before him. In traditional Confucianism and Taoism *ch'i* is the source of both matter and form, and "gives birth to" the myriad creatures, and so is vital rather than material. So

the traditional ontology would be better classified as "vitalism," rather than as "materialism." Julia Ching argues that *ch'i* should be translated as "Vital Force" rather than "Material Force".[334] In my opinion, she is right if her recommendation is limited to the traditional use of the term before Chu Hsi. But the result would be misleading if this were applied to the usage of Chu Hsi and subsequent philosophers.

With this clarification, I suggest that it is appropriate to regard Chu Hsi as an advocate of an ontology based upon the conceptions of "law" and of "order," and also as the medium through which the concept of *ch'i* became modified from a vitalist to a materialist one. In the following section I shall investigate the process of this modification.

5. Vital Principle and Material Force

The place of Principle (*li*), and of Material Force (*ch'i*), in the context of life was interpreted further by Chu Hsi in a letter written in reply to Liao Te-ming. I date this letter to the period 1173-1174 when Chu Hsi was forty-four or forty-five.[335] The topics discussed in the letter include eternal life and ancestral worship, but our concern is only with the part discussing Principle and Material Force. Here Chu Hsi says:

> Nature is Principle. Heaven and Earth change and the myriad creatures receive their life. Although I am endowed with Nature at birth, it is a Principle not private to me.... Nature is Principle, which neither is generated nor perishes. That which gathers itself together into life, and disintegrates in death, is Material Force. The so-called Ghost (*p'o*) and Soul (*hun*) (equivalent in Chu Hsi to the Mind) which are conscious and perceptive are made of Material Force, and consequently come and go with the

> assembling and disintegrating of the individual Body. But Principle is eternal.[236]

In this passage Chu Hsi merely stated his opinion of the mortality of the individual Mind ("the Ghost and the Soul" in this passage) as we have seen in his criticism of Hu Hung. But he extends the context of his discussion to the universe in the same letter:

> Where there is Principle, there is Material Force. Where Material Force gathers together into creaturehood, the latter is endowed with Principle. The analogy of water and foam is not appropriate.[237]

In order to understand the analogy referred to, we must examine Chu Hsi's conception of Material Force. The Physical Form of an individual, according to Chu Hsi in the earlier quotation, passes through stages from formation to disintegration. After disintegration, it no longer exists. What's more, it is implied in that quotation that what comes and goes is not merely the individual Body and Mind, but also the material basis of both of these, that is, Material Force. It is evident that Chu Hsi believed that the Material Force of an individual is in a constant process of coming into being and perishing, in total contrast, incidentally, with the modern conception of the conservation of matter. What is created with the new entity is the matter itself, and when the individual dies, the matter also vanishes with it forever. This explains Chu Hsi's saying that the analogy of the relationship between water and foam is unsuitable, because when foam disintegrates, it returns to water, and so its matter remains. Extending this conception to Material Force in general, in the same letter Chu Hsi says:

> The disintegrating Material Force vanishes forever, but the continually becoming Material

> Force, which has its source in Principle, emerges without exhaustion.[226]

In this passage, Material Force emerged from nowhere, and then vanished forever. It may be said that Principle is the source of Material Force, but not in the sense of creating the latter. It is rather that Principle, as the reason for the existence and movement of creatures, requires that there be Material Force to actualise the creatures. But since Principle is eternal and is the Principle of life, correspondingly Material Force emerges and perishes continuously, and the creatures which contain Principle are incessantly coming into being and dying.

The transformation of the conception of *ch'i* from vitalistic to materialistic, took place not only in virtue of the transience of *ch'i*, but also because of the degeneration of *ch'i* into the secondary and material element of life. Principle then becomes the first and dominant element; and despite its being abstract and having nothing to do with consciousness or perception, it is properly called "Vital Principle" (*sheng-li*).

What is the nature of Vital Principle? It is eternal, in contrast with the temporality of Material Force. It is the unique Great Ultimate, and can perhaps be thought of as the "immovable mover." It causes the evolution of Material Force in a circulating pattern of opposing forces, and therewith the myriad creatures are born and die. Because of the Vital Principle, from the very first moment of the inception of the universe Material Force has been dividing into Yin and Yang, the two opposite and interacting material forces. Then there is the circulation of the four seasons, and the life and death of the myriad creatures. The Vital Principle, as the abstract regulative principle, brings about, and then exists within, the evolution of the whole universe. Therefore it is proper to say that the world is made of law and matter, Vital

Principle and Material Force being their respective sources.[239]

6. The Concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities"

Chu Hsi regarded the Mind of Heaven and Earth as the intention to create the myriad creatures. The opening sentence of the "*Jen-shuo*," quoted in the previous chapter makes this clear. This concept in fact plays the role of linking the Vital Principle and Material Force.

Chu Hsi interpreted the Mind of Heaven and Earth as a constant intention to create in accordance with the Vital Principle without preference or capriciousness.[240] For him another way of refering to "the Mind of Heaven and Earth" was "the Spirits (*kuei*) and the Divinities (*shen*)." This concept, when adopted to his new metaphysics, was given a role as the highest level of Material Force. This adoption, to my knowledge, was first made in his "Ta Liao Te-ming," where he says:

> "The Spirits and the Divinities" are analogous to "the Ghost (*p'o*) and the Soul (*hun*)." Master Ch'eng called this the function of Heaven and Earth and the signs of creation. Master Chang called it the inborn capacity of the Two Forces (i.e., Yin and Yang). It does not belong to Nature [but to Material Force].[241]

In this passage, Chu Hsi explains "the Spirits" and "the Divinities" in terms of their counterparts in Man, "the Ghost" and "the Soul." By Ghost (*p'o*) Chu Hsi means the essence of human substance (*t'i-chih-shen*), and by Soul (*hun*) he means the essence of human breath (*ch'i-chih-shen*).[242] Through this analogy, "the Spirits and the Divinities" are classified into the category of Material Force. Chu Hsi quotes Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I in order to

support this opinion particularly for the association of the Spirits and the Divinities with the constituent parts of Material Force, namely, Yin and Yang respectively.[243]

In his "Ta Liao Te-ming" Chu Hsi turned his attention to the meaning of ancestral worship, so that the ontological significance of the argument was not fully developed. We can only say that in his forty-fifth year, Chu Hsi had successfully divided Principle and Material Force, and had touched upon the ontological significance of the concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities." But in order to complete the exposition of Chu Hsi's ontology it will be necessary to give a brief account of the later development of this concept in his system.

The advantage of the separation of Vital Principle from Material Force is that it produced a reverence for Principle, which is eternal and dominant in contrast with Material Force which is temporal. A consideration of the problem of immortality leads us to the conclusion that we should pay attention not to our transient personal lives, but to the eternal moral Principle. However, so long as the Vital Principle was elevated above Material Force, another problem was bound to arise. In such a dichotomous system, Vital Principle, the mover, belongs to metaphysical level, so can neither be divided nor move the real world; Material Force, the object moved, is oriented toward the myriad things and dynamic. Moreover, even if Material Force were set in motion, that motion would be mechanical rather than vital. Ch'ien Mu, in his *Chu-tzu hsin-hsüeh-an* [*A New Anthology and Commentary on Chu Hsi's Philosophy*], makes this point clear: "If the universe is understood only in terms of Principle and Material Force, it would lack vivacity and vitality."[244] In order to escape this paradoxical result there needs to be a third element acting as medium, having the characteristics of both Principle and Material Force. In Chu Hsi's system, "the Divinities" (when mentioned singly, it can include

the notion of "the Spirits"), or "the Spirits and the Divinities," serves this function.

In a conversation held after 1196, Chu Hsi says:

> The Spirits and the Divinities exist on the level of Material Force, so it is physical (*hsing-erh-hsia*). However, in contrast to Things, the Spirits and the Divinities, being on the level of Material Force, are the substance of Things. Things exist on the level of Physical Form, and actually come into existence only given the existence of Material Force. The Spirits and the Divinities are the quintessence of Material Force.[245]

"The Spirits and the Divinities" as opposing-and-circulating forces dominate the aggregation and separation of matter and may be regarded as the substance of Things. On the other hand, insofar as it is dynamic it belongs to the level of Material Force. Although the Vital Principle dwells in Material Force, it can activate the latter only by way of the forces of "the Spirits and the Divinities." However, from the point of view of Things, during the evolution of Material Force it is the forces of the Spirits and of the Divinities that we encounter as the most universal, and so it is from them that the working of Vital Principle may be inferred. "The Spirits and the Divinities" are therefore the representative of Vital Principle in the realm of Material Force. The ontology of Confucianism and Taoism before Chu Hsi was basically vitalist. While Chu Hsi for the purpose of emphasising morality elevated the Vital Principle and let Vital Force degenerate into Material Force, he had to add a medium between Vital Principle and Material Force, lest the universe should become unmovable, or move merely mechanically.

The concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities" is also advantageous for explaining consciousness. In appearance all things are separated, but they are in

substance interconnected into a whole by the underlying opposing-and-circulating forces of "the Spirits and the Divinities." And because the Spirits and the Divinities are the substance of everything, each thing is interconnected with all the others. The means of connexion is consciousness. In physical objects and inferior creatures consciousness is latent or feeble; while in Man it is fully developed. The counterpart of "the Spirits and the Divinities" in Man is "the Ghost and the Soul," another name for the Mind. Through his consciousness Man can embrace the whole universe. In this way Chu Hsi found place for the subjective Mind in the objective context of the universe. With the theory of "the Spirits and the Divinities," Chu Hsi had elucidated the existence of a world of consciousness for Man within the dichotomous world of Principle and Material Force. It is noteworthy that the simultaneous insistence on the doctrine of "Man as subject" and "Man as creature," referred to previously, is provided with a systematic justification by this metaphysical position.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHU HSI'S METHOD OF SELF CULTIVATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE (1170-1177)

1. The Relationship of the Two Methods, "Holding Fast to Attentiveness" and "Investigating Things," to the Tranquil and Active States of Mind Respectively

The Investigation of Things (*ko-wu*) was an enterprise Chu Hsi had been dedicated to for most of his life. Since childhood, he had been devoted to broad and deep reading. While studying with Li T'ung, he regarded this enterprise as having its basis in the metaphysics of "the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars." During his "old theory" period, his method involved the combination of two kinds of discipline, "Seeking for Humanity," and "Investigating Things," of which the former was fundamental, while the latter was a subsidiary practice. However, with the establishment of the "new theory" and thereafter his new metaphysics, "the Investigation of Things" was placed on a par with "Holding Fast to Attentiveness" (*chu ching*) which replaced the earlier discipline of Seeking for Humanity.

Not long after the formulation of the "new theory" in which Mind alternates between tranquility and activity, Chu Hsi allocated the practice of Attentiveness to the tranquil state of Mind, and added the Investigation of Things as a discipline for the regulation of the active state of Mind. As these are practised together, they make possible moral cultivation of the whole Mind. Chu Hsi said at that time that these two practices included the practices of both substance and function, the fundamental and the minute, the internal and the external.[246]

Since then Chu Hsi had regarded these two methods as complementary to one another, so that even when he was sixty-five he still described them as the two wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird.[247] However, a careful examination shows that there was a gradual change in their significance: they no longer matched the tranquil and active states of Mind respectively, but became unified as a daily regimen of moral cultivation.

2. The Establishment of the Stages of Elementary Learning and Great Learning

The famous division of Elementary Learning (*hsiao-hsüeh*) and Great Learning (*ta-hsüeh*), which is crucial to the development of Chu Hsi's method of moral cultivation, was made during his debate on the problem of Humanity with the Hunan School.[248] The Hunan scholars argued that the "knowledge and consciousness" of Humanity should precede moral practice. Chu Hsi reversed this procedure so that Attentiveness preceded knowledge. In their debate, Chu Hsi tried to support this sequence of moral disciplines by appealing to the classical authority of the *Li chi*. Although in his youth Chu Hsi had touched on the idea of Elementary Learning based on that Classic,[249] it is through that debate that he ascertained its position in the whole education, as well as its philosophical significance.

There is an interesting dialectical process in Chu Hsi's reconstruction of the ancient theory of education. In the "old theory" Chu Hsi's thought was close to that of the Hunan School, teaching that knowing Humanity is the premise of moral practice. But after establishing the "new theory" he argued that self-cultivation must precede the "knowledge and consciousness" of Humanity. It seems,

inferred from Chu Hsi's reply, that the Hunan scholars fought against Chu Hsi by appealing to the authority of the *Ta-hsüeh*, in which "the Investigation of Things" (*ko-wu*) and "the Extension of Knowledge" (*chih-chih*) come before moral practice. Reacting to this challenge, Chu Hsi, appealing to another authority, the *Li-chi*, added a stage of Elementary Learning antecedent to the Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowlege. The Elementary Learning of the ancients had the purpose of teaching children under fifteen the familial requirements, such as hygiene and manners, and those of society such as rites, music, archery, and charioteering. It was not only a means of socialization, but was also a discipline for the composure and firmness of Mind through habitual practice. Although the *Ta-hsüeh* [the *Great Learning*] starts from the Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge, these disciplines are subsequent to the habitual practice started in the Elementary Learning.

In contrast to the opinion of the Hunan School that according to the *Ta-hsüeh* acquisition of knowledge should precede practice, Chu Hsi argued that the order of those two displines should be decided in the context of the whole process of learning. This process, according to Chu Hsi, is as follows. For each item to be inculcated, a knowledge and understanding of it should precede any practice of it. So in the stage of Elementary Learning, while teaching children the virtues of filial and fraternal piety, Purity (*ch'eng*) and Attentiveness, and familiarizing them with the texts of the Classics, we must explain to them the significance of each item of these disciplines before requiring the children to practise them. Such learning is called "shallow" knowledge and "small" practice. Coming into the stage of Great Learning, students are taught to extrapolate from what they already know toward the unknown, and so to broaden their knowledge until it comprehends all the principles of Heaven, Earth,

and the myriad things. And it is not until such time that the Way, including Purification of the Will (*ch'eng-i*), Rectification of the Mind (*cheng-hsin*), Personal Cultivation (*hsiu-shen*), Regulation of the Family (*ch'i-chia*), Bringing Order to the State (*ch'ih-kuo*), and Bringing Peace to the World (*p'ing-t'ien-hsia*), may be completely fulfilled. This completion of knowledge is what Chu Hsi called "deep" knowledge, and the fulfillment of the Way is what he called "great" practice. Chu Hsi concluded that for every item, at each stage, knowledge is required before practice is possible, yet the totality of learning is itself a dialectical development between knowledge and practice, such that shallow knowledge and small practice must be attained before their deep and great counterparts.[250]

Chu Hsi could defend his position that the practice of Attentiveness must precede the knowledge of Mind by formulating the relationship between these two in terms of the distinction between Elementary and Great Learning. The practice of Attentiveness then could be categorized as Elementary Learning, for the latter does in fact aim at acquiring the habit of Attentiveness during the course of learning. But the knowledge of Mind is of a deep kind, and so must be subsequent to the practice of Attentiveness.

The formulation of the teaching of Elementary and Great Learning also prompted a new phase in Chu Hsi's method of self-cultivation. The practice of Attentiveness and the Investigation of Things were no longer assigned to particular states of Mind, but were simply treated as daily moral disciplines. One reason might be that once these practices are thought of as the school curriculum, they would inevitably lose any sense of "inner" cultivation and become formal disciplines. More significantly, although Chu Hsi proposed a two-staged course of education, his students were in fact adults who had missed their Elementary education, and had long since

entered the proper time for Great Learning. Therefore Chu Hsi required them to practise both the Elementary and the Great Learning concurrently. They had to devote themselves to the Investigation of Things, while at the same time practising Attentiveness in order to compensate for having missing the opportunity in childhood.[251]

In this way, in Chu Hsi's assessment, the two methods became a daily regimen of moral practice, not necessarily assigned to different states of Mind; while the Investigation of Things, as it belonged to "Great Learning," became increasingly important.

3. Holding Fast to Attentiveness for the Containment of Mind

Since the establishment of the "new theory," Attentiveness had been regarded as the fundamental method of self-cultivation. But because the purpose of Attentiveness was the cultivation of Mind, its significance would not be ascertained until the character of Mind was understood. We have seen that Chu Hsi accounted the essential character of Mind as a pure capacity, independent from, and able to dominate, such elements as Nature, Feelings, and the Body. But the question of how Mind could be moral still had to be answered. Chu Hsi's opinion on this matter was formulated around 1174, at the age of forty-five, through discussing a paragraph of the *Meng-tzu* with a few of his friends.[252] The relevant *Meng-tzu* text is, "Confucius said, 'Hold it fast (*ts'ao*) and you contain (*ts'un*) it. Let it go and you lose it. It comes in and goes out at no definite time and without anyone's knowing its direction,' He was talking about Mind."[253] Chu Hsi interpreted this as follows:

> The substance of Mind is originally tranquil, yet it cannot but move. Its function is originally good, but it may also drift into evil. That which drifts into evil may not be called the original [function of] substance of Mind, nevertheless it must be called Mind, albeit under the spell of external things. Thus the sage (i.e., Confucius) only says, "Hold it fast and you contain it (Chu Hsi appends a note: the Mind while contained is tranquil, and all its activities will be good); let it go and you lose it (note: Therefore the active Mind drifts into evil); it comes in and goes out at no definite time and without anyone's knowing its direction (note: 'go out' means 'lose' and 'come in' means 'contain.' There is neither definite time nor definite place [as regards the Mind's being contained or lost], but all depends on whether man holds it fast or lets it go)." These four sentences included all that may be said of Mind: substance, function, beginning, end, reality, illusion, righteousness, and perversion. And there are only two alternatives for the placing of Mind: either hold it fast, and it "comes in," or let it go, and it "goes out;" there is no other place to locate Mind.[254]

This exposition is a continuation of his "new theory," in which, with the effort of Attentiveness (i.e., the "holding fast" in this passage), Mind may contain itself in tranquility, so that its activity (function) may follow due course and degree. An examination of Chu Hsi's criticism of his friends' interpretation of this text will clarify Chu Hsi's opinion on the character of Mind, and the role of the practice of Attentiveness.

There are three other interpretations and therefore three more views of Mind:

(1) Ho Hao and Shih Lei held that the substance of Mind is transcendent. They maintain that the substance of Mind cannot be described in terms of "containing" and "losing." Chu Hsi retorted that if this were so, what is held fast and contained is not the substance. But in that case, what is it and why bother to contain it?[255] It becomes clear that Chu Hsi held a realistic view of Mind,

contrary to the idea that there might be a pure transcendental Mind beyond our reach and therefore impossible to be cultivated.

(2) Yu Chiu-yen thought that the correctness of Mind lies in its coming in and going out at the right time. Against this view Chu Hsi argued that Confucius did not consider it an affliction of Mind that it should come in and go out at no definite time.[356] It seems that, different from Chu Hsi, Yu Chiu-yen used "come in" and "go out" to mean the "tranquility" and "activity" of the Mind. But here I analyse only Chu Hsi's opinion. Chu Hsi's criticism is important in deciding the relation of Mind to morality. Chu Hsi meant, I suggest, that the character of Mind as such consists in *spontaneity* rather than in *morality*. Mind may spontaneously be moral, but not necessarily so. Therefore the "going out" (which means "acting and drifting into evil") of Mind cannot be called the affliction of Mind. If preceded by the practice of Attentiveness, Mind will spontaneously be moral. If there has been no such practice, the drifting of Mind into evil will still be a result of its spontaneity, and therefore of the character of Mind.

(3) The third erroneous opinion, proposed by Lü Tsu-chien, is that Confucius, though referring to the actual Mind with these terms ("coming in" and "going out"), is not to be understood as making a value judgement. Rather, his intention is to convey something of the swiftness and agility of Mind in the transition between tranquility and activity. Although what Confucius indicated to us is not the Original Mind, the marvellous agility and flexibility of the substance of Mind is still revealed in its continuous cyclical transformation. Facing this opinion, Chu Hsi's attitute became conservative again. He commented that Confucius, in describing the endless transition of Mind, did not mean to admire it, but rather mean to cultivate it with the method of Attentiveness.[357]

Set in contrast to the above three views, Chu Hsi's concept of Mind should be clear. There is only one Mind, which is our everyday mind, and whose character is pure spontaneity. Nevertheless, Mind should not be thought of as amoral; firstly, it has to be evaluated in terms of morality; and secondly, only if preceded by the practice of Attentiveness, will Mind naturally move in the direction of morality.

But in that case Attentiveness is only the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for achieving a moral Mind. Mind as such is a purely spontaneous capacity, and in form is a pure consciousness. The practice of Attentiveness contributes to its containment and so enhances its tendency toward morality. But a great deal more effort is required in order to extend the Mind and increase its moral value. For this purpose, another moral method, the Investigation of Things, has to be employed.

4. The Concept of the Body and the Search for Universality

In section A of this chapter we have seen that through the debate with the Hunan School, Chu Hsi's concept of the Body (*shen*) was formed. What I shall now consider is how that concept contributed to the development of the method of the Investigation of Things. In the tenth month of 1173, Chu Hsi wrote "Nan-chien-chou yu-hsi hsien-hsüeh chi." In it he said:

> Heaven gives birth to Man and endows him with the Nature of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom, and therefore puts Man into the relations of sovereign and subject, father and son, brother and brother, husband and wife, friend and friend, which are called the "constancies" of Man. However, the material force which a particular man is endowed with is not necessarily pure and excellent. Therefore

> while desires are aroused and Feelings are in excess, he may degenerate without knowing it. For this reason the ancient sage kings established schools to educate their people....[258]

Following this is a passage concerned with Elementary and Great Learning similar to that described in the previous section. It is noteworthy that in this passage it is the Body that brings about the necessity for learning. Chu Hsi followed Chou Tun-i and Ch'eng I, in maintaining that the human Body, with Nature as its Principle, is composed of the "highest excellence of the Five Agents." But as evident in this passage, this excellence is relative to the animals and plants. Between men, Bodies manifest natural differences, and these differences are ultimately due to an unequal endowment of Material Force. Thus, it is the differences between Bodies, and in their underlying Material Force, that constitute the reason that all men are in need of education; and this education enables them to realise their Nature and the Essential Relationships, which are universal. In other words, learning is a struggle toward the objective and universal Principle, by Man who, still being imperfect, is inclined toward error. The purpose of the Investigation of Things, which now becomes the central method of moral cultivation, is therefore to search for the objective and universal Principle.

5. The Substance-Function Structure of Principle

Chu Hsi came to appreciate the philosophical significance of the Investigation of Things in the period from about 1174, when he was forty-five years of age. This is shown by the following facts. (1) In a letter replying to Chiang

Mo, written probably in 1174, Chu Hsi said that he had known of Ch'eng I's interpretation of the method of the Investigation of Things when he was fifteen or sixteen, and had given it more than thirty years thought. He added, however, that it had not been till recently that he had realised the correctness of this interpretation. This realisation came, he said, on the one hand through the justification it offered his own method of moral practice, and on the other hand through the discovery of the consistency between that interpretation and other Classics.[359] (The classical source for the Investigation of Things is the *Ta-hsüeh*.) (2) Two years later in another essay he related the Investigation of Things to other Classics and declared it the cardinal heritage of the tradition received from Confucius, Yen Tzu, Tzu-ssu, and Mencius.[360] (3) A year earlier, in 1175, Chu Hsi confronted Lu Chiu-yüan at the Goose Lake Monastery (O-hu ssu) in a debate over the relative primacy of learning (i.e., the Investigation of Things), or of the cultivation of Original Mind (*pen-hsin*).[361] Although their debate was somewhat preliminary, it may well have brought about Chu Hsi's rethinking of the meaning of Investigation of Things.

Now we shall see how Chu Hsi interpreted the Investigation of Things in the letter replying to Chiang Mo.

> Heaven gives birth to people, giving them Things (*wu*, by which Chu Hsi meant external things and affairs, although the human Body should also be included) and Standards (*tse*). "Things" refer to that which has Physical Form, and Standards to Principle (*li*), which transcends Physical Form. As soon as Man is born, he cannot but have Things. If he does not understand the Principle of those Things, he is unable to follow the correctness of Nature and Heavenly Destiny nor to respond to Things in the proper manner. Therefore he must reach into Things in order to find Principle. If he knows to search for Principle but does not enter

> thoroughly into Things, the Principle of Things will not be totally uncovered and his Knowledge will not be fully extended. Therefore he should Investigating Things thoroughly. This is why we say that in the Investigation of Things, only by entering into Things can the Principle of Things be fully uncovered. When this is achieved, our Knowledge will become comprehensive and thorough, and consequently without obstacle or ignorance; the Will will naturally become Pure and Mind will become Rectified. This is the original meaning of the text in the *Ta-hsüeh*, and that is why the interpretation of Master Ch'eng is correct.[262]

The first thing we notice in this paragraph is that Chu Hsi maintains Man can reach Principle only by Investigating Things, including himself and all that he encounters. The idea that Principle, the aim of Investigation, is to be found in Things, is evidently based on the doctrine of his new metaphysics that the Great Ultimate (i.e., Principle) dwells in each Concrete Thing. According to Chu Hsi, the Principle in a Thing will be revealed to us in terms of its substance-function structure. The functional part he named "the way it (i.e., the Thing in which Principle dwells) should be" (*suo-tang-jan*) and the substantial part "the reason it should be so" (*suo-i-jan*).[263] The former refers to both the ideal state of the Thing, and the self-evidently correct behaviour which should be universally directed towards that Thing. For example, Chu Hsi says in the same letter:

> "What should be treated generously" refers to fathers, sons, and brothers, having affection towards each other. This is "the way it should be" of Principle, and is also the way Mind cannot help but feel.[264]

In this example, fathers, sons, and brothers are "Things," whereas the affection and the devotion among them are "the way Things should be."[265] The substantial part, "the reason it should be so," indicates Nature (the Great

Ultimate immanent in that Thing) which supports the existence of that Thing, and which can manifest "the way it should be."

This substance-function structure of Principle may be examined from the two ponts of view discussed in the previous chapter. From the point of view of the whole, the Great Ultimate is the reason for the circulation of Material Force between tranquility and activity. The Great Ultimate, as substance, is "the reason that Things should be as they are." As regards "the way Things should be," it consists in the circulation of Material Force, during the tranquility of which the Concrete Things are made, and during the activity of which the Concrete Things fulfill their Natures. From the point of view of Concret Things, in each of them dwells Nature, the Great Ultimate incarnated: that is "the reason it should be so." When Nature is manifest both as the ideal of that Thing, and as the moral codes which should be followed by all those who come in touch with that Thing, it becomes the Way (in a narrow sense, meaning the manifestation of Nature), that is "the way the Thing should be."

With this concept of Principle there is no distinction, such as we make today, between natural law and moral law. This is because Principle, the metaphysical substance, as abstract regulative standard is itself the idea of law. It is in itself the metaphysical reason for the existence of Things. But while dwelling in a Thing as its Nature, its function consists in the laws which are to be followed by all Things. Both natural and moral laws constitute "the way Things should be." As natural Things must follow natural law so must Man observe moral law. And as to "the reason Things should be so" it is the same Great Ultimate for both kinds of law. In this sense there is no distinction between natural and moral law.

Now we examine how "Investigating Things" enables Mind to achieve morality. For this purpose Chu Hsi first

contrasts and then combines the Investigation of Things (as an external study) with the Extension of Knowledge (as an internal acquirement). Chu Hsi can do this, in my opinion, for the following reason. Mind, as pure consciousness, may be considered both with regard to its contents and with regards to its capacity. Its contents are what it embraces, and this includes Nature and Feelings, as well as the acquired knowledge of Principle. Its capacity is shown by the fact that it can yield a mastery over Nature, Feeling, and the Body, and can acquire Principle and put it into application. Since Mind has these two aspects, the uncovering of the Principle of Things not only extends the contents of knowledge, but, more importantly, extends the capacity of Mind. The Will, in Chu Hsi's system, is defined as "the activity of the Mind." Therefore, while Knowledge is broadened to the point where nothing remains obscure and the capacity of the Mind is greatly increased, the Will will be Pure, and as a natural consequence Mind will be Rectified.

Here I shall give an example from Chu Hsi's *Meng-tzu huo-wen* [*Questions and Answers on the Mencius*], the production of many years effort, published in 1177.[266] In that work Chu Hsi discussed substance and function in terms of understanding Principle. He interprets the phrase "the extension of Mind to the utmost, (*chin-hsin*)"[267] as the result of Investigating Things and Extending Knowledge. He says that the substance of Mind emcompasses [the Principle of] everything and the function of Mind manages (i.e., properly responds to) everything. Therefore, while through Investigation, Principle is thoroughly understood and nothing is left unknown, the substance and function of Mind which include everything may be fully extended.[268]

These conclusions concerning the Investigation of Things and its relation to Mind were the culmination of Chu Hsi's long retirement from public office, when he left

his post as the clerk of records of the T'ung-an prefecture in 1156. During these twenty years he had adopted Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, and then struggled to establish his own metaphysics. Living on a government sinecure, he enjoyed "the twenty years in seclusion."[269] By the end of that period, he had achieved many things. The meaning of Principle had been clarified; and, of the two methods of self-cultivation, the Investigation of Things had been given a predominent position. This was because the practice of Attentiveness had been restricted to the role of "containing" (*ts'un*) Mind as the prerequisite for further effort, whereas the Investigation of Things was the way to "extend" (*chih*) Mind, in the aspects both of substance and of function. By this time, then, the elements of his philosophy were complete. From about the age of fifty, his life entered a new stage. Although he still had plenty of time in seclusion, he dedicated himself sometimes to government duties, sometimes to political struggles, and he often involved himself in debates with other schools. His life was no longer as peaceful as it had been during the previous twenty years, yet it was only in response to these challenges that he was able to test and revise his opinions, and so merge them into a comprehensive system.

C. THE ELEVATION OF PRINCIPLE (1175-1189)

1. Honouring Moral Nature and Following the Path of Enquiry and Study

In 1175 the celebrated debate between Chu Hsi and the Lu brothers, Lu Chiu-ling and Lu Chiu-yüan, took place in the Goose Lake Monastery. The significance of this debate for Chu Hsi was that he was provoked into rethinking his method of the Investigation of Things. This is evident from the fact that in the following years one of Chu Hsi's main concerns was to find a balance between "honouring moral nature" (*tsun-te-hsing*) and "following the path of enquiry and study" (*tao-wen-hsüeh*).

The classical source for these two methods of moral cultivation is an axiom of the *Chung-yung*.[270] The latter method was generally regarded in Chu Hsi's time as the essential part, and indeed often as identical with, the Investigation of Things. This was the first of the many disagreements between Chu Hsi and the Lu School.

In the debate at the Goose Lake Monastery, the Lu brothers made a contrast between the Original Mind (*pen-hsin*) and book learning. The Original Mind they referred to was that which is universal to everybody and which is naturally moral. That everybody has the Original Mind is evident from the fact that everybody, without instruction, knows how to love their parents, respect their elders, mourn for the dead, and show reverence during rituals. They argued that extension of the Original Mind leads to sagehood, but that book learning distracts from the cultivation of the Mind, so much so that if it should become the chief focus and concern, it would block the Original Mind and never lead to sagehood.[271] Chu Hsi was

very displeased with their criticism of book learning, to which he had been devoted for so many years. After the debate, in a letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi described the Lu brothers as "totally abolishing book learning and dedicated solely to daily practice. Their teaching is the enlightenment of the Original Mind in the course of daily practice." Chu Hsi thought "they are too confident, and narrow-minded, and they do not acquire virtues externally, so that they are unconsciously inclined toward Ch'an." However, although he did not retreat an inch in his argument in favour of book learning, he was impressed by the personal virtues of the Lu brothers, so that he described them as "having admirable temperaments," "holding fast to simplicity and honesty, and straightforward from within, which is really extraordinary."[272]

In the next few years Chu Hsi had more encounters with the Lu brothers and their students. Comparing their personalities with those of his own students, Chu Hsi concluded that both schools had strengths and weaknesses, and the best thing to do was to combined the strengths and to eliminate the weaknesses of both sides. In 1180, at the age of fifty-one, he expressed this opinion in several letters,[273] but what I shall quote here is a letter written to Hsiang An-shih, a student of the Lu brothers, in 1183.

> Generally speaking, from the time of Tzu-ssu (the supposed author of the *Chung-yung*), it has been proposed that "to honour moral nature" and "to follow the path of enquiry and study" are the two crucial disciplines in education. Now what Tzu-ching (Lu Chiu-yüan) has said is exclusively concerned with honouring moral nature, while what [Chu] Hsi usually discusses is generally in the line of enquiry and study. Therefore his (Tzu-ching's) followers are mostly magnificent in moral integrity, but are not the least bit *careful* in studying the Way. On the contrary they cover up their carelessness by inventing and sticking to an imaginary doctrine. As for myself,

> although I never talk unintelligibly about the Way, I often miss the the crucial point of discerning whether my study is "for [the improvement of] myself" or "for [the approbation of] others,"[274] [and consequently neglect the pursuit of internal virtues.] Now both of us should reflect and make effort to avoid the weaknesses and combine the strengths, so that we may not be one-sided.[275]

Chu Hsi admired "keeping steadfast to virtues" on the part of the Lu School, but was more reserved when speaking of their learning and doctrine. However, the teaching of the Lu School served as a mirror in which were reflected the shortcomings of his own method. Moral cultivation and classical study should be combined, as Tzu-ssu taught. But in reality they are usually so divided that complete dedication to one results in neglect of the other. Perhaps this difficulty is a permanent one. For, strictly speaking, neither Chu Hsi nor Lu Chiu-yüan solved it, nor was it solved in the subsequent intellectual history. It is said, for example, that the Ming scholars "honoured moral nature," whereas the Ch'ing scholars "followed the path of enquiry and study."[276]

Our task, however, is to see how Chu Hsi formulated his solution to this problem. His experience with the Lu brothers reminded him to keep a balance between daily practice and book learning. But in my opinion, a more positive consequence is that it inspired Chu Hsi to reflect upon the significance of studying the Confucian Classics. This can be seen from the following change in his attitude to this question. In his letter of 1183, quoted above, he had been critical merely of the carelessness with which the Lu School approach book learning, but from 1185 on, he became increasingly distressed by their occasional self-proclaimed superiority and arrogance, which he ascribed to their lack of cultivation in the Classics.[277] Their behaviour increased his confidence in the relation of the Classics to moral

cultivation, so that a year later in a letter to Lu Chiu-yüan he described how effective he himself had recently been in his daily practice, and how he was no longer troubled by the shortcomings of detailed and therefore fragmented study.[278] Because Chu Hsi never abandoned commentating the Classics, I believe, that what he meant by this must have been that the sayings in the Classics were now for him not only texts for study, but increasingly applicable to daily life.

In a letter from his later years written to one of his students, Lin Pu, Chu Hsi described the nature of Confucian teaching as follows:

> Although the Way as a whole is high and great, it exists to the fullest in the daily, trivial, and immediate affairs. ... Therefore the sage (Confucius) taught us to go about our affairs in the proper order. He made us seek among the most immediate and trivial things, thereby enlarging our minds with *learning* to open the door of scholarship, and constraining our behaviour with propriety to guarantee the fulfillment of daily practice.[279] Then, when one advances an inch, one will stand fast at that inch; when one advances a foot, one will stand fast at that foot. In this way we gain ground daily and monthly. Then the Way as a whole may be expected to be gradually understood, and practised until eventually fulfilled.[280]

From this letter we can see that Chu Hsi made use of a correspondence between the Confucian Classics, daily practice, and the Way. Chu Hsi had sufficient reason to require such a harmony between these three, because the Confucian Classics reflected the world of the Essential Relationships, and it was within that world that Chu Hsi sought the Way. This position could not have been reached without the challenge of the Lu School with respect to book learning.

2. The Distinction Between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires

In the twelfth month of 1182, at the age of fifty-four, Chu Hsi was appointed financial adviser of Eastern Chekiang (*Che-tung*), and in that capacity was responsible for the management of a large famine relief campaign. While in that post he had the opportunity of meeting several Chekiang scholars. In the result, he was far from impressed by their teaching; and after he resigned and returned home, in the ninth month of 1183, he wrote several letters in criticism of them.[281]

He said of them in a letter to Shen Shu-hui:

> They abolish the Classics while studying the Histories; pass over the Way of the sage kings, while promoting the art of power politics; discussing thoroughly the historical process of ascent and downfall, yet not examining whether their own minds are contained or distracted.[282]

These three criticisms are made by means of three contrasts. The first contrast concerns the works to be studied: the Classics or the Histories. In the second contrast Chu Hsi attacks their learning: their goal was the politics of self-interest and opportunism. In the final contrast Chu Hsi complains that they are rashly negligent of the cultivation of their own minds.

In the course of the dispute, the focus of attention gradually fell on the distinction within the Mind itself between Heavenly Principle (*t'ien-li*) and Human Desires (*jen-yü*). This theme was earnestly debated between Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang, the outstanding Chekiang scholar. In their debate such problems as the role of ethics in politics, and of the Way in history, were also raised,[283] but we shall be concerned only with Chu Hsi's elevation of the concept of Heavenly Principle.

Ch'en Liang argued that human History always manifests Morality. According to him, wherever Man exists, there is the Mind, which cannot be lost forever, and wherever there is the Mind, there are the laws (of the sage kings), which cannot be abolished forever.

Chu Hsi retorted that in the use of the term "not forever," Ch'en Liang in fact has allowed that the Mind may "sometimes" be lost and the laws "sometimes" abolished. Chu Hsi pointed out that the Mind is not always reliable. It is composed of the Moral Mind (*tao-hsin*) and the Human Mind (*jen-hsin*), and that although the former is the source of morality, the latter is the source of immorality. Chu Hsi then traced the origins of both kinds of Minds and showed that from the time of birth, Man is confined to the particularity of his individual Body, and so has a particular Human Mind manifesting Human Desires. On the other hand, because at his birth he acquired the perfection of Heaven and Earth, he must have a Moral Mind manifesting Heavenly Principle. In daily life there is always the continual competition between these two Minds, and one must win over the other. Therefore we must make sure to discriminate the Human Mind from the Moral Mind, and having done so to hold fast to the latter. Only through such steadfast application will it be possible not to stray from Heavenly Principle to Human Desires.[264]

The distinction between the Human Mind and the Moral Mind played an important role in Chu Hsi's late philosophy. It was a continuation of his theory that the Mind should not be regarded as inherently good, but must be made virtuous through moral effort. That is why he had developed the "new theory," in which he maintained that the practice of Attentiveness was necessary for the proper functioning of the Mind. The advance made by Chu Hsi during the present debate consisted in his having accounted theoretically for the moral character of the Mind. Since Man is endowed with the excellence of Heaven

and Earth, while at the same time being confined to a particular Body, so there is a permanent distinction and a constant competition between the Moral Mind and the Human Mind. Indeed, though Chu Hsi touched on this point, most of his argumentation during this period was concerned with the distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires.

In making this distinction, Chu Hsi affirmed the supremacy of Principle. In contrast to the sometimes wayward Mind, Principle is permanent and absolute. When the Mind becomes conscious of the Principle, it becomes identified with the Moral Mind. But even if the Human Mind should supersede or obstruct the Moral Mind, Principle will still subsist within Man as the inchoate perfection, or will exist above Man as the Way of Heaven and Earth. Indeed, Principle precedes Mind, and even precedes history. In this way Chu Hsi came to deny Ch'en Liang's argument which ascribes moral value to human history without qualification. Chu Hsi points out in a letter to Ch'en Liang:

> It is true that Heaven, Earth, and Man are as they are because there is only one Way. But Heaven and Earth have no Mind (here "having no Mind" means "being absolutely objective") whereas Man has Desires. Therefore although the revolution of Heaven and Earth is constant, Man may sometimes go astray. The moment the Moral Mind is lost, the Way of Man is extinguished. When the Way of Man is extinguished, although the one Way still functions in Heaven and Earth, it does not proceed among Men. It is wrong to infer from the fact that Heaven always proceeds high above and Earth always complies down below, that the Way of Man is always fulfilled, and in its turn supports the existence of Heaven and Earth.[205]

In this way Chu Hsi not only demanded the necessity of the self-examination of the Mind, and of the fulfillment of the Way of the ancient sage kings, but, most importantly,

taught the constancy and absoluteness of Principle (the constant Way of Heaven and Earth).

The distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires became another weapon for Chu Hsi to use in his attacks on the Lu School. In 1186 when Chu Hsi was fifty-seven, his relationship with the Lu School became increasingly antagonistic. From this time he often made reference to this distinction. In a letter to Lu Chiu-yüan he described their advocacy of the primacy of Original Mind as an arrogant theory separating the internal and the external, the subtle and the coarse, and involving a dichotomy between conscience and daily affairs.[386] This is an accusation that the Lu School failed to cultivate their Minds with the Principle which is manifested in external Things. In a letter to his friend, Chao Yen-su, written at about this time, Chu Hsi describes the learning of Lu Chiu-yüan as follows:

> He has good opinions on the cultivation of the Mind. Because of these, he regards himself as transcending traditional and contemporary scholarship, and pays no more attention to the Investigation of Principle. In this way he has lost what he had gained. He fails to notice that his human desires are going astray everywhere while he boasts that he possesses all Heavenly Principle within his mind. I do not know where his cultivation lies![387]

This comment, I believe, is too harsh on Lu Chiu-yüan. However, it does reflect how Chu Hsi had regained his confidence in his own method. It also shows that in his own philosophy the position of Principle had been elevated above that of Mind.

3. The Distinction Between "the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang"

I shall now consider the development of the relationship between Principle and Material Force in Chu Hsi's philosophy. The use of "Principle" and "Material Force" as contrasting terms seems to date from 1172, when he wrote his draft of the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh*; but he does not use them frequently in this contrastive way until 1189, after a debate with Lu Chiu-yüan.[288] I believe the reason for this is that when first proposed in Chu Hsi's forties, it was explicitly used for the purpose of explanining individual life (this has been discussed earlier in this chapter), but for this purpose Chu Hsi found the other pair of categories, the Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin and Yang (Concrete Things), was more powerful. But as his emphasis was towards providing a metaphysical foundation for morality, he came to rely more and more on the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force." Although in a broader sense the Great Ultimate is identical with Principle, and Yin and Yang with Material Force, these two sets of categories have different emphases. The pair of "the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang" emphasises the union of substance and function, while the other pair emphasises the distinction between them. The following is a description of the process through which "the Great Ultimate" was elevated above "Yin and Yang," paving a way for the substitution of the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force."

In the years 1173-1174, Chu Hsi discussed in a letter to Yang Fang his *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh* and explained the term "Great Ultimate." He said that the name "Ultimate" (*chi*) was derived from the word for "hinge-pole" (*shu-chi*), which term suggests the unmoved but activating Principle for the circulation of Yin and Yang. It is in this sense that the Great Ultimate is "the root of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things."[289] From this explanation, we may deduce that while the Great Ultimate was used for

the purpose of interpreting life, it was its immanence in Yin and Yang that Chu Hsi was concerned with.

I explained in the last section how, while forming the doctrine of the Investigation of Things, Chu Hsi thoroughly explored the moral significance of Principle. Having done this, it was the transcendence of the Great Ultimate (i.e., Principle) that gradually became his main concern.

In his early fifties, in a letter replying to Ch'eng Chiung, Chu Hsi states that the meaning of the words "Great Ultimate" (*t'ai-chi*) is "the consummation of Principle" (*li-chih chih chi*). His intention in this letter was to refute Ch'eng Chiung's opinion that "the Great Ultimate" means "the Great Equilibrium" (*ta-chung*) which existed *before* the separation of Yin and Yang, and of Heaven and Earth. Ch'eng Chiung's theory, according to my classification, was that of Evolutionary Vitalism. In the letter, after defining the meaning of the Great Ultimate, Chu Hsi explains its immanent character by saying:

> Wherever there is Principle, there must exist some Thing. There is no temporal sequence between them. So it is said "Change constitutes the Great Ultimate," meaning that the Great Ultimate is immanent in Yin and Yang, and not external to them.[290]

Here Chu Hsi emphasises the immanence of the Great Ultimate in order to refute Ch'eng Chiung's theory, but the description of the Great Ultimate in terms of "the consummation of Principle," replacing his earlier "hinge-pole" metaphor, reveals his increasingly transcendental view of the Great Ultimate.

In the second month of 1188, in his fifty-ninth year, Chu Hsi produced printed editions of his two earlier works, *T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh* and *Hsi-ming chieh-i* [*Commentary on Chang Tsai's Western Inscription*].[291] In

the summer of that year, he received a letter from Lu Chiu-yüan charging that Chou Tun-i's original work, the *T'ai-chi t'u shuo*, was taken from Taoism. Subsequent to this letter, a new debate developed between Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan on the relationship between "the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang."[22] I believe that this debate functioned as the last step in Chu Hsi's elevation of Principle, resulting in the establishment of the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force" in the following year.

In this debate Lu Chiu-yüan defined the Ultimate as "*chung*," but differd from Ch'eng Chiung in that he situated it in the state after the emergence of the myriad things. Therefore the term "*chung*" as Lu Chiu-yüan used it should be translated "the mean." In contrast to Ch'eng Chiung, Lu Chiu-yüan advocated a Great Ultimate that was completely immanent. He even went to the extreme of calling Yin and Yang (which belong to the category of Concrete Things) "the Way" and "that which is above the formed" (*hsing-erh-shang*). Both Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan agreed that Yin and Yang constitute Material Force, and by opposition and interaction, produce the world and create the myriad creatures. But as regards the Great Ultimate, Chu Hsi thought that it was the abstract Principle activating Yin and Yang. Lu Chiu-yüan, for his part, maintained that since Yin and Yang are above individuals they themselves constitute the Way. This means that the Great Ultimate cannot be independent and distinct from Yin and Yang, but rather that the Great Ultimate must be thought of as constituted by the latter and by their constant alternation. In the world of individuals, the Great Ultimate is nothing other than the proper arrangement of Yin and Yang; hence his definition of the Great Ultimate is "the Great Mean."

Chu Hsi rejected Lu Chiu-yüan's definition by saying:

> "Ultimate" refers to the "consummation" of Principle, while "mean" describes its

> "impartiality." Although the Great Ultimate is so impartial as to be the foundation of the revolution of the myriad creatures, the name derives not from the "impartiality" but from the word "consummation" (*chih-chi*) with the meaning of a "standard" (*piao-chun*).[293]

The reason for Chu Hsi's elevation of Principle to the highest metaphysical level is a moral one. He is suggesting, in my view, that to regard Concrete Things, such as Material Force or Yin and Yang, as the Great Ultimate easily leads to the confusion of the actual world with the ideal standard, and that to avoid this confusion it was necessary to insist that the Great Ultimate was the abstract absolute Principle, existing in but distinct from the Material Force of Yin and Yang and the myriad things they produce.

In the first month of 1192, three years after this debate, Lu Chiu-yüan gave a public lecture on the "*huang-chi*" section of the "*hung-fan*" chapter of the *Shu ching* [the *Book of History*]. In that lecture he followed the traditional definitions of "*huang*" as "great," and "*chi*" in the sense of "*chung*" as "the mean." When Chu Hsi learned about that lecture, he wrote the "Huang-chi pien" ["A Discussion on *Huang-chi*"] in refutation.[294] In this piece Chu Hsi gives the following definitions:

> *Huang* means "emperor" and *chi* means both "consummation" and "standard," and always stands in the centre as the paradigm for the things on all sides.[295]

And goes on to say:

> The earlier scholars ... wrongly defined *huang-chi* as the "great mean," and owing to the prevalence of terms indicating leniency and broad-mindedness in the text they misinterpreted "the mean" as "ambiguity," "looseness of Principle," "indiscrimination between good and evil." They did not know that the Ultimate itself should not be understood as the mean, though it stands in the middle. They did not realise that

> "mean" indicates neither being in excess nor falling short, nor that it indicates accuracy and the utmost propriety without the least deviation.[296]

Although this essay was primarily concerned with the political application of the concept of the Ultimate, it does reveal the ethical motivation for Chu Hsi's insistence on the definition of Ultimate as "the consummation and standard." Principle then must be elevated to the position of paradigm for the Concrete Things. The completely immanent interpretation leads to an understanding of Principle as either the uniqueness of every individual or the harmony between all individuals. But such an interpretation, in Chu Hsi's eyes, could encourage moral laxity and compromise, in direct opposition to his idea of Principle.

We are now in a position to re-examine Chu Hsi's criticism of the Lu School, in terms of this contrast between the actual and the ideal. In his early fifties Chu Hsi had admired the moral integrity of the Lu brothers and some of their students. He had even considered their method of cultivating Original Mind to be a valuable technique of moral cultivation, their only fault being their neglect of careful study of the Classics. Later, after meeting other students of the Lu School, Chu Hsi was lead to accuse them of separating the Original Mind from daily life, and of dedicating themselves to the former while being negligent of the latter, and as a consequence being allured by Human Desires. But now with his revised theory he could criticise both types of students. Whether they united the Original Mind with daily practice or not, they based themselves on individuality and actuality, which cannot be their own ideal standard. In my opinion this criticism was more fundamental than the charge of lacking learning, or of not discerning Human Desires in daily actions. Although it is unjust to impute curruption

by Human Desires to people as honest and upright as the Lu brothers, there does seem to be ground for maintaining that individuality and actuality form an unreliable basis for moral behaviour.

At this stage the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force" was almost complete. Principle had been elevated to absoluteness, and was contrasted no longer with selfish desire, but with actuality and individuality. Material Force, which was still seen as the metaphysical basis for actuality and individuality, has now also been assigned the role of determining their moral values, and has therefore itself become a moral concept.

CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF MAN UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE

SUMMARY

This chapter presents Chu Hsi's final concept of Man based on his doctrine of "Principle and Material Force."

Principle and Material Force became a pair of associated concepts in Chu Hsi's metaphysics after he had reached his sixties. By that time the role of Principle had been raised to that of a regulative standard, and Material Force had also come to be regarded as the reason for moral differences. The concepts of Principle and Material Force were combined in order to account for the moral quality of creatures - Principle as the reason for the universality of morality in the world, and Material Force as the reason for moral differences among different creatures. This combination, as applied to creatures, formed the concept of Physical Nature, such that Man would be morally higher than the other creatures because of the superiority of his Physical Nature.

But the superiority of Man's Physical Nature consists in his possessing Mind, which enables him to transcend individuality and actualise the universal Principle. Mind is constantly influenced, though never determined, by Principle and Material Force. Mind, therefore requires moral cultivation. It is through such cultivation that Mind is able to actualise Principle, and to avoid the harmful influence that may arise from Material Force.

I shall in this chapter discuss how Elementary Learning, and the first four steps of the Great Learning, contribute to the cultivation of Mind.

A. THE CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL NATURE

The last phase of Chu Hsi's metaphysics was characterized by the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force," which he completed around his early sixties, as a development of the doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things." The following passage is a typical example of Chu Hsi's presentation of this metaphysics. It comes from his "Ta Huang Tao-fu," written in about 1190:

> Principle and Material Force are the two constituents of the world. Principle is "the Way above Physical Form," and the origin of creation. Material Force is "[the source of] Concrete Things having Physical Form," and is the matter of creation. Therefore, when Man and Things are born, they must be endowed with Principle in order to have Nature, and with Material Force in order to have Physical Form. Although Nature and Physical Form are within the same Body, their differences in respect of the Way and Concrete Things are very distinct and not confused.[297]

In this passage, Principle and Material Force are the two sources of creation. But the significance of this doctrine lies rather in its account of creatures (Man and Things), within which Principle and Material Force are combined in a "neither separate nor alloyed" (*pu-li pu-tsa*) relationship.

We have seen that Principle and Material Force had been used together for the purpose of interpreting life. However, in his sixties Chu Hsi made use of this pair, not only for ontological reasons, but, it seems clear, also for interpreting the moral character of creatures. Of course, for such a purpose, both Principle and Material Force must have moral implication. In the previous chapter I described the development of the moral import of Principle during Chu Hsi's fifties. Here I shall present

how the concept of Material Force acquired moral significance.

In Chu Hsi's philosophy there are two aspects of Material Force relevant to morality. One of these, discussed in the previous chapter, is that Material Force, while its transient character is in contrast with the permanence of objective Principle, can make the excellence of the latter evident. The other, which he had begun to develop during his middle age, but did not complete until his sixties, is that Material Force must be regarded as the reason for moral differences. Indeed, an ethical "ladder" may be constructed with Material Force determining the relative position of every creature. However, the constituents, Principle and Material Force, are not by themselves sufficient for this purpose, what is required is their conjunction as the Physical Nature (*ch'i-chih chih hsing*) of the different species. On the top of this ladder stands Man, who through his Physical Nature possesses the moral capacity to engage in moral cultivation. The development in Chu Hsi's philosophy of this second moral implication may be summarized as follows.

In his "*Hu-tzu chih-yen i-i*," written in 1172, there Chu Hsi states in the following passage that Heavenly Principle and Human Desires have different origins:

> The beginning of Heavenly Principle is unknown. In Man it is with him from his birth. Human Desires come into existence only after he is confined by Physical Form, contaminated with Material Force, habituated to bad customs, and disquieted by Feelings.[298]

In this passage Material Force is presented, not only as the material source of the creation of Man, but also as a determinant of his moral character. However, this seems to me to have been only Chu Hsi's initial view of this second ethical significance of Material Force.

The increase in this ethical significance of Material Force was reflected in Chu Hsi's gradual adoption of the concept of Physical Nature (*ch'i-chih chih hsing*). Before his sixties Chu Hsi was concerned to advocate the excellence of Principle. But parallel to the moral elevation of Principle, possibly unconsciously, he gradually made use of the concept of Material Force to explain the moral differences among creatures. But once Principle and Material Force acquire the purpose of determining the moral character of different creatures, they could not simply be two distinct metaphysical sources, but had also to combine in the creatures they composed. Through focusing on this immanent conjunction, the concept of Physical Nature gradually emerges. The process in which this conception took shape is reflected in Chu Hsi's change of attitude to the following three passages of the two Ch'engs and Chang Tsai on the relation of Nature to Material Force.

Ch'eng Hao said:

> What is inborn is called Nature. Nature is the same as Material Force and Material Force is the same as Nature. They are both inborn.[299]

Ch'eng I said:

> Man's Nature is the same as Principle, and Principle is the same from the sage-emperors Yao and Shun to the man in the street. Capacity (*ts'ai*) is an endowment of Material Force. Material Force may be clear or turbid. Among Men those endowed with clear Material Force are wise, while those endowed with turbid Material Force are foolish.[300]

And Chang Tsai wrote:

> With the existence of Physical Form, there exists Physical Nature. If one cultivates properly a "returns to his Origin," his Heaven-and-Earth Nature (*t'ien-ti chih hsing*, i.e., Original Nature, *pen-jan chih hsing*) will be preserved.

> Therefore in Physical Nature there is that which the superior man denies to be his Original Nature.[301]

Ch'ien Mu, in his *Chu-tzu hsin-hsüeh-an*, studied Chu Hsi's attitude toward these three passages, and reached the conclusion that Chu Hsi's opinion in his forties and fifties was close to that of Ch'eng I, who emphasised the distinction between Nature and Material Force; while after the age of sixty, he became more like Ch'eng Hao in holding that Nature is always combined with Material Force. Recognizing such a combination, Chu Hsi's references to Chang Tsai's concept of Physical Nature also become more frequent.[302] It seems correct to say that Chu Hsi's conception of Physical Nature was formulated through a struggle to synthesize these three views on "Nature and Material Force." When the final formulation of his own concept of Physical Nature had been achieved, Chu Hsi was able to compromise the differences between the three philosophers. His explanation is as follows. Principle and Material Force are combined in Physical Form (the Body), Principle being the reason for moral identity, and Material Force the reason for moral differences. That which results from this combination is Physical Nature. In it Principle and Material Force are closely associated, yet not identified. Because of this combination, Material Force exercises its influence, and consequently Original Nature, as the indwelling Principle, is in some way ethically limited.

In addition, in Chu Hsi's later years he showed a tendency to ascribe the term "Nature" exclusively to "Physical Nature." One of the reasons for this is semantic. In a conversation some time after 1197, he quoted the following remarks of Ch'eng Hao:

> What is inborn is called Nature. Man is born in tranquility. That which is before tranquility cannot be described. As soon as we talk about

> Nature, what we refer to is already not *that* Nature.[303]

His own explanation was:

> With regard to Nature, not until there is material substance can the term Nature be used. Before the birth of Man in tranquility, there has been no more than the Heavenly Way, and so the word Nature cannot be used.[304]

Chu Hsi's explanation took the last "Nature" in the saying of Ch'eng Hao as "Original Nature," but since, Chu Hsi contended, it is the same as the Heavenly Way, it should not be denominated "Nature." Nature, as Heavenly Way (Principle) dwelling within individual creatures, can only be referred to after their birth. But in that case it should be called Physical Nature, which is the combination of Principle and Material Force, even if in theory there may still be Original Nature, which refers to the abstract regulative aspect of Physical Nature.

But his conflation of Nature and Physical Nature is more a matter of ethical fact than of definition. From the point of view of Original Nature all creatures are of the same ethical quality. But in reality, because of differences of Physical Nature (Original Nature influenced by Material Force as a result of their combination), ethical quality differs throughout the different species.

In this way Material Force gained an ethical import in addition to its original corporeal meaning. The moral role of Material Force is clear from the following passage in his *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen* [*Questions and Answers on the Great Learning*]:

> From the point of view of Principle, all things arise from one source, and of course Man and Things cannot be distinguished as higher and lower creatures. But from the point of view of Material Force, that which receives its integrity (*cheng*) and clarity (*t'ung*) becomes Man, while those which receive its partiality (*p'ien*) and

> cloggedness (*se*) become Things. Because of this, they cannot be equal, but some are higher and others are lower.[305]

The degree of integrity or partiality of their endowed Material Force determines the degree of uprightness or baseness of the type of creature; while the clarity or cloggedness of their endowed Material Force determines their intelligence or foolishness. In this way Material Force accounts for moral differences as well as material actualisation.

Physical Nature is, therefore, the synthesis of Original Nature (which is both vital and moral Principle), and Material Force (which actualises life and differentiates moral quality). It follows that the myriad creatures are classified according to differences between their Physical Natures with respect both to life and to morality. In his "Ta Yü Fang-shu," Chu Hsi points out that there are three general divisions:

> Heaven gives birth to creatures. Among them, there are those having blood, breath, perception, and consciousness: these are Men and animals. There are also those not having blood, breath, perception and consciousness, but are alive: these are grasses and trees. There are still those no longer living which retain only form and smell: these are the withered and dried.[306]

Things are classified according to the degree of openness and strengh of life determined by Material Force, while the degree of morality is commensurate with such degree of life. So that Chu Hsi continues:

> Man is most brilliant and furnished with the Nature of Five Virtues, while animals are muddled and not complete in those Virtues. Plants and the withered have neither perception nor consciousness, not to mention the Virtues. However, as creatures they are still completely furnished with Principle.[307]

The above quotation shows how with the concept of Physical Nature, the superiority of Man is vindicated. At the top of the ethical ladder, Man alone is endowed with complete perception and consciousness, which is the prerequisite for the fulfillment of Principle. So Man is the only moral creature. This point can be clarified by attending to the difference between Man and animals.

Here I shall quote a comparison between Man and animals by a student of his, with whom Chu Hsi states that he agreed:

> Consciousness and movement proceed from Material Force, while Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom proceed from Principle. Both Man and Things (i.e., animals) are capable of consciousness and movement, but though Things possess Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom, they cannot have them completely.... In your [*Meng-tzu*] *chi-chu* [*Comprehensive Commentary on the Book of Mencius*] you maintain that "with respect to Material Force, Man and Things do not seem to differ in consciousness and movement, but with respect to Principle, the endowment of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom are necessarily imperfect in Things."... [308]

In this paragraph only morality comes from Principle whereas the phenomena of life such as consciousness and movement come from Material Force. By this distinction Man and animals are classified. It seems to me that the following interpretation is plausible. Principle is the reason for both life and morality. It is in itself an abstract concept, which from the vital point of view, activates the opposing-and-circulating pattern of life, and from the moral point of view, constitutes the Four Virtues, Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom. On the other hand, consciousness and movement are "phenomena" of life and therefore belong merely to Material Force. Differences in Physical Nature determine the differences between Man and animals. In animals, the Material Force component of their Physical Nature enables

them to manifest the "phenomena" of life, while in Man, the Material Force components of Physical Nature are such as to make him understand and put into practice the vital-and-moral Principle. Therefore it is Man alone who has the complete and perfect virtues. His intention, it seems, is to say that the Material Force composing Man is more excellent than that composing animals, so that, in Man it is possible for Principle to be free from the confinement of the individual life, and to unfold completely as the universal moral Principle.

But what is that excellence with which Material Force endows Man? It is Mind. In Chu Hsi's description of the Material Force composing Man, his use of such terms as "integrity" (referring to morality) and "clarity" (referring to intelligence) suggests Mind. It is Mind, which elevates Man above animals both in his faculty of knowledge, and in his capacity to transcend his individuality.

B. THE STATUS OF MIND

1. The Content and the Form of Mind

In the fourth chapter of this essay, I described how Chu Hsi, while discriminating between the concepts of Principle and Material Force in traditional Confucian vitalism, had proposed the concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities" as the essence of Material Force, in order to serve as a link between them. I also pointed out that, according to Chu Hsi, the counterpart of "the Spirits and the Divinities" in Man is Mind. In the previous section, through analysing the Physical Nature of Man, we saw that Chu Hsi regarded Man's superiority as consisting in his having Mind, which, as the excellence of Material Force, enables Man to transcend his individuality and to realise Principle. In this section I shall focus on the structure, position, and inclination of Mind.

I have said that Mind may be examined either from the point of view of its content, or from the point of view of its form. As this distinction is important to my present study, I would like to give a brief account of it at this point.

For Chu Hsi the content of Mind is exclusively of Nature and Feelings. This idea was formulated in 1169, when he was forty, but even in a conversation dated from 1198 he still said:

> Mencius says that the *Mind* of compassion is the beginning of Humanity. Humanity is Nature, compassion is Feeling. Here we know Mind through Feeling. Mencius also says that Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom are rooted in *Mind*. Here we know Mind by Nature. Mind includes Nature and Feelings. Nature is substance, Feelings are functions.[505]

On the other hand, from the formal point of view, Chu Hsi looked on Mind as pure consciousness. This conception is easy to reach by reflecting upon one's own mind, so that at the age of twenty-nine, in his "Ts'un-tsai chi" Chu Hsi had already said:

> It is all because of his Mind that Man occupies the centre between Heaven and Earth and is the most intelligent among the myriad creatures. Nevertheless, the entity of Mind cannot be grasped by seeing, nor by hearing, nor by thinking. If you say there is such an entity, you cannot describe it. But if you say there is not, you meet it everywhere in daily life.[310]

In this passage, Chu Hsi means that Mind, as consciousness and as the faculty of intelligence, is that which makes Man unique in the universe. Mind is everywhere, because with its intelligence it can form a world of consciousness extending to everything it encounters. However, since consciousness itself is only a subjective capacity, it cannot be grasped by faculties such as seeing, hearing, and thinking.

In Chu Hsi's mature period, the formal aspect of Mind became more important than its content. This was because for him Mind as consciousness also had the capacity to know and apply moral principles, thereby giving Man the ability to control his environment. The most immediate object of such control is his Body, so that in a conversation some time after 1178, Chu Hsi said: "Mind is the abode of intelligence and is the master of the Body."[311] But in addition, Mind, as form, can even master its own content. In the following two passages which can be dated from 1193 and from 1180 respectively, Chu Hsi said:

> There is a difference between Mind and Nature. That which is intelligent (*ling*) is Mind, and that which is substantial (*shih*) is Nature. The intelligent is that which is perceptive and conscious. ... Nature is Principle, Mind is that

> which stocks, holds, implements, and manifests Principle.[312]
>
> Nature is no more than Principle, and Feelings are its unfolding and functions. The perception and consciousness of Mind is that which contains Principle and carries out Feelings.[313]

The first passage describes Mind's mastery over Principle, and the second passage points out that Mind takes charge of both Principle and Feelings.

2. The World of Consciousness

Mind is the counterpart of the cosmological concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities" in Man. Nevertheless, they are different in that the latter concept was devised as the link between Principle and Material Force, whereas Mind, in addition to this, also forms a world of consciousness for Man. In his "*Chung-yung chang-chü hsü*" ["Preface to the *Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean*"] written in 1191,[314] Chu Hsi said:

> In its perspicuity, intelligence, perception, and consciousness, the Mind is one. However, it is supposed that there is a difference between "Human Mind" (*jen-hsin*) and "Moral Mind" (*tao-hsin*). This is because Mind may either be born from the particularity of "Physical Form and Material Force" (*hsing-ch'i*), or originated from the perfection of endowed Nature and Destiny. Because of this difference [in the basis] of perception and consciousness, the same Mind may exist in a state of precariousness and instability or in a state of subtlety and obscurity.[315]

Here Chu Hsi is appealing to the first two of four famous sentences in the *Shu ching*. These are: "The Human Mind is precarious. The Moral Mind is subtle."[316] In this explanation he declares that there is but *one* Mind which

may emerge from two different sources. What is important here is his implication that Mind is relatively independent from both Principle and Material Force. Mind can either be regarded as emerging from Nature and Material Force, or (as he sometimes put it) as the essence itself of Material Force. But as consciousness it is independent. It is influenced, but not dominated, by either of its sources, otherwise there would be two Minds conflicting with each other. On the other hand this independence is relative, not absolute, because Mind has an innate inclination either towards morality or towards error, rather than a self-contained completeness. In consequence, Mind occupies a special position in the universe, namely, the world of consciousness. Nevertheless, this world of consciousness exists merely for Man, and its position in the universe is subsequent to Principle and Material Force. Therefore this view of Chu Hsi's ought not to be called Idealist, although it shows signs of the influence of Buddhist Idealism.

It is worthwhile to mention Tomoeda Ryûtarô's evaluation of the position of Chu Hsi's metaphysics in the history of Chinese philosophy. According to him, the problem faced by Chu Hsi was that of the contradiction between the traditional Confucian cosmology of the Primitive Ether (*yüan-ch'i*), and the Buddhist idealistic metaphysics. He asserts that the most sophisticated Buddhist Idealism was that of the *Yüan-jen lun* [*An Enquiry on Man*] of Tsung-mi (770-841). Tsung-mi was a critic of both Confucianism and Taoism. Both schools affirm the existence of Nature (*hsing*) and of the Primitive Ether (*yüan-ch'i*). But for Tsung-mi, both Nature and the Primitive Ether are but a development of consciousness, Nature being its subjective and active aspect, and the Primitive Ether being its objective and passive aspect. The ultimate reality beneath this development of consciousness is the true, unique, and intelligent Mind,

which is the foundation of both the subjective and the objective world. According to Tomoeda, from the time that Tsung-mi proposed this idealistic interpretation of Man and the world, the Confucianists had endeavoured to find a suitable refutation. In the T'ang dynasty, Tsung-mi provided a more powerful theory than that of Confucian scholars such as Han Yü, Liu Tsung-yüan, and Liu Yü-hsi. By the Sung dynasty, the Neo-Confucianists felt it necessary to explore a new metaphysical foundation upon which both subject and object, the human and natural worlds could be established. It therefore became necessary to settle the controversy between the Confucian Primitive Ether cosmology and Buddhist Idealism. This work, according to Tomoeda, was completed by Chu Hsi who established Principle or the Great Ultimate, as the foundation of both human and natural existence. Tomoeda's conclusion is that Chu Hsi gave traditional Confucianism a metaphysical basis by substituting the Great Ultimate as Principle for the Buddhist idea of the true, unique, and intelligent Mind.[注17]

I would add to this analysis the important fact that Mind still played a crucial role in Chu Hsi's system. Although he no longer regarded it as the ultimate substance, and gave it a secondary role, Mind still formed the subjective world of consciousness for Man.

3. Mind and Moral Disciplines

In his "*Chung-yung chang-chü hsü*," immediately following the passage quoted above which distinguishes between the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, Chu Hsi continues:

> Everybody has Physical Form, so that even the most intelligent cannot but have Human Mind.

> Everybody has Nature as well, so that even the most foolish cannot but have Moral Mind. If the two become confused and cannot be controlled, the precarious one (i.e., Human Mind) will become more precarious and the subtle one (i.e., Moral Mind) subtler. Finally the selfishness of Human Desires will no longer be conquerable by the justice of Heavenly Principle. "To be discerning" is to discriminate between the two, and "to be single-minded" is to keep steadily to the justice of the Moral Mind. Strive endlessly until the Moral Mind becomes the enduring master of the Body, with the Human Mind its abiding servant. In this way the precarious will become stable and the subtle will become manifest, so that justice and correctness may be in your activity and tranquility, in your speech and behaviour.[318]

This passage appeals to the latter two of the four sentences in the *Shu ching*, which read: "Remain discerning and single-minded. Keep steadfastly to the Mean (*chung*)."[319]

As has been said above, although Mind forms its own world, it is not independent of the influence of its two sources, endowed Heavenly Nature and Material Force underlying one's Physical Form. Because of the incessant influence of these two, Mind can never be static, but inclines towards both morality and immorality. Because these two sources are equal and universal, no individual inclines exclusively in one of these directions. Rather, there is a constant struggle between the two for supremacy in all men, from the most intelligent to the most foolish. In this sense Man is the point of convergence of both possibilities. This is the metaphysical basis of morality.

Heavenly Nature and Material Force are the two sources of Mind and therefore no more than external determinants. Mind, having formed its own world of consciousness, can arrange its own cultivation. While Mind is in tranquility, it contains nothing which can be described as immoral. But in activity, by the influence of these two sources it may tend to either Heavenly

Principle or Human Desires. Different moral efforts are required for different states of Mind. While in tranquility, there should be Attentiveness or Containment of Mind. Whereas in activity the effort should be directed towards discriminating between the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, and towards keeping to the latter.

At this stage Chu Hsi's theory of Mind was complete. He had established the position of Mind in the universe, and clarified its structure and its inclinations. He was now ready to systematise the various moral disciplines which had been for so long his major concern. This he did in his two studies of the *Ta-hsüeh*, the *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü* [*Commentary on the Ta-hsüeh*] and the *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen* [*Questions and Answers on the Ta-hsüeh*].

C. METHODS OF MORAL PRACTICE

1. Elementary Learning and the Practice of Attentiveness

In the *Ta-hsüeh*, the eight steps of the Great Learning are listed as the Investigation of Things (*ko-wu*), the Extension of Knowledge (*chih-chih*), Purification of Will (*ch'eng-i*), Rectification of Mind (*cheng-hsin*), Personal Cultivation (*hsiu-shen*), Regulation of the Family (*ch'i-chia*), Bringing Order to State (*ch'ih-kuo*), and Bringing Peace to the World (*p'ing-t'ien-hsia*). Chu Hsi had much respect for the comprehensive scheme of moral education expounded in this classic work, and accordingly, systematised his own methods of moral practice. For this reason, having discussed the development of these methods in previous chapters, we can conclude with a look at Chu Hsi's last writings on that Classic, the *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü* and the *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, both of which he continued to revise until his last years.

The first thing noteworthy in Chu Hsi's studies of the *Ta-hsüeh* is his addition of a precedent stage of Elementary Learning as preparation for the Great Learning. The significance of the Great Learning is that it aims at the philosophical and political aspects of morality, in contrast with the Elementary Learning which aims at the establishment of personal character and good behaviour. Chu Hsi says:

> Although there are differences between the Great and Elementary Learning, both aim at the same Way. In childhood, if one does not engage in the Elementary Learning, one will be unable to collect one's straying Mind and to cultivate one's character, which is the foundation of the Great Learning. When one grows up, if one does not advance to the Great Learning, one will be unable to examine Principle and put it to

> [political] practice. In that case the successful conculsion of one's Elementary Learning will not be achieved.[320]

According to Chu Hsi, in the ancient golden age, everyone went to "elementary school" at the age of eight, whereas at the age of fifteen, the children of aristocrats, and the brilliant youth among the commoners, went to "great school." The curriculum in the "elementary school" was concerned with daily manners and the practical skills of social life. But in the "great school" students were taught such disciplines as the Investigation of Principle, Rectification of Mind, personal cultivation, and public administration.[321]

There are three things to be noted in this division. Firstly, Chu Hsi was reconstructing an ideal of the ancient system of education from fragments in the *Li chi*. His plan was that the aristocrats should be highly educated in preparation for their political privileges and responsibilities, and that the brilliant among the commoners should also have access to political power. Secondly, this division was a reflection of the social situation of Chu Hsi's own age. In the Sung dynasty, society was composed of various overlapping strata: there was a political division between bureaucrats and commoners, and an economical one between landowners and tenants. The children of bureaucrats and landowners not only had the opportunity to be educated, but were also potential recruits for governmental posts. Under these circumstances, their education, as reflected by Chu Hsi's interpretation of the *Ta-hsüeh*, should be morally and politically oriented. The admission of commoners suggested by Chu Hsi also reflected the social situation of his time. Because in the Sung dynasty the civil examinations were the major condition for the recruitment of officials, the commoners also had an equal chance in *theory* to enter government. Their actual lack of opportunity was due

rather to the *fact* that they could not afford an education, not to class ideology or legal obstacles. Because in *theory* their class was no obstacle to education, Chu Hsi aimed at the single Way throughout the Elementary and Great Learning. He believed that through the popularization of elementary education cultivated commoners would not only be more easily governed, but the brilliant among them would also have the opportunity to go on to the great school, and finally join the ruling elite.

The third and most important point is that, leaving aside the socio-political background, the division between moral practice (the Elementary Learning) and moral knowledge (the Great Learning) contributed to the theory of moral education. This division can be justified by the common sense notion that, in society, moral codes must be inculcated in and practised by everybody, of no matter what social standing, while the philosophical investigation into their significance cannot but be exclusive to a talented few. On the other hand, although a philosophical enquiry into morality is limited to those few, it still has to be based on the moral practice in which they were trained during their Elementary Learning. Moral practice, though it belongs to Elementary Learning, is the foundation for moral knowledge. And moral knowledge investigates the "why" of moral codes so that students may be conscious of, and thereby improve, their practice.

Chu Hsi insisted that Elementary Learning should be universal and fundamental, and that its essence consists in the training of Mind. This has been discussed in the fourth chapter, but a few words need to be added here. In the daily exercise of social conduct during Elementary Learning, students simultaneously learn endurance and composure of Mind. Chu Hsi said that for those who missed the opportunity of Elementary Learning, the practice of Attentiveness would make up well for it, and should prevail throughout the whole process of learning. In

Elementary Learning, Attentiveness cultivates the Mind as such and enhances vigilance in daily practice, while in the Great Learning, it opens the path to intelligence and promotes morality and merits.[322]

2. The Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge

Although the Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge are the first two steps of the *Ta-hsüeh*, for Chu Hsi they are related as effort and achievement, as objective enquiry and subjective acquisition - therefore I shall discuss them together.

Since the Investigation of Things is the moral effort of Mind, its significance must be understood in the context of Mind. Although Mind is the capacity of conciousness, it is constantly influenced by its two underlying sources, Principle and Material Force. Therefore, the significance of the Investigation of Things may be expounded in terms of the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force."

The following describes how Chu Hsi made use of this doctrine in his exposition. Man, in comparison with animals, is endowed with Material Force, characterized by "integrity" (*cheng*) and "clarity" (*t'ung*). Therefore his Mind is moral and intelligent, having the capacity to know and practise the endowed Principle. On the other hand, there are differences of degree within these categories of the Material Force from man to man. Within the characteristic of "integrity" there are degrees of "beauty" (*mei*) and "ugliness" (*e*), which determine the different moral capacities among Men, and within the characteristic of "clarity" there are degrees of "clearness" (*chíng*) and "turbidity" (*chuo*), which

determine the different degrees of intelligence among Men.[323] Therefore although Man is fundamentally moral, he has to struggle with obstacles within his Material Force in order to secure the successful actualisation of Principle. The Investigation of Things, which investigates the Principle immanent in Things, is the first step of the process of transcending the limitations of Material Force.

The relation of the Investigation of Things to the preceding effort, the Elementary Learning or Attentiveness, may also be examined by means of the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force." According to Chu Hsi, no matter how obstructed a man's Material Force is, the original Brilliance (*ming*) of his Mind, as the gift of Heaven, always subsists. Morality, therefore, is natural to Man. For those born with the best Material Force the Brilliance of their Minds facilitates the natural manifestation of Principle, while those with the most obstructed Material Force may still come upon a sudden enlightenment of their original Brilliance. Based on this theory of innate morality, moral education becomes the cultivation of the original Brilliance of Mind. The Elementary Learning or Attentiveness, then, takes place in the first stage, during which Mind is contained, and disposed to display its Brilliance. This Brilliance continues to be the main concern of the Great Learning, in which the Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge, the first two steps, magnify the Brilliance, and the following steps realise it in actual practice.[324]

Two things should be mentioned here with regard to the relationship between Elementary Learning (or Attentiveness) and the Investigation of Things. The first concerns the nature of moral cultivation in Chu Hsi's philosophy. According to Chu Hsi, Man is a combination of Principle and Material Force, and the purpose of moral cultivation is to carry out Principle, by overcoming any hindrance from Material Force. But by "overcome" Chu Hsi

did not mean to suggest that it could be corrected or changed directly. Rather, he meant that by concentrating on the Brilliance of Mind Man may extend its capacity and realise Principle. As his concept of Physical Nature came from Chang Tsai, so this opinion on moral cultivation also shows the influence of Chang Tsai, who said:

> While Virtue (i.e., Principle functioning in Man) has not overcome Material Force, our Nature and Destiny proceed from Material Force. But when Virtue overcomes Material Force, then our Nature and Destiny proceed from Virtue.[325]

In other words, because Principle and Material Force are the two ineradicable sources of Mind, moral practice consists in extending the influence of the former while carefully avoiding any baleful influence from the latter. The second thing we should mention here is that although the Elementary Learning (or Attentiveness) and the Investigation of Things are closely connected, they do not overlap. The fulfillment of the former step makes the latter possible and easy, but though the former practice forms the prerequisite for the latter, it does not include the latter. The same relationship occurs between all successive steps of moral practice.

Now we shall discuss the objects of Investigation. Chu Hsi attempted to Investigate many kinds of Things: manifest things, abstruse thoughts, Classical texts, and discourse; objects ranging from personal virtues and the Essential Relationships to the vast universe and the natural world.[326] Although the Principle Chu Hsi was searching for was an abstract regulative standard, it subsisted in all kinds of empirical Things. For instance, in a conversation recorded from his seventieth year, Chu Hsi pointed out the importance of empirical knowledge. He said that if one were to neglect a book one would lack the Principle contained in that book, and if one were to evade a practical task, one would lack the Principle in that

task.[327] This position is put in the *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü*, which says that the virtue of Mind is "to contain all Principle and to respond to all affairs correctly."[328] Obviously a broad empirical knowledge is required in order to engage with all affairs correctly.

The purpose of Investigation is to attain the Principle within Things. In everything Principle exists at two levels, as "the way Things should be," and as "the reason Things should be so."[329] On some occasions, in his "Ta Wang Ch'ang-ju" for instance, Chu Hsi omitted the reference to the level of the "reason," thinking that the significance of that level would be grasped as long as one constantly acted in accordance with "the way Things should be." In this way these omissions show us that in his method, knowledge and practice are combined. Principle will first appear as "the way Things should be." Only after this way is well understood and efficiently practised, will one feel that Principle also appears necessarily and spontaneously. Then one may be said to have recognized the level of "the reason Things should be so."[330] In the *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü* the aim of the Investigation of Things is "to reach thoroughly the surface and the core, the essence and the crudeness, of Things".[331] The core and essence are "the reson Things should be so," while the surface and crudeness are "the way Things should be."

I shall now discuss the relationship between the Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge. The Extension of Knowledge is the subjective acquisition made during the process of the Investigation of Things. The phrase "Extending Knowledge" indicates not only extending the contents of knowledge, but, more importantly, increasing the capacity of intelligence. Because Mind is pure consciousness, while it practises the Investigation of Things, it not only increases its knowledge of things, but also increases its own

Brilliance, and its capacity for knowledge. Therefore, while the practice of the Investigation of Things succeeds in "reaching thoroughly the surface and the core, the essence and the crudeness, of Things," the effect on the Extension of Knowledge is to bring out "the total Brilliance of the whole substance and the great functions of the Mind."[332] The Brilliance of the substance of the Mind refers to the understanding of Principle, while the Brilliance of the functions of the Mind refers to the proper management of affairs. Both refer to the increase of the capacity of the Mind.

3. The Purification of the Will

The third step of moral practice is the Purification of the Will (*ch'eng-i*). The Will here means the activity of Mind. According to Chu Hsi, Mind has a natural Brilliance, and so should be in its activity naturally Pure. But in reality, because Mind receives harmful influences from Material Force, the Will as the Mind in activity may contain impurities. Because the impure Will is against its own nature, Man with impure Will is in a state of "self-deception" and cannot be at peace with himself. The Purification of the Will, Chu Hsi contends, consists in nothing more than guarding against self-deception, and remaining at peace with oneself.[333]

Purification of the Will is mainly concerned with moral feelings and with moral behaviour. The following is a summary of Chu Hsi's exposition on this subject. Because Mind emerges from, and is consequently influenced by, Principle and Material Force, its activity may be either good or bad, and external behaviour will also fall into these two categories. But because the good is that which is originally endowed by Heavenly Destiny, and the evil is

the contamination by Human Desires, the activity of Mind should be to love the former and abhor the latter. However, owing to lack of Knowledge, or the turbidity of Material Force, the good may be not known. In that case, Purification of Will must be preceded by the effort of Extending Knowledge, in order to make known the truth of good and evil. But even after Knowledge is Extended and the activity of Mind becomes generally good, further effort towards the Purification of the Will remains necessary in order to purge any unnoticed inclination toward evil.[394] This effort, therefore, ensures the natural unfolding of the Brilliance of the Mind, which loves, and is determined to acquire, the good, just as it loves beautiful women, and hates, and also is determined to reject, the bad, just as it abhors a repulsive stench.[395]

4. The Rectification of Mind

After the effort to Purify the Will, we come to the fourth practice in the *Ta-hsüeh*, the Rectification of the Mind. Since all of the practices we have discussed so far are somehow concerned with the Rectification of Mind, it will be necessary to find a more specific meaning for this term.

Besides "rectification," Chu Hsi adopted another meaning of the word *cheng*, namely, "to balance and make stable." This phrase refers to the substance of Mind which is "clear and bright, without content like a mirror, and balanced as a steelyard."[396] When Mind functions properly, the state of balance and stability is maintained; if it functions improperly, that state is lost. In the *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, Chu Hsi says:

> When Mind fails to examine the external affairs it meets, its response cannot but inaccurate, and the Mind cannot but be led astray by its wrong response. At that time, it may be said that Feelings disturb the original substance of Mind, or that the functions of Mind have lost their appropriateness.[337]

We may notice that in this passage the earlier efforts to Extend Knowledge and Purify the Will are included, since the proper functioning of Mind is the result of the practice of both "examining external affairs" and "responding to them correctly." But in addition to these, there is one more effort implied in this passage, that is, the constant containment of Mind. This consists in restraining the functioning of Feelings from exceeding their due course; and preventing Feelings, after their functioning, from continuing to influence the original balance and stability of Mind.

There is a complete system of moral cultivation in the realm of Mind from the stage of Elementary Learning to that of the Rectification of the Mind. But at this point Chu Hsi shows us that what he aimed at was more than individual morality. The effort of Rectifying the Mind is the conclusion of all the earlier practices whose concern was with the Mind. But from now on the Mind was to be regarded in contrast with the Body and the external world. The Mind is the master of the Body; only by maintaining its balance and containing itself can it successfully master this corporeal Body, and make all its activities follow its will and manifest Principle.[338] The later stages of practice in the *Ta-hsüeh* are concerned with social and political practice, which will not be discussed here. But it is clear that Chu Hsi's conception of morality, in spite of requiring subjective fulfillment, is by no means merely individualistic.

CHAPTER VI
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVEN AND MAN

SUMMARY

This chapter presents Chu Hsi's final account of the world, that is to say, of the relationship between Heaven and Man. This position, fully formulated in his sixties, was in complete opposition to the ideas of Ch'an Buddhism.

In the earlier chapters we have seen how Chu Hsi produced parallel analyses of the concepts of Heaven and Man. In this chapter I shall examine the relationship between these concepts from three points of view: those of Principle, Mind, and Material Force.

According to Chu Hsi, Principle is immanent in the empirical world, and is manifested within it as "the Way the world should be." The world may be thought of as manifesting the Way. From the point of view of this theory of Principle, therefore, the world appears stable and orderly, and prescribes to Man his moral duty. The universality and objectivity of the Essential Relationships also becomes evident.

From the point of view of Mind, Chu Hsi was to propose the concept of Purity, the subjective capacity to carry out the Way. The Purity of the Will of Heaven is due to the natural working of Principle, and makes possible the unfolding of the Heavenly Way. But Man must exert much effort in order to acquire the Purity of Heaven.

From the point of view of Material Force, the limitations and the contingency of Man are clearly evident. Even if a man is able to cultivate morality, there is no guarantee that he will gain happiness. Although, in this view, Man gain the dignity of moral toil, he loses the original simplicity and harmony of spirit sought by Ch'an Buddhism.

A. THE WORLD AS MANIFESTING THE WAY

1. Chu Hsi's View of the World - the Relationship Between Heaven and Man

In the last two chapters, I have described Chu Hsi's treatment of the concepts of Heaven and of Man. With respect to Heaven, Chu Hsi established the three levelled system of Principle, the Spirits and the Divinities, and Material Force. And for Man, he constructed three parallel levels: Nature, Mind, and Material Force. I have also pointed out in previous chapters that a moral concern provides a clue to the development of this metaphysics.

I have in general restricted my examination of the above concepts to a discussion of their development within Chu Hsi's system, and have not given detailed consideration to their structural relationships. I hope that this treatment has nevertheless contributed to an understanding of the role played by each concept, and of the nature of the system as a whole. In this chapter I shall conclude my thesis with an examination of morality considered as a relationship betweeen Heaven and Man. In other words, I shall examine the structure of Chu Hsi's world-view in terms of morality.

Chu Hsi says in his *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*:

> First there is Principle, and then comes Material Force, comprised of Yin, Yang, and the Five Agents. The birth of creatures consists in the crystallization of Material Force into Physical Forms. Therefore, the birth of Men and creatures depends upon their reception of Principle as Nature, and Material Force as Bodies.[333]

In this paragraph, Chu Hsi interpreted the relationship between Heaven and Man from the point of view of creation.

In the process of creation not only Man, but Heaven too, has both ideal (i.e., Principle) and real (i.e., Material Force) phases. But Chu Hsi also says:

> Between Heaven and Earth, "Things" are all those which have voice, colour, discernible features, and forms. Since there are Things, there must, as the reason for their existence, be the Standards (*tse*) of "the way Things should be" which cannot be altered, which is endowed by Heaven, and not artificial.[340]

The main point of this paragraph is that the moral standard of Things (including Man) is not artificial but endowed by Heaven. What is emphasised here is the idealistic aspect of Heaven. Therefore when we examine Chu Hsi's world-view, we shall find that Heaven is both the metaphysical foundation and the moral paradigm of Things, and Man, containing an idealistic element, while remaining in fact limited, must therefore be bound by moral obligations.

In this chapter, I shall examine Chu Hsi's world-view, that is, his conception of the relationship between Heaven and Man, from three points of view. The first is that of Principle, through which we discover his conception of an orderly world. The second is that of "the Spirits and the Divinities," or Mind, through which the Purity of the world is revealed. Finally, to balance these two idealistic points of view, I shall examine his world-view from the aspect of Material Force.

2. The World as Moral Binding on Man

In the previous chapter I examined Chu Hsi's teaching on morality with regard to personal cultivation, and reached the conclusion that the moral effort of the intelligent

faculty of Mind is aimed at the fulfillment of Principle, in the face of the possible adverse influence of Material Force. Now I shall examine what Chu Hsi taught about morality with regard to the world as a whole.

To give a revealing example, Chu Hsi once answered a student who asked about the meaning of "the Investigation of Things and Extension of Knowledge," in this way:

> Unless Principle is apprehended one sees only Things, and not Principle. But once Principle is attained, one sees Principle rather than Things.[34]

For Chu Hsi empirical Things are composed of both Principle and Material Force, Principle being immanent in them. Therefore, if one, through the practice of Investigating Things should extend one's knowledge to the utmost, one will see the world of Principle which underlies the empirical world.

This appears to be a description of what may be expected when one attains the ultimate goal. However, the method of self-cultivation appropriate to our present condition should consist in a gradual disclosure of Principle in the Things we encounter, as well as a gradual unfolding of their moral constitution. This is why in the *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen* Chu Hsi said that:

> We should start from that which is closest and most pressing. Mind is that Thing which has mastery over the Body. It has as its substance the Nature of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom, and as its function the Feelings of compassion, of shame-and-disgust, of respect-and-reverence, and of right-and-wrong. These Feelings are intact within Mind, and respond to external stimuli appropriately. Second comes the [proper] use of the organs of Body: mouth, nose, ears, eyes, limbs. And third comes the relations in which the person (*shen*, "individual" not "corporeal body") is involved, those of sovereign and subject, of father and son, of husband and wife, of elder and younger, and of friends. In all of the above there is

> the Standard (*tse*) of "the way Things should be" which cannot be altered. This we call Principle. Beyond myself there are others, and their Principle is not different from mine. Beyond Man there are Things, and their Principle is not different from that of Man. From the vastest, the revolution of Heaven and Earth, and the evolution of time - to the minutest - a mote of dust, or the duration of a breath - nothing is beyond the scope of Principle.[342]

Chu Hsi's point is that through the examination of every one of the Things that we possess or encounter, from our minds to the external world, we may find Principle within each of them. This Principle, since it is universal, is not only "the way Things should be," but also requires that Man should act in accordance with it, that is, Principle prescribes Man's moral obligations. According to Chu Hsi, the world of Principle is immanent in the empirical world, and becomes "the Way the empirical world should be." In this sense our world may be regarded as a world of moral obligation.

3. Nature, Standard, and the Way

In a conversation held some time from 1198, Chu Hsi differentiates between several of the concepts relevant to the relationship between Heaven and Man. The following is an outline of this conversation. "Standard" (*tse*) is understood as the *endowment* of Heaven to Things, and connotes the idea of "exactness and criterion" (*wu-kuo-pu-chi ch'ia-hao te tao-li*). "Nature" can be considered as "Standard," from the point of view of the *reception* by Things of the endowmed Standard; it generally, however, refers to the reception by *Man*. Another term, "the Way," indicates the *path* followed by Man (in a broader sense of

the term, Things may also be included). The relationship between Nature and the Way is that of substance and function. As regards the relationship between the Standard and the Way, while Heaven gives birth to a Thing with its Standard, the latter functions as "*the Way* that Thing should be," which Man should follow constantly.[343]

As Nature (both of Man and of Things) is natural and unchanging, so the Way, as the function of Nature, is also natural and unchanging, with regard both to the natural and the human worlds. Therefore, in his commentary on the text, "Following our Nature is called the Way," from the *Chung-yung*, Chu Hsi says:

> The Way is like a path. When Man and Things follow the natural course of their Nature, they will find, among the daily affairs and objects, the path which they should follow. This path is called the Way.[344]

And as Nature is universal, so the Way is universal. Chu Hsi appealed to the text of the *Chung-yung* which says: "The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can be separated from us is not the Way."[345]

But although the Way is everywhere, that which mostly concerns Man is the way of the Essential Relationships. The reason that Chu Hsi defined the "*yung*" of the *Chung-yung* as "ordinary" rather than "constant" is that "what is ordinary will also be constant...and may be examined in the present."[346] But it is the Essential Relationships that are implied in this definition. Although the Way includes everything great and small, the most important thing is the way of the Essential Relationships. The *Chung-yung* enumerates them as follows:

> There are five universal ways. ... These are those governing the relationship between ruler and subject, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and younger

> brothers, and that in the intercourse between friends. These five are universal paths in the world.[347]

It is only because these five paths are universal that they are constant throughout history. In a conversation dated from 1193, Chu Hsi said of the continuity, and the changes, through history:

> It is the transmission of the three relations (of ruler and subject, of father and son, and of husband and wife), and the five constancies (i.e., the five relationships), that is important. All modifications have the purpose of transmitting these relationships. For example, although the Ch'in dynasty, following the Chou, and made many mistakes, it still could not change the three relations and the five constancies.[348]

In conclusion, it may be said that Chu Hsi demonstrated how the world manifest the Way. Man and Things have a moral obligation to follow their Way, of which the Essential Relationships of Man are the most essential.

4. The Significance of Principle in the History of Chinese Philosophy

In a conversation held after 1190, Chu Hsi said that a constant, perservering practice of the Way in daily life, and in the Essential Relationships, will lead to an understanding of the inherent Principle.[349] Because he took Principle as the goal of self-cultivation, it is obvious that Chu Hsi could not have regarded it merely as an incentive to diligent practice, but rather as a reality which could be confirmed through assiduous moral effort. Chu Hsi believed that all our moral efforts are aimed at

the realization of an immanent, pre-existent moral order of the world, not one which is invented *a posteriori*.

One may wish to ask the following question: does Principle really exist as the metaphysical foundation of the natural and moral Way? If one does, one would have to admit that, although all of Chu Hsi's philosophical enquiry implies an affirmative answer, he failed to convince many subsequent philosophers, especially those of the present day. Nevertheless it is possible to find a reasonable historical explanation for his world-view.

Firstly, after he rejected the Eclecticism towards which he had been inclined in youth, Chu Hsi maintained throughout his life an hostility toward Ch'an Buddhism. His proposal of a world manifesting the Way, and of Principle as its ultimate metaphysical foundation, had the purpose of opposing the view of Ch'an, which interpreted the world as a place of transcendence, freedom, and uniformity, and employed the concept of Emptiness as metaphysical foundation. Some time after 1193, a student of his offered an opinion on the two-levelled structure of Principle. He suggested that "the way Things should be" could be seen in the revolution of the universe, while "the reason Things should be so" was itself the Great Ultimate, Chu Hsi replied:

> Yes, our enquiry must be penetrating. Such an enquiry is apt to incline us toward Ch'an. But the depth of our enquiry must remain distinct from Ch'an.[350]

So it was that the Great Ultimate, conceived as the regulative standard, replaced the Emptiness characteristic of Ch'an. And the world, based upon such a foundation, was given stability, order, and certainty.

Secondly, Chu Hsi supported a society based upon the Essential Relationships, in a period when the new socio-political structure was being consolidated. For him the

validity of the Way was based on the reality of Principle, the Essential Relationships being its most fundamental part. Chu Hsi affirmed the Great Ultimate (i.e., Principle) to be the metaphysical reality, through which Things are provided with the potential to manifest the Way. Man, upon encountering these Things, discovers in them the Way as the manifestation of Principle. But, because Man is able to realise the Way through his mental capacities, Chu Hsi regarded Principle as functioning through Mind. He says in a conversation in his seventieth year:

> Principle permeates everything within Heaven and Earth, while Mind masters the Principle of them. Since it is mastered by Mind, it functions only within [the capacities of] Mind. Therefore the substance of Principle subsists within Things, but its functions are manifested through Mind.[95]

It becomes clear that the Way is based on the Principle within Things, and Man's task is simply to carry it out. In this way Chu Hsi demonstrated that the Way is an objective reality.

B. THE WORLD AS MANIFESTING THE PURITY OF THE WILL OF HEAVEN

1. Virtue as a Subjective Moral Capacity

From the last chapter, most of our discussion on moral cultivation, and on the Way manifested by the world, has been based on Chu Hsi's *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü* and *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, both of which he completed in his sixtieth year, and continued to revise for the rest of his life. In these last two sections, I shall concentrate on two other works representative of his late years, the *Chung-yung chang-chü* [*A Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean*] and the *Chung-yung huo-wen* [*Questions and Answers on the Doctrine of the Mean*]. Although the former was completed in his sixtieth year, and the latter could possibly have been written at about the same time,[352] Chu Hsi did not undertake any subsequent revision of these two works, and they may be taken to represent the thought of his final years.

Chu Hsi regarded the *Chung-yung* as a Confucian Classic on metaphysics, and suggested that, of the Four Books, while the *Ta-hsüeh* should be studied first to acquire the scheme of moral cultivation, the *Chung-yung* should be studied last because it deals with such subjects as Heaven, Nature, and the Way, through which the "hidden and marvellous" aspect of the ancient sages may be discovered.[353] Therefore, to conclude my investigation of Chu Hsi's view of the relationship between Heaven and Man, it is proper to turn to these two works.

In Chu Hsi's interpretation of the *Chung-yung*, there is a fundamental antithesis between that which has objective certainty and that which exerts effort subjectively. The former is the Way, while the latter can be expressed by the concept of Virtue (*te*). "Virtue"

refers to the moral capacity of Mind which carries out the Way, rather than to Nature which is the reason for the Way.

The contrast he made between the Way and Virtue is based on the following text of the *Chung-yung*:

> There are five universal Ways, and the way by which they are effectuated is threefold. The five are those governing the relationship between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and that between friends. These five are universal paths in the world. Wisdom, Humanity, and Courage: these three are the universal Virtues. The way through which they are accomplished is one.[354]

I quoted most of this passage in section A of this chapter for the purpose of introducing the "five universal Ways." But now my concern is with the other two concepts, those of Virtue (*te*) and of Purity (*ch'eng*). Virtue also manifests Principle, just as the Way does. But the Way, as "the universal path which ought to be followed by everybody in the world, throughout history," is an objective reality, while Virtue, as "the Principle with which everybody in the world throughtout history is endowed," is a subjective capacity.[355] The concept of Virtue can refer to Principle, which is one of the two sources of Mind; but it can also be investigated with reference to the other source - Material Force. In that case Virtue will have different strengths in different people. Therefore the text of the *Chung-yung* continues:

> Some are born with knowledge (of the Way). Some learn it through study. Some learn it through hard work. But when the knowledge is acquired, it is found to be the same thing. Some practise it naturally and easily. Some practise it for their own advantage. Some practise it with effort and difficulty. But the achievement made comes to the same thing. (Chu Hsi's commentary: The object of both knowledge and practice is "the universal Way.")[356]

It is clear that Chu Hsi considers Virtue as the capacity to know and practise the Way. Principle provides the foundation for Virtue, but because of the influence of Material Force its strength varies among different people. The inferior therefore have to struggle to improve their abilities.

According to Chu Hsi's commentary, the significance of Virtue consists in the consummation of the Way, rather than in the improvement of Virtue for its own sake. This distinction, though minute, seems to me to be of importance. If Chu Hsi had recommended Virtue for its own sake, he would have been advocating an individualistic morality. But his commentary rules out this possibility. However, the other extreme of collective morality is also inadequate to characterize his system, for, although the Way is the ultimate goal, both its reason (i.e., Nature) and its momentum (i.e., Virtue) must be found in the individual, and its accomplishment relies on the improvement of the individual. In this way Chu Hsi like many other great philosophers, although inclined towards collectivism, endeavoured to maintain a balance between the individual and society.

Chu Hsi's conception of the relationships between Nature, Mind, the Way, and Virtue, can be schematised in the following diagram:



The passage quoted earlier said that the Way by which the three universal Virtues are accomplished is one. According to Chu Hsi, this one way is that of Purity (*ch'eng*). By "Purity" is meant maintaining the integrity of Mind and not letting Human Desires intervene or contaminate the practice of Virtue.[357]

2. The Homogeneity of Way from the Essential Relationships to the Natural World

In section A of this chapter we saw that the Way is universal, encompassing both the natural and the human worlds. An examination of this homogeneity from the subjective point of view will lead us to an explanation of the Purity of Heaven and Earth (i.e., the world). In the *Chung-yung* there is a relevant passage:

> *Shih ching* says, "The hawk soars in the heavens; the fish leaps from the abyss." This means that [the Way] is clearly seen above and below. The Way of the superior man has its simple beginnings in the relation between husband and wife, but in its furthest reaches, it is clearly seen in heaven and on earth.[358]

Since Principle is unique, and the Way is the functioning of Principle, there can be only one Way common to all things from the natural world to the Essential Relationships. It is noteworthy that in the above quotation the Way known and followed by the superior man begins from the Essential Relationships before extending to the natural world. This progression implies that the Way can be attained to only through moral effort. On the other hand, from its homogeneity it is clear that the Way in itself is equally natural and vigorous, both in the

Essential Relationships and in the natural world. Ch'eng Hao commented on this passage:

> "Hawk flies and fishes leap," this is the crucial point of Tzu-ssu's (the supposed author of the *Chung-yung*) moral teaching, which is the same as Mencius's "Always be occupied by something but without expectation." Both activities are sprightly and vigorous.[359]

Chu Hsi quoted Ch'eng Hao and explained that Tzu-ssu taught us that the Way unfolds and manifests itself in all places between Heaven and Earth. The Way is evident not only in the flight of the hawk and the leaping of fishes, but also in our daily affairs and the Essential Relationships. By that understanding of these manifestations which cannot be expressed in words, one gains insight into the wonderful essence of the Way. As to the teaching of Mencius, Chu Hsi explained that although the substance and functions of the Way permeate the entire universe throughout history, in the sphere of Man the containment of Mind is necessary for the manifestation of the Way in daily affairs. As soon as Mind is contained, substance is manifested in its entirety, and the wonderful functions then unfold; it is not necessary to wait to observe the flight of the hawk and the leaping of fishes![360] Chu Hsi's proposal was that the Way is manifested as lively and vigorously in the human world, as it is in the natural world - on condition that one's Mind is contained.

An understanding of the *liveliness* of the Way, and its uniformity in the natural and human worlds will provide a clue to the concept of Purity.

3. The World as Manifesting Purity

In Chu Hsi's philosophy, as the Way encompasses objectively the natural and the human worlds, so Purity of Mind unites subjectively the moral struggle of Man and the natural creative unfolding of Heaven. This conception is derived from the *Chung-yung*, in which there are two levels of Purity, that of Heaven, and that of Man. The relevant *Chung-yung* text is:

> Purity is the way of Heaven. Endeavouring to be Pure is the way of Man. He who *is* Pure is one who has hit upon what is right without effort and knows it without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a *Sage* (i.e., a man who is commensurate with Heaven). He who *tries to be* Pure is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.
> Study extensively, enquire circumspectly, reflect carefully, sift clearly, and practise earnestly. ... If this course is followed diligently, even the stupid will become intelligent, and the weak will become strong.[361]

Let us first examine the Purity of Man. The "one way" of the earlier quotation ("The way by which the three universal Virtues are practised is one,") also refers to Purity in this sense. Since the slightest impurity of Will can make hypocritical our Virtuous actions, we say that Purity is that which accomplishes the Virtues. But then Purity requires as much cultivation as Virtue in order to reach perfection. It must be preceded by the endeavour to know the good (objectively speaking, the Way), and it is achieved by holding fast to the good. Purity is that by which the Mind of Man can be united with that of Heaven. Such an identity of Purities of Man and Heaven is exemplified in the sages. Their Purity is spontaneous and natural, not an object of acquisition. That is why the Purity of the sages is regarded as the Way of Heaven.

We must now examine the Purity of Heaven. There is a relevant passage in the *Chung-yung*:

> Purity is the beginning and end of things. Without it there would be nothing. Therefore the superior man values Purity.[362]

Chu Hsi explained this text by identifying "Pure" and "real" (*shih*). The Principle of Heaven and Earth is the *ens realissimum*, therefore its process of creation allows no breath of illusion, and everything created since the beginning of the universe. At the level of Man, the Mind of the sage is the most real subject to no illusion, therefore, every event of his life is real, having sprung from his Pure Mind. As for the ordinary man, while his Mind remains real what he does will also be real, but while his Mind is distracted, what he does will lack substantiality.[363] This explanation by Chu Hsi implies that Purity, or the Mind of Heaven and Earth, is no more than the continuing process of creation. "the Divinities," or "the Spirits and the Divinities" which were discussed in the fourth chapter as the link between Principle and Material Force, can now be regarded as the Purity of Heaven and Earth.

There is another relevant passage in the *Chung-yung*:

> The Way of Heaven and Earth may be completely described in one maxim. It is altogether without duality and so produces things in an unfathomable manner.[364]

According to Chu Hsi's commentary, this "one maxim" is equivalent to "Purity", as is evident from the description "altogether without duality."[365] Therefore, as Principle is the Vital Principle, so Purity is its dynamic force, by which the universe revolves and Things are continuously produced.

Now we may conclude our investigation into the relationship between Principle, the Way, and Purity. Principle, the Great Ultimate, is the substance, while both the Way and Purity are its functions. The Way is the

objective aspect, and involves the real, natural and moral laws. Purity is the subjective, dynamic aspect, and refers to the purity and creativity that ensues from Principle and sustains the Way.

Although Man must struggle to be Pure, Purity in itself is natural both to Man and to the universe. And, since the purity of Mind is moral, when the universe is examined in its subjective aspect and regarded as Pure, it may properly be called a moral universe. Here we find another aspect of Chu Hsi's world-view opposing that of Ch'an. I have said that according to Chu Hsi the world is real, both because its Way has objective existence, and because Principle is its ultimate foundation. But Chu Hsi proposed one more reason for the reality of the world, and that is, that it is the creation of Purity. Therefore, besides the conclusion we have reached that this is a world manifesting the Way, we may add that, subjectively speaking, this is also a world of Purity.

In Chu Hsi's system, Principle is the reason for the existence of the myriad things. Purity, as the dynamic function of Principle, may then be regarded as the creative agent of Principle. Since the Purity of Heaven and Earth results in the creation of things, so in the human world, Purity should also express itself as a creative process. Purity therefore is not only the purification of Mind, but also involves the creation of correct knowledge and practice. Morality, then, may be conceived of as creative, affecting not only character, but also entailing external consequences. In this way we come to Chu Hsi's conception of "honouring the moral nature and following the path of enquiry and study" (*tsun-te-hsing erh tao-wen-hsüeh*).

4. Honouring the Moral Nature and Following the Path of Enquiry and Study

In order to discuss this conception we shall first quote a passage of the *Chung-yung* which demonstrates the creative character of Purity:

> Purity is not only the fulfillment of one's own self, it is that by which all things are fulfilled. The fulfillment of the self means Humanity. The fulfillment of all things means Wisdom. These (i.e., Humanity and Wisdom) are the virtues of Nature, and also the way in which the internal and the external are united. Therefore whenever it (i.e., Purity) is employed, everything done is right.[366]

This passage presents an ideal of the Purity of the Sage which is not merely limited to the accumulation of inner Virtue, but simultaneously strives to attain external fulfillment. This ideal attacted Chu Hsi, for he made use of it in his commentary on many other sections in the *Chung-yung*. In chapters twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-six, and twenty-seven of the *Chung-yung*, there are such passages concerning the Purity of the sages as: "The sages by their Purity can develop the Nature of Things;" "They can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth." Some Neo-Confucianists explained these passages by saying that the sages mysteriously inspire the Purity of others, who may then devote themselves to the development and nourishment of their own Nature. Nevertheless, Chu Hsi avoided this kind of mysticism with the simple explanation that since the sages have comprehensive knowledge they can manage Things properly.[367] Chapter twenty-six of the *Chung-yung* says that the highest Purity is uninterrupted, and therefore enduring, and therefore manifest, and therefore extensive and deep, and therefore ultimately lofty and brilliant. Against the contention that this refers to the magnificent

individuality of character of the sages achieved through their inner accumulation of Virtue, Chu Hsi argued that it refers rather to the development of their external career.[368]

Chu Hsi had said, while contrasting the Way and Virtue, that the Way is the aim, and that Virtue is the necessary condition of moral endeavour, and that Virtue will itself be cultivated through that endeavour. Now that Purity is proposed as the subjective and dynamic function of Principle, it would seem proper to say that the Purity of the sages initiates the Way, just as the Purity of Heaven and Earth continuously creates things. This is supported, according to Chu Hsi, by the following *Chung-yung* text: "Unless there is perfect Virtue, the perfect Way cannot be materialised."[369] This perfect Virtue of the sage is Purity, so Man who endeavours to be Pure must make the effort to cultivate his Virtue as the inner source of the Way, and to pursue external knowledge and practice for the fulfillment of the Way in particular circumstances. The *Chung-yung* text continues:

> Therefore the superior man "honours the moral nature" and "follows the path of enquiry and study." He "achieves breadth and greatness" and "pursues the refined and subtle to the limit." He "seeks to reach the greatest height and brilliancy" and "follows the path of the Mean." He "goes over the old" so as to "find out what is new." He "is earnest and deep" and "respects highly all propriety."[370]

Commenting these five contrasting pairs, Chu Hsi said that each of the former terms in these pairs belongs to the category of "honouring the moral nature", which refers to the containment of Mind in order to attain the greatness of the Way, while each of the latter terms belongs to the category of "following the path of enquiry and study," which refers to the Extension of Knowledge in order to fulfill the detailed practice of the Way.[371] Through the

former practice, the perfect Virtue within the Mind may be attained - this is to reach the greatness of the Way. However, only through the latter practice, with knowledge of the external world, can the Mind respond to external affairs properly - this is to fulfill the details of the Way.

In his latest years, Chu Hsi often stressed this point and appealed to the authority of the *Chung-yung*. For example, at the age of seventy he spoke a lot with Ch'en Ch'un about the way of learning. He emphasised that the Way is not an abstract and unfathomable mystery, but permeates the knowledge and affairs of the external world. According to Chu Hsi, the ideal scholar should broaden his mind to receive the sayings of the sages, and further, he should communicate with the wise among his contemporaries, observe current affairs, examine military geography, and study the rise and decline of dynasties in history. Only then can he realise the Way to the utmost. He said that since ancient times, there had been no sage who did not know practical affairs, or was incapable of responding to changing situations, or who merely sat confined within his room. The sages knew everything and could do anything.[972]

C. A FEW WORDS ON THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

1. The Imperfection of the World from the Point of View of Material Force

We have discussed Chu Hsi's world-view from the points of view of Principle, and of Mind. The third element, Material Force, has also been touched on. We have shown that Man's moral obligation to strive for the Way and for Purity, which themselves can never be completely attained, is due to the limitation of Material Force. But it will be necessary to end this thesis by examining Chu Hsi's world-view exclusively from the point of view of Material Force. We shall, in doing so, find that Chu Hsi, despite having the lofty ideals of the Way and Purity, also had a realistic outlook and a keen sense of the inscrutability of human destiny.

Material Force is the reason for the actual existence of individuals, as well as the cause of their moral and intellectual differences. Therefore from the point of view of Material Force, the world, as the totality of individuals, is composed of all kinds of contingent goods and evils, and can never be said to be perfect.

So, from this point of view the moral values of both Heaven and Man may be seen to be contingent. For example, in a conversation dated from 1191, Chu Hsi said:

> As regards the evolution of Heaven and Earth, there are all kinds of possibilities. For some obvious examples: There may be some time when the sun and the moon are clear and bright, and the weather mild and normal. If men in their birth are endowed with this kind of Material Force, they will possess the clear, bright, and generous Material Force, and will naturally become good men. But when the sun and the moon

> are obscured, and summer and winter are out of their regular order, they embody the perverse Material Force of Heaven and Earth. If men receive such Material Force, they will become bad men. This truth is beyond doubt.[373]

This applies to individuals at any one point in time. But Material Force is also the reason for moral differences between historical periods. In addition to actualising the development of history according to the opposing-and-circulating Principle, it contributes many accidental strengths and weaknesses to that development. As a result history will evolve in many different stages of flourishing and decline, and within each stage both the virtues and the fortunes of the people will be diverse.[374]

2. The Connexion Between Virtue and Happiness

Before this thesis comes to an end we shall take a glimpse of what Chu Hsi had to say about the problem of individual happiness, in the light of his doctrines of "Principle and Material Force."

In the first chapter of this thesis, I said that according to Ch'an, Man can find Emptiness directly in everything he meets, and so should be happy and free, whatever his situation. But Chu Hsi established his own world-view, which opposed that of Ch'an. As the metaphysical foundation he substituted Principle for Emptiness; as the object of Man's commitment, he substituted the Essential Relationships and practical affairs for personal freedom. It will be worthwhile to compare these two world-views from the point of view of Man as an individual.

The basic ethical problem of whether those who are virtuous will also be happy, is irrelevant to Ch'an. Since

if the term "virtue" has any application for Ch'an, it must mean the realization of Emptiness, and freedom from burden. In this sense, Virtue already includes happiness, if not worldly pleasure. But in Confucianism, since the world is regarded as having objective reality, Virtue and happiness cannot simply be identified, as they are in Ch'an. For, so long as the world has objective reality, happiness, which would then at least have some relation to the external world, can no longer be wholly immanent in virtue.

The seventeenth chapter of the *Chung-yung* describes the conformity of virtue and happiness positively:

> Confucius said, "Shun indeed had great filial piety! In virtue he was a sage; in honour he was the Son of Heaven (i.e., emperor); and in wealth he owned all within the four seas. Temple sacrifices were made to him, and his descendants preserved the sacrifices for him. Thus it is that he who possesses great virtue will certainly attain to a corresponding position, to corresponding wealth, to corresponding fame, and to corresponding long life. For Heaven, in the production of things, is sure to be generous to them, according to their natural capacities. Hence the tree that is well taken care of is nourished and that which is about to fall is overthrown. The *Shih ching* says, 'the admirable, amiable prince displayed conspicuously his excellent virtue. He put his people and his officers in concord. And he received his emolument from Heaven. It protected him, assisted him, and appointed him king. And Heaven's blessing came again and again.' Therefore he who possesses great virtue will surely receive the appointment of Heaven."[378]

The *Chung-yung* tells us that he who has perfect virtue also has the greatest gain. Since virtue does not contain happiness, the conformity of virtue and happiness must rely on some external link. In the *Chung-yung* this link occurs in Heaven. To him who can accomplish the Way, Heaven will give the greatest fortune, to ensure his

success as much as to reward his labour. However, in reality we see that many virtuous men suffer misfortune - Confucius himself, for example. So that the relation between virtue and happiness must be re-examined.

Chu Hsi was not so positive about the conformity of virtue and happiness. In his view, because Heaven contains Material Force as well as Principle, any correspondence between virtue and happiness can only be accidental. The fortune of Shun is consistent with the Way things should be but the fortune of Confucius is not. Yen-hui, the best student of Confucius, was short-lived, whereas Tao-chih, the nortorious bandit, lived long to enjoy his plunder. Such inconsistency is, of course, due to the obstruction of Material Force, which may be of different moral quality in history as well as in individuals. It was good at the time of Shun and bad at the time of Confucius. And for an example of differing Material Force in the same historical period: Yen-hui received a paltry span of life, while Tao-chih received a generous one.[376]

With such a realistic world-view, Chu Hsi proposed that one should aim not at external happiness which is unreliable, but at the fulfillment of responsibility relevant to one's position. Such an attitude is supported by the following text of the *Chung-yung*:

> The superior man does what is proper to his position and does not want to go beyond this. If he is in a noble station, he does what is proper to a position of wealth and honour. If he is in a humble station, he does what is proper to a position of poverty and humility. If he is in the midst of savages, he does what is proper to savages. In a position of difficulty and danger, he does what is proper to a position of difficulty and danger. He can find himself in no situation in which he is not at ease with himself. In a high position he does not treat his inferiors with contempt. In a low position he does not court the favour of his superiors. He rectifies himself and seeks nothing from others, hence he has no complaint to make. He does not complain against Heaven

> above, nor does he blame men below. Thus it is that the superior man lives peacefully and at ease and waits for his destiny, while the inferior man takes to dangerous courses and hopes for good luck.[377]

Chu Hsi's commentary emphasises the first sentence: "The superior man does what is proper to his position and does not want to go beyond this." Because Chu Hsi had a clear sense of the fortuity of human life based on his conception of Material Force, he proposed that one should maintain integrity and perform one's duties within the constraints of nature and society, thereby acquiring a tranquility and contentment.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the process through which Chu Hsi formulated a new metaphysics; one which, in contrast with that of Buddhism, provided the foundation for a world-view characterized by morality. I hope that it has not only achieved this purpose satisfactorily, but that it has also constituted something new to our understanding of Neo-Confucianism.

Before the rise of Neo-Confucianism, Chinese philosophy was dominated by the Subjective Idealism of Ch'an, which tended to promote individualism and supra-moral values. Neo-Confucianism arose with the task of defending the validity of social and interpersonal morality, and for this purpose Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism proposed the metaphysics of Immanent Vitalism. But, as I pointed out, during the transition period between Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism, there occurred a stage of Eclecticism, which mediated between these two modes of thinking, and which was also the position which Chu Hsi adopted in the beginning of his philosophical enquiry.

After his initial period of Eclecticism, Chu Hsi adopted Immanent Vitalism as a result of his apprenticeship with Li T'ung. Nevertheless, while trying to approach the Way (i.e., the cosmic life-principle) subjectively, Chu Hsi found that that theory was defective in dealing with self-cultivation. So, during the period from his twenty-seventh year to his forty-fourth, he struggled to revise Immanent Vitalism. One of the characteristics of his metaphysics which resulted from this revision was that Man was not only a function of Heaven, as the cosmic life-principle, but was also a subject, and because he had Mind, was self-determining and

had the capacity to establish substance and functions in his own right. Tomoeda Ryûtarô mentioned the point that there is a two-dimensional substance-function structure in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, to which I have added the observation that the lower dimension is established from the subjective, or the individual point of view. Another point deserving notice is that he gradually abandoned the tradition of Immanent Vitalism by looking on substance as an abstract regulative principle. He formulated this new metaphysics as a fundamental rationale for his new moral method, in which the Mind played a role of nourishing Nature and controlling Feelings.

The development of Chu Hsi's thought from his forty-fourth year to his sixtieth involved an essential insight, of which the following is a resumé. That Man cannot achieve morality without self-restraint reflects the fact that Man is a limited being despite his possessing a moral capacity. Man, therefore, in addition to being a subject, must also be recognized as a creature. Consequently, morality for Man cannot be established unless there exists a universal Principle as an independent Standard, transcending Man's individual life. Chu Hsi therefore modified his new metaphysics and developed the doctrine of "Principle and Material Force," Principle being the regulative standard, and Material Force being the material cause of the existence of individual lives and moral differences. Gotô Toshimizu and Tomoeda Ryûtarô have offered major contributions to the understanding of the significance of this doctrine in the history of Chinese philosophy. To complement their discoveries, I have investigated the place of Mind in Chu Hsi's new system, and his ascription of moral significance to Material Force.

With his doctrine of "Principle and Material Force" Chu Hsi was in a position to propose a theory of the nature and the purpose of Man. The combination of

Principle and Material Force, as they subsists within creatures, is Physical Nature, and through it both the capacities and the limitations of Man may be explained. Man then requires moral practice in order to increase the moral capacities of his Mind, and overcome its limitations.

Finally, after a consideration of the above concepts and their development, I have examined Chu Hsi's world-view. According to Chu Hsi, this universe is a moral one. Heaven is the source of, and is itself the exemplification of, morality. Man, as a limited creature, is bound by moral obligations through which he may hope to be at one with Heaven. But, although Chu Hsi expounded a world of Principle, he held a realistic view of that same world. Perhaps this was because he was aware that moral struggle presupposes the imperfection of Man and his world. The limitation of Material Force is significant not only as the reason for Man's moral struggles, but also is that it ensures that his efforts can never guarantee the acquisition of his happiness. Nevertheless, it is through that effort that he may finally find dignity and contentment in his own person. Chu Hsi's world-view, then, in comparison with that of Ch'an, is characterized by a sense of realism, lacking the light-heartedness and naive optimism of the latter.

NOTES

CHAPTER I THE BACKGROUND: THE TRANSITION OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN FROM CH'AN TO NEO-CONFUCIANISM

1. Yamanoi (1980), p. 5.

2. Fung Yu-lan says: "'Chinese Buddhism' is the form of Buddhism, that had made contact with Chinese thought and thus developed in conjunction with the Chinese philosophical tradition. In later pages we will see that the Middle Path School of Buddhism bears some similarity to philosophical Taoism." He then demonstrates the similiarity of the "negative method of metaphysics," in the Emptiness School (the Middle Path School) and in Taoism. With regard to Ch'an he says: "In it the combination already begun between the Emptiness School and Taoism reached its climax." See Fung (1948), pp. 242-243, 246, 257.

3. 1.諸行無常 2.諸行皆苦 3.諸法無自性

   The following description of Hinayana Buddhism is that of Lao Sze-kuang. With regard to the "three codes of truth," see Lao (1971), pp. 191-193.

4. The description in this paragraph is from *ibid.*, pp. 199, 200.

5. Fung (1948), p. 243.

6. See *ibid.*, p. 244.

7. "夫大乘之悟，本不近舍生死，遠更求之也。斯在生死事中，即用其實為悟矣。"
   Collected in Seng-chao, p. 392; translated in Fung (1948), p. 252.

8. (順三脫門則到彼岸矣!)若有到，則不到也。無不到，然後為到耳。此岸者生死也，彼岸者涅槃也。
   Seng-chao, p. 410; translated in Fung (1948), p. 252.

9. 若以見佛為見者，此理本無，佛又不見也。不見有佛，乃為見佛耳。

Seng-chao, p. 410; translated in Fung (1948), p. 252.

10. See Fung (1948), p. 252.

11. 從他生故無自性也。既無自性，豈有他性哉？然則本自不然，何有滅乎？故如幻。
Seng-chao, p. 348; also collected in Shih Chün (1981), p. 207.

12. 法既無常苦空，悟之則永盡泥洹。泥洹者，不復然也。不然者，事之靖也。夫終得寂寞者，以其本無實然。然既不實，滅獨實乎？
Seng-chao, p. 354; also in Shih Chün (1981), pp. 207-208.

13. 凡夫之人，謂諸法實錄是有，不知無所有，是故諸佛，為說諸法畢竟空無所有。言諸法有者，凡夫謂有，此是俗諦，此是凡諦。賢聖真知諸法性空，此是真諦，此是聖諦。令其從俗入真捨凡取聖，為是義故，明初節二諦義也。
Chi-tsang, pp. 90-91; also collected in Shih Chün (1983), pt. i, 388; translated in Fung (1948), pp. 245-246. Translation modified by the author of this thesis.

14. 次第二重，明有無為世諦，不二為真諦者，明有無是二邊，有是一邊，無是一邊，乃至常、無常、生死、涅槃，並是二邊。以真、俗、生死、涅槃，是二邊故，所以為世諦；非真、非俗、非生死、非涅槃，不二中道為第一義諦也。
Chi-tsang, p. 91; Shih Chün (1983), pt. i, 388.

15. 次第三重，二與不二為世諦，非二非不二為第一義諦者，前明真、俗、生死、涅槃，二邊是偏，故為世諦；非真、非俗、非生死、非涅槃，不二中道為第一義，此亦是二邊，何者？二是偏，不二是中，偏是一邊，中是一邊，偏之於中，還是二邊，二邊故名世諦；非偏非中，乃是中道第一義諦也。
Chi-tsang, p. 91; Shih Chün (1983), pt. i, 388-389.

16. This argument is based on the following quotation:
空是有空，既其失有，是即失空，又且有即是空。中論云："因緣所生法，我說即是空。"既即是空，失有即失空。空既然，有亦爾。

Chi-tsang, p. 83; Shih Chün (1983), pt. i, 388.

17. The description of this argument is based on the following quotation:
若不識世諦，此有何過？失世諦則失第一義諦。失第一義諦則不得涅槃。中論云：'若不因世諦，不得第一義，不得第一義，則不得涅槃。'故此人過失極大也。
Chi-tsang, p. 83; Shih Chün, (1983), pt. i, 387.

18. For the story of Hui-neng's leaving home, see the following:
客答曰："我於新州黃梅縣東馮墓山，禮拜五祖弘忍和尚，見今在彼，門人有千餘眾。我於彼聽見大師勸道俗，但持金剛經一卷，即得見性，直了成佛。"惠能聞說，宿業有緣，便即辭親，往黃梅馮墓山，禮拜五祖弘忍和尚。....
惠能答曰："弟子是嶺南人，新州百姓。今故遠來，禮拜和尚，不求餘物，唯求佛法。"
The text of the *Liu-tsu t'an ching* is taken from Yampolsky's collation in the appendix of Yampolsky (1967). The text quoted above is in appendix, 1-2; translation in p. 127 of the same book.

19. The story of Fa-ta is from the following:
又有一僧，名法達，常誦法華經七年，心迷不知正法之處。.... 大師言："...吾一生已來，不識文字。汝將法華經來，對吾讀一遍，吾聞即知。"法達取經到，對大師讀一遍。六祖聞已，即識佛意，便與法達說法華經。
Yampolsky (1967), appendix, 20-21; translation cf. p. 165.

20. 故三世諸佛十二部經，云在人性中，本自具有。
Ibid., appendix, 14; translated in p. 152.

21. 法無頓漸，人有利鈍。迷即漸勸，悟人頓修。識自本心，是見本性，悟即元無差別。
Ibid., appendix, 6; translated in p. 137. Translation modified by the present author.

22. 身是菩提樹，心如明鏡臺，時時勤拂拭，莫使有塵埃。
Ibid., appendix, 3; translated in p. 130.

23. 菩提本無樹，明鏡亦無臺，佛性常清淨，何處有塵埃。
心是菩提樹，身為明鏡臺，明鏡本清淨，何處染塵埃。

Ibid., appendix, 4; translated in p. 132.

24. This description of the Fifth Patriarch's remark is summarized from the following quotation:
汝作此偈，見即未到。…作此見解，若覓無上菩提，即未可得。須入得門，見自本性。
Ibid., appendix, 3; translated in p. 131.

25. (不如留此偈，)令迷人誦，依此修行，不墮三惡，依法修行，人有大利益。
Ibid., appendix, 3; translated in p. 131.

26. 從上已來，皆立無念為宗、無相為體、無住為本。無相者於相而離相，無念者於念而不念，無住者為人本性。
Ibid., appendix, 6-7; translated in pp. 137-138. Translation modified by the present author.

27. All of Hui-neng's sayings in this paragraph come from the following passage:
於一切境上不染，名為無念。於自念上離境，不於法上念生。莫百物不思，念盡除却。一念斷，即別處受生。…即緣迷人於境上有念，念上便起邪見，一切塵勞妄念，從此而生。…無者無何事？念者念何物？無者離二相諸塵勞，念者念真如本性。真如是念之體，念是真如之用。自性起念，雖即見聞覺知，不染萬境，而常自在。
Ibid., appendix, 7.

28. (定慧猶如何等？如燈光。)有燈即有光，無燈即無光。燈是光之體，光是燈之用。
Ibid., appendix, 6; translated in p. 137.

29. Mou Tsung-san includes a comprehensive discussion of the substance-function relationship in various schools of Mahayana Buddhism. The exposition of that relationship here is based on his conclusion. See Mou (1968), I, 571-657.

30. 自性能含萬法是大。萬法盡是自性。見一切人及非人，惡之與善，惡法善法，盡皆不捨，不可染著，猶如虛空，名之為大。
Yampolsky (1967), appendix, 11.

31. 此法門中，一切無碍，外於一切境界上念不起為坐，內見本性不亂為禪。

Ibid., appendix, 8.

32. (與善知識授無相三歸依戒)…惠能勸善知識歸依自性三寶。佛者覺也，法者正也，僧者淨也。
Ibid., appendix, 10.

33. Paraphrased from the following quotation:
何名波羅蜜？此是西國梵音，言彼岸到，解義離生滅。著境生滅起，如水有波浪，即是於此岸。離境無生滅，如水承長流，故即名到彼岸，故名波羅蜜。
Ibid., appendix, 11; translated in p. 147.

34. 若欲修行，在家亦得，不由在寺。在寺不修，如西方心惡之人。在家若修行，如東方人修善。但願自家修清淨，即是西方。
Ibid., appendix, 17; translated in p. 159. Translation modified by the present author.

35. Cf. Chan (1973), pp. 444, 445, 449.

36. 你欲得如法見解，但莫受人惑。向裏向外，逢著便殺。逢佛殺佛，逢祖殺祖，…始得解脫。
I-tsang, 4: 12a, p. 15635; translated in Fung (1948), p. 258.

37. Fung (1948), pp. 260-261.

38. See Chan (1973), p. 428.

39. The description of Hui-neng's youth is taken from the following:
惠能幼小，父又早亡，老母孤遺移來南海，艱辛貧乏，於市賣柴。
大師遂責惠能曰："汝是嶺南人，又是獦獠，若為堪作佛？"惠能答曰："人即有南北，佛性即無南北。獦獠身與和尚不同，佛性有何差別？"
Yampolsky (1967), appendix, 1.

40. 他說治生產業皆與實相不相違背云云。如善財童子五十三參，以至神鬼神仙士農工商技藝都在他性中…他舊時體裁說得本不如此廣闊，後來禪家自覺其陋，又翻轉案曰，只說直指人心，見性成佛。

Chu Hsi, *Chu-tzu yü-lei* (hereafter quoted as *yü-lei*), VIII, 126(th chapter) : 60(th section), 4843(rd page).

41. 嘗見畫底諸祖師，其人物皆雄偉，故杲老謂臨濟若不為僧，必作一渠魁也。又嘗在廬山見歸宗像，尤為可畏。若不為僧，必作大賊矣！

Ibid., VIII, 126: 7, 4824.

42. See Kusumoto Fumiô (1980), pp. 12-25.

43. The following saying is one of many examples:
本朝士大夫好佛者，始初楊大年，後來張無盡。又說張無垢參杲老，汪玉山被他引去，後來亦好佛。
Yü-lei, VIII, 126: 117, 4867.

44. Yamanoi's text reads "feudal landowning class." I omit "feudal" because in the Sung dynasty the relation of tenants to landowners was based upon contract rather than domination, and thus should not be called feudal. See Liang (1984), p. 134.

45. Yamanoi (1980), p. 6.

46. 心量廣大，猶如虛空。…虛空能含日月星辰，大地山河，一切草木，惡人善人，惡法善法，天堂地獄，盡在空中。世人性空，亦復如是。

Yampolsky (1967), appendix, 11; translated in p. 146.

47. 前輩多有得於佛學，當利害禍福之際而不變者。蓋佛氏勇猛精進清淨堅固之說，猶足以使人淡泊有守，不為外物所移也。
Yü-lei, VIII, 132: 87, 5108.

48. 若真修道人，不見世間過。若見世間非，自非卻是左。
他非我不罪，我非自有罪。但自去非心，打破煩惱碎。
Yampolsky (1967), appendix, 18; translated in p. 161. Translation modified by the author according to the commentary by Ting Fu-pao, see Ting (1933), pp. 35b-36a.

49. 士當先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂而樂。

For the contributions of Fan Chung-yen and Hu Yüan, see Ch'ien (1940), pp. 2-3.

50. Ôtsuki (1958).

51. See Fung (1948), p. 269.

52. 無極而太極。太極動而生陽，動極而靜，靜而生陰，靜極復動。一動一靜，互為其根，分陰分陽，兩儀立焉。陽變陰合，而生水火木金土。五氣順布，四時行焉。…無極之真，二五之精，妙合而凝。乾道成男，坤道成女。二氣交感，化生萬物，萬物生生，而變化無窮焉。

Text from Chu Hsi ed. *Chin-ssu lu*, 1: 1ab; translated in Chan (1973), p. 463.

53. 唯人也，得其秀而最靈。形既生矣！神發知矣！五性感動而善惡分，萬事出矣！

Chin-ssu lu, 1: 1b-2a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 463.

54. 聖人定之以中正仁義（聖人之道，仁義中正而已矣）而主靜（無欲故靜），立人極焉！…故曰：立天之道，曰陰與陽；立地之道，曰柔與剛；立人之道，曰仁與義。

Chin-ssu lu, 1: 2a; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 463-464.

55. Lu Chiu-yüan insisted on the first interpretation, believing that Chou Tun-i had regarded "the Ultimate of Non-Being" as substance. He therefore criticised it as a cosmology derivative of Lao Tzu. Chu Hsi defended the second interpretation. See Huang Tsung-hsi, pp. 246-250.

56. 聖人本天，釋氏本心。

Erh-Ch'eng i-shu, 21B: 1b. Araki Kengo maintains that this change of fundamental conceptions is a development towards objectivity. See Araki (1963), pp. 255-270.

57. Such an analysis was first proposed by Gotô Toshimizu, see Gotô Toshimizu (1964), pp. 23-24.

CHAPTER II THE INHERITANCE OF THE NEO-CONFUCIAN TRADITION

58. 某五六歲時，心便煩惱箇天體是如何？外面是何物？
Yü-lei, III, 45: 30, 1836; and cf:
某自五六歲，便煩惱道天地四邊之外是什麼物事。見人說四方無邊，某思量也須有箇盡處。如這壁相似，壁後也須有什麼物事。其時思量得幾乎成病。到而今也未知那壁後是何物。
VI, 94: 56, 3774.

59. 某十數歲時讀孟子，言聖人與我同類者，喜不可言，(以為聖人亦易做，今方覺得難。)
Ibid., VII, 104: 4, 4151.

60. The following recollection serves as an example:
某舊時亦要無所不學。禪道文章楚詞詩兵法，事事要學。出入時撚數文字，事事有兩冊。
Ibid., 104: 40, 4167.

61. The following quotation serves as evidence:
某自十五六時至二十歲，史書都不要看，但覺得閑是閑非沒要緊，不難理會。大率才看得此等文字有味，畢竟蠹心了。
Ibid., 104: 23, 4159.

62. See "Ta Chiang Yüan-shih," *Chu-tzu ta-ch'üan* (hereafter quoted as *Ta-ch'üan*), IV(th volume), 38(th chapter): 34ab(th pages):
以先君子之餘誨，頗知有意於為己之學而未得其處，蓋出入於釋老者十餘年。(答江元適)
and Chao Shih-hsia, "*Yen-p'ing ta-wen pa*" (Postscript to *Yen-p'ing ta-wen*), in Chu Hsi ed., *Yen-p'ing ta-wen*, Introduction, 10a:
文公先生嘗謂師夏曰：余之始學，亦務為儱侗宏濶之言，好同而惡異，喜大而恥於小。(趙師夏 延平答問跋)

63. Consult Chu Hsi's sayings, quoted in Wang Mao-hung, p. 6, and Ch'ien (1971), III, 38-46. With the exception of the *Hsiao ching*, all the books named are those recollected by Chu Hsi himself. Thus this is not an exaggeration of his childhood genius of the sort prevalent in Chinese biographies.

64. For example, Chu Hsi studied the works of Ssu-ma Kuang and Ch'en Huan under the supervision of Liu

Tzu-hui. His main purpose was to learn essay writing for the civil examinations, but he paid more attention to their philosophical arguments. This is evident from his own saying:

溫公省試作民受天地之中以生論…某舊時這般文字，及了爾集之類，盡用子細看過。其有論此等去處，盡拈出看。少年被病翁監看，他不許人看，要人讀，其有議論好處，被他監讀，煞喫工夫。

Yü-lei, VIII, 130: 38, 4976.

65. (考官蔡茲謂人曰：)吾取中一後生，三篇策皆欲為朝廷措置大事，他日必非常人。

Wang Mao-hung, p. 5.

66. See Chu Hsi's comment in *Yü-lei*, VIII, 126: 85, 4856.

大抵此風(禪)亦有盛衰，紹興間最盛。

67. Goyama, (1972), pp. 25-27.

68. See "Shu Hsien-li-pu yü Ching-wu shu hou", *Ta-ch'üan*, X, 84: 20a:

先君子少日喜與物外高人往還。(書先吏部與淨悟書後)

69. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 3-4.

70. With regard to the Ch'an learning of Liu Tzu-yü, Liu Tzu-hui, and Hu Hsien, see Chu Hsi's sayings, quoted in Ch'ien (1971), III, 11. Liu Mien-chih's interest in Ch'an is suggested by his study of "transcendental learnings" under Liu An-shih劉安世; see "P'in-shih Liu-kung hsien-sheng mu-piao"聘士劉公先生墓表, *Ta-ch'üan*, X, 90: 20a.

71. See "P'ing-shan hsien-sheng Liu-kung mu-piao" 屏山先生劉公墓表, *Ta-ch'üan*, X, 90: 2a; "Pin-shih Liu-kung hsien-sheng mu-piao", 90: 20a-21a; "Chi-hsi hsien-sheng Hu-kung hsing-chuang" 籍溪先生胡公行狀, XI, 97: 15b-16b.

72. See "Shao-shih wei-kuo Chang-kung hsing-chuang" 少師魏國張公行狀, *ibid.*, XI, 95b: 4b, 11a.

73. 彥冲修行，却不會禪；竇學會禪，却不修行。

Yü-lei, VIII, 126: 85, 4856.

74. Liu Tzu-hui shared with Chu Hsi his insights into self-cultivation. See "Pa chia-ts'ang Liu Ping-weng yi-t'ieh", *Ta-ch'üan*, X, 84: 17b:

病翁先生壯歲棄官，端居味道，一室蕭然，無異禪衲。視世之聲色權利，人所競逐者，漠然若亡見也。熹蚤以童子獲侍左右，先生始亦但以舉子見期，而熹竊窺觀，見其自為與所以教人者若不相似，暇日僭有請焉。先生欣然嘉其有志，始為開示為學門户，朝夕諄誘，諄諄不倦。（跋家藏劉病翁遺帖）

75. This description is from Chu Hsi's own account in *Yü-lei*, VII, 104: 38, 4166:

某年十五六時，亦嘗留心於此。一日在病翁所會一僧，與之語。其僧只相應和了說，也不說是不是。却與劉說，某也理會得箇昭昭靈靈底禪。劉後說與某，某遂疑此僧更有要妙處在，遂去扣問他，見他說得也煞好。及去赴試時，便用他意思去胡說。是時文字不似而今細密，由人麤說。試官為某說動了，遂得舉。時年十九。

76. See Chu Hsi's funeral oration to Tao-ch'ien in *Fo-fa chin-t'ang pien* 佛法金湯編, ch. 15, quoted in Kusumoto (1980), p. 344. I believe the oration is reliable.

77. Ch'ien Mu thinks that the monk that Chu Hsi met in Liu Tzu-hui's place, was Tao-ch'ien. See Ch'ien (1971), III, 28.

78. 某年十七八時，讀中庸大學，每早起，須誦十遍。

Yü-lei, ch. 16, quoted in Ch'ien (1971), III, 42.

79. Cf. note 60 of the present chapter.

80. 此人極穎悟，力行可畏。講學極造其微處。渠所論難處，皆是操戈入室，從源頭體認來，所以好說話。…渠初從謙開善處下工夫來，故皆就裏面體認。(今既論難，見儒者路脈，極能指其差誤之處。)

Wang Mao-hung, p. 16.

81. "Chu-tzu chien Yen-p'ing hsien-sheng i-hou hsüeh-shu k'ao" 朱子見延平先生以後學術考 (The Learning of Chu Hsi After He Followed Li T'ung), Hsia, ch. 2.

82. See Chu Hsi's recollection in *Yü-lei*, VII, 104: 37, 4164:

初師屏山籍溪。籍溪學於文定，又好佛老。以文定之學為論治道則可，而道未至，然於佛老亦未有見。…其後屏山先亡，籍溪在。某自見於此道未有所得，乃見延平。

83. See Chu Hsi's recollection in *Ibid.*, 38, 4166:

後赴同安任時，年二十四五矣！始見李先生，與他說，李先生只說不是。某却倒疑李先生理會此未得，再三質問。李先生為人簡重，却不甚會說，只教看聖賢言語。某遂將那禪來權倚閣起，意中道禪亦自在，且將聖人書來讀。讀來讀去，一日復一日，覺得聖賢言語漸漸有味。却回頭看釋氏之說，漸漸破綻罅漏百出。

84. 初見李先生，說得無限道理。李先生云："汝恁地懸空理會得許多，面前事却理會不得。道亦無元妙，只在日用間著實做工夫處理會，便自見得。"(後來方曉得他說，故今日不至無理會耳。)

Quoted from Wang Mao-hung, p. 16.

85. The above description of Chu Hsi's transition from Ch'an to Confucianism is based on Ch'ien Mu's study. Ch'ien (1971), III, 12-17.

86. He was thinking over the *Lun-yü*, 19: 12. The sources relevant to this incident are collected in Ch'ien (1971), III, 17-18.

87. *Meng-tzu* 2A: 2. See Chu Hsi's recollection in *Yü-lei*, VII, 104: 14; 4157:

子夏之門人小子章

看文字却是索居獨處好用功夫，方精專，看得透徹，未須便與朋友商量。某往年在同安日，因差出體究公事處，夜寒不能寐，因看得子夏論學一段分明。後官滿，在郡中等批書，已遣行李，無文字看。於館人處借得孟子一册熟讀，方曉得養氣一章語脈。

88. See "Yü Fan chih-ko", *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 37: 6a:

去歲在同安獨居幾閱歲，看論語近十篇。(與范直閣)

89. 李先生不著書不作文，頽然若一田夫野老。

Yen-p'ing ta-wen, II, 13b.

90. Chu Hsi made this recollection with certain reservations, see *ibid.*, 14a:

正蒙知言，李先生極不要人傳寫及看。舊嘗看正蒙，李甚不許。然李終是短於辯論邪正。蓋皆不可無，無之即是少博學詳說工夫也。

91. 熹竊謂天地生物，本乎一源。人與禽獸草木之生，莫不具有此理。其一體之中，即無絲毫欠剩；其一氣之運，亦無頃刻停息，所謂仁也。先生批云：有有血氣者，有無血氣者，更體究此處。
Ibid., I, 34b-37a

92. 竊謂理一而分殊，此一句言理之本然如此。…合而言之，則莫非此理；然其中無一物之不該，便自有許多差別。雖散殊錯糅，不可名狀，而纖微之間，同異畢顯，所謂理一而分殊也。
Ibid., 35b.

93. This description of the relationship between metaphysics and morality is based on *ibid.*:
知其理一，所以為仁；知其分殊，所以為義。此二句乃是於發用處該攝本體而言，因此端緒而下工夫以推尋之處也。

94. Li T'ung's attitude is revealed in *ibid.*, 29b, 34a:
"吾儕在今日，止可於僻寂處，草木衣食，苟度此歲月為可。他一切置之度外，唯求進此學問，為庶幾耳。"
"吾儕雖在山野，憂世之心，但無所伸爾。"

95. This description of the first set of proposals is paraphrased from "Jen-wu ying-chao feng-shih," *Ta-ch'üan*, II, 11: 3a:
蓋記誦華藻，非所以探淵源而出治道；虛無寂滅，非所以貫本末而立大中。是以古者聖帝明王之學，必將格物致知，以極夫事物之變，使事物之過乎前者，義理所存，纖微畢照，瞭然乎心目之間，不容毫髮之隱，則自然意誠心正，而所以應天下之務者，若數一二辨黑白矣！（壬午應詔封事）

96. The description in this paragraph is based on "Kuei-wei ch'uei-kung-tien tsou-tsa erh," *ibid.*, 13: 2b-3a:
故臣嘗竊妄謂人主之學當以明理為先，是理既明，則凡所當為而必為，所不當為而必止者，莫非循天之理，而非有意必

固我之私也。臣請復指其實而明之。蓋臣聞之，天高地下，人位乎中。天之道不出乎陰陽，地之道不出乎柔剛，是則舍仁與義，亦無以立人之道矣！然而仁莫大於父子，義莫大於君臣，是謂三綱之要，五常之本，人倫天理之至，無所逃於天地之間。其曰君父之讎不與共戴天者，乃天之所覆，地之所載，凡有君臣父子之性者，發於至痛不能自已之同情，而非專出於一己之私也。恭惟國家之與北虜，乃陵廟之深讎，言之痛切，有非臣子所忍聞者，其不可與共戴天明矣！（癸未垂拱奏劄二）

97. Maruyama Masao considers the uniform reasoning from natural law to moral principle as most characteristic of Chu Hsi. See Maruyama (1953), pp. 21-29. Here we have seen the homogeneity between nature and humanity. But from the following chapters we shall find that the concept of law will be a later development.

98. This description of Su Shih's theory is based on *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 20ab:

（易繫辭上．第五章）
蘇曰：聖人知道之難言也，故借陰陽以言之。曰一陰一陽之謂道。一陰一陽者，陰陽未交而物未生之謂也，喻道之似莫密於此者矣！陰陽一交而生物，其始為水。水者無有之際也，始離於無而入於有矣！…若夫水之未生，陰陽之未交，廓然無一物而不可謂之無有，此真道之似也。
蘇曰：陰陽交然後生物，物生然後有象。象立而陰陽隱，凡可見者皆物也，非陰陽也。

99. The description of Chu Hsi's refutation in this paragraph is based on *ibid.*, 20b:
愚謂一陰一陽往來不息，舉道之全體而言，莫著於此者矣！而以為借陰陽以喻道之似，則是道與陰陽各為一物，借此而況彼也。…今曰"一陰一陽者，陰陽未交而物未生，廓然無一物，不可謂之無有者，道之似也。"然則道果何物乎？此皆不知道之所以為道，而欲以虛無寂滅之學揣摸而言之，故其說如此。

100. This description of Su Shih's conception of Nature is based on *ibid.*, 21b:

蘇曰：敢問性與道之辨？曰：難言也，可言其似。道之似則聲也，性之似則聞也。有聲而後聞耶？有聞而後聲耶？是二者果一乎？果二乎？

101. See *ibid.*:
蘇曰：昔者孟子以為性善，以為至矣！讀易而後知其未至也。孟子之於性，蓋見其繼者而已矣！夫善，性之效也，孟子未及見性而見其性之效，因以所見者為性。

102. See *ibid.*, 21a:
蘇曰：陰陽交而生物，道與物接而生善。物生而陰陽隱，善立而道不見矣！故曰：繼之者善也，成之者性也。

103. 仁者見之謂之仁，知者見之謂之智，百姓日用而不知，故君子之道鮮矣。（易繫辭上、第五章）
I ching, Hsi-tz'u A, ch. 5; translated in Chan (1973), p. 266.

104. See *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 22ab:
蘇曰：屬目於無形者，或見其意之所存。故仁者以道為仁，意存乎仁也；知者以道為智，意存乎智也。賢者存意而妄見，愚者日用而不知，是以君子之道成之以性者鮮矣！

105. 乾道變化，各正性命，保合大和，乃利貞。（乾卦彖傳）
I ching, Ch'ien, T'uan-chuan; translated in Chan (1973), p. 264. Translation modified by the author.

106. See *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 17b:
蘇曰：正，直也。方其變化，各之於情，無所不至。反而循之，各盡其性，以至於命，此所以為貞也。

107. This description of Chu Hsi's argument is based on *ibid.*, 21a:
愚謂繼之者善，言道之所出無非善也，所謂元也。物得是而成之，則各正其性命矣，而所謂道者固自若也。故率性而行，則無往而非道。此所以天人無二道，幽明無二理，而一以貫之也。

108. This description is based on *ibid.*, 22b:
愚謂蘇氏不知仁智之根於性，顧以仁者為妄見，乃繹老之說，聖人之言豈嘗有是哉？

109. This description is based on *ibid.*, 17b:

愚謂品物流行，莫非乾道之變化，而於其中物各正其性命以保合其大和焉，此乾之所以為利且貞也。此乃天地化育之源，不知更欲反之於何地？而又何性之可直，何命之可至乎？

110. This description of Su Ch'e's theory is paraphrased from *ibid.*, 24a-25a:

蘇曰：孔子以仁義禮樂治天下，老子絕而棄之，或者以為不同。易曰："形而上者謂之道，形而下者謂之器。"孔子之慮後世也深，故示人以器而晦其道。使中人以下守其器，不為道之所眩，以不失為君子，而中人以上自是以上達也。老子則不然，志於明道而急於開人心，故示人以道而薄於器，以為學者惟器之知，則道隱矣！故絕仁義棄禮樂以明道。

111. See *ibid.*, 26b:

蘇氏後序云：天下固無二道，而所以治人則異。君臣父子之間，非禮法則亂；知禮法而不知道，則世之俗儒，不足貴也。居山林，木食澗飲，而心存至道，雖為人天師可也，而以之治世則亂。古之聖人，中心行道而不毀世法，然後可耳。

112. This description of Chu Hsi's criticism is from *ibid.*:

愚謂天下無二道，而又有至道世法之殊，則是有二道矣！然則道何所用於世，而世何所資於道耶？

113. See *ibid.*, 27a:

張公始學於龜山之門，而逃儒以歸於釋。既自以為有得矣，而其釋之師語之曰："左右既得柄入手，開導之際，當改頭換面，隨宜說法，使殊塗同歸，則世出世間兩無遺恨矣！然此語亦不可使俗輩知，將謂實有恁麼事也。"見大慧禪師與張侍郎書。今不見於語錄中，蓋其徒諱之也。用此之故，凡張氏所論著，皆陽儒而陰釋。其離合出入之際，務在愚一世之耳目，而使之恬不覺悟，以入乎釋氏之門，雖欲復出而不可得，本末指意略如其所受於師者。

114. 天命之謂性，率性之謂道，修道之謂教。

Chung-yung, ch. 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 98. Translation modified by the author.

115. The description in this paragraph is paraphrased from *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 27b:

張云：天命之謂性，第贊性之可貴耳，未見人收之為己物也。率性之謂道，則人體之為己物而入於仁義禮智中矣！然而未見其施設運用也。脩道之謂教，則仁行於父子，義行於君臣，禮行於賓主，知行於賢者，而道之等降隆殺於是而見焉！

116. See *ibid.*, 29a:
張云：方率性時，戒懼恐懼，此學者之事也。及其深入性之本原，直造所謂天命在我，然後為君臣父子兄弟夫婦之教以幸於天下。至於此時，聖人之功用興矣！

117. 好學近乎知，力行近乎仁，知恥近乎勇。…凡為天下國家有九經。
Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 105. Translation modified by the author.

118. This description of Chang Chiu-ch'eng's interpretation is paraphrased from *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 36ab:
張云：近之為言，以不遠也，不遠即在此而已。第知所以好學者誰？所以力行者誰？所以知恥者誰？則為知仁勇矣！
張云：如其知仁勇，則亦不期於脩身尊賢親親敬大臣體羣臣子庶民來百工懷諸侯柔遠人矣！又曰：九經以次而行，皆中其會矣！

119. This description of Chu Hsi's criticism is paraphrased from *ibid.*, 29a:
（張氏）又曰："深入性之本原，直造所謂天命在我。"理亦有礙。且必至此地，然後為人倫之教以幸天下，則是聖人未至此地之時，未有人倫之教；而所以至此地者，亦不由人倫而入也。凡此皆爛漫無根之言，乃釋氏之緒餘，非吾儒之本指也。

120. For the *Ta-hsüeh* text and Lü Pen-chung's interpretation, see *ibid.*, 43a:
致知在格物，物格而後知至。（大學）
呂氏曰：致知格物，脩身之本也。知者，良知也，與堯舜同者也。理既窮則知自至，與堯舜同者忽然自見，默而識之。

121. This description of Chu Hsi's criticism is paraphrased from *ibid.*, 43ab:

愚謂致知格物，大學之端，始學之事也。一物格則一知至，其功有漸。積久貫通，然後胸中判然不疑所行，而意誠心正矣！然則所致之知固有淺深，豈遽以為與堯舜同者，一旦忽然而見之也哉？此殆釋氏一聞千悟、一超直入之虛談，非聖門明善誠身之實務也。

CHAPTER III THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW METAPHYSICS

122. Derived from the following sayings of Li T'ung:
春秋所以難看者，蓋以常人之心推測聖人，未到聖人洒然處，豈能無失耶？
如孟子稱堯舜之道孝弟而已，人皆足以知之。但合內外之道，使之體用一源，顯微無間，精粗不二，衆同盡是此理，則非聖人不能是也。
Yen-p'ing ta-wen, I, 8b, 15a.

123. *Ibid.*, 1b, 4b, 6a, 6b, 8b, 19a, 22a, 28a.

124. Cf. the following quotation:
某嘗謂進步不得者，勞攘多是如此類窒礙。更望思索，它日熟論，須見到心廣體胖，遇事一一洒落處，方是道理，不爾，只是說也。
仁字只是有知覺了了之體段，若於此不下工夫令透徹，即何緣見得本源毫髮之分殊哉？若於此不了了，即體用不能兼舉矣，此正是本源體用兼舉處，人道之立，正在於此。
Ibid., 21b, 31b.

125. 先生既從之（羅從彥）學，講誦之餘，危坐終日，以驗夫喜怒哀樂未發之前氣象為如何，而求所謂中者。若是者蓋久之，而知天下之大本真有在乎是也。蓋天下之理無不由是而出，既得其本，則凡出於此者，雖品節萬殊，曲折萬變，莫不該攝洞貫，以次融釋，而各有條理，如川流脈絡之不可亂。大而天地之所以高厚，細而品彙之所以化育，以至於經訓之微言，日用之小物，折之于此，無一不得其衷焉！由是操存益固，涵養益熟，精明純一，觸處洞然，泛應曲酬，發必中節。（延平先生李公行狀）
"Yen-p'ing hsien-sheng Li-kung hsing-chuang," *Ibid.*, XI, 97: 27b.

126. 喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中，發而皆中節謂之和。中也者天下之大本，和也者天下之達道。致中和，天地位焉！萬物育焉！
Chung-yung, ch. 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 98. Translation modified by the author.

127. See "Ta Ho Shu-ching," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 40: 8a:

李先生教人，大抵令於靜中體認大本未發時氣象分明，即處事應物自然中節。此乃龜山門下相傳指訣。然當時親炙之時，貪聽講論，又方竊好章句訓詁之習，不得盡心於此。至今若存若亡，無一的實見處，辜負教育之意。每一念此，未嘗不愧汗沾衣也。

128. 喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中。
張云：未發以前，戒愼恐懼，無一毫私欲。
愚謂未發以前，天理渾然。戒愼恐懼則既發矣！
"Tsa-hsüeh pien," *Ibid.*, IX, 72: 28b.

129. 張云：由戒愼恐懼以養喜怒哀樂，使為中為和，以位天地育萬物。
愚謂喜怒哀樂之未發乃本然之中，發而中節乃本然之和，非人之所能使也。天地位焉萬物育焉，亦理之自然，今加"以"字而倒其文，非子思之本意矣！
Ibid., 30b.

130. 張云：君子自戒愼恐懼，醞釀成中庸之道。
愚謂中庸之道，天理自然，非如酒醴，必醞釀而成也。
Ibid., 33b.

131. This dating is that proposed by the Ch'ing scholars Wang Mao-hung and Hsia Hsin. Ch'ien Mu places it in Chu Hsi's thirty-ninth year. But to me the evidence seems more in favour of Wang Mao-hung and Hsia Hsin. See Wang Mao-hung, pp. 254-256; Hsia, ch. 3; Ch'en Lai, (1982a), (1982b).

132. Wang, p. 22.

133. See "Ta Lo Ts'an-yi," *Ta-ch'üan*, XII, s(upplement) 5: 12a, b; also collected in Wang Mao-hung, p. 27:
胡仁仲所著知言一册，内呈。其語道極精切，有實用處。…欽夫嘗收安問，警益甚多。大抵衡山之學只就日用處操存辨察，本末一致，尤易見功。某近乃覺知如此，非面未易究也。（答羅參議）
某塊坐窮山，絕無師友之助，惟時得欽夫書問往來，講究此道。近方覺有脱然處，潛味之久，益覺日前所聞於西林而未之契者，皆不我欺矣！幸甚幸甚。（同上）

134. 有而不能無者，性之謂歟！
Hu Hung, 4: 2a.

135. 萬物皆性所有也。聖人盡性，故無棄物。
Ibid., 4: 3a.

136. 宰物而不死者，心之謂歟！
Ibid., 4: 2a.

137. Based on the following quotation:
人心應萬物，如水照萬象。應物有誠妄，當其可之謂誠，失其宜之謂妄。
Ibid., 4: 10b.

138. See *ibid.*, 3: 12b:
形形之謂物，不形形之謂道。物拘於數而有終，道通於化而無盡。

139. For this description of the two virtues, see *ibid.*, 1: 1a:
靜觀萬物之理，得吾心之說也易；動處萬物之分，得吾心之樂也難。是故仁智合一，然後君子之學成。

140. This description of the comparison between Buddhism and Confucianism is based on *ibid.*, 1: 3b-4a:
釋氏定其心而不理其事，故聽其言如該通，徵其行則顛沛。儒者理於事而心有止，故內不失成己，外不失成物，可以贊化育而與天地參也。
釋氏直曰吾見其性，故自處以靜，而萬物之動不能裁也；自處以定，而萬物之分不能止也。是亦天地一物之用耳！

141. See *ibid.*, 1: 6b:
道無不可行之時，時無不可處之事。時無窮，事萬變，惟仁者為能處之不失其道而有成功。

142. See "Ta Ho Shu-ching," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 40: 10b; also collected in Wang Mao-hung, pp. 26-27:
昔聞之師，以為當於未發已發之幾，默識而心契焉，然後文義事理，觸類可通，莫非此理之所出，不待區區求之於章句訓詁之間也。向雖聞此，而莫測其所謂。由今觀之，始知其為切要至當之說，而竟亦未能一躐而至其域也。（答何叔京）

143. In accordance with the opinions of Mou Tsung-san and Tomoeda Ryûtarô, I arrange the four letters from *Ta-ch'üan* IV in the following order. The first is that of 30: 19a-19b, the second 32: 5a-6a, the third 30: 19b-20b, and the last 32: 4a-5a. See Mou (1968), III, 93-94, and Tomoeda (1969), pp. 71-76.

144. This description of the first letter is paraphrased from *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 30: 19ab:
人自有生，即有知識，事物交來，應接不暇，念念遷革，以至於死，其間初無頃刻停息，舉世皆然也。然聖賢之言，則有所謂未發之中，寂然不動者，…於是退而驗之於日用之間，則凡感之而通，觸之而覺，蓋有渾然全體，應物而不窮者，是乃天命流行、生生不已之機，雖一日之間，萬起萬滅，而其寂然之本體，則未嘗不寂然也。所謂未發，如是而已，夫豈別有一物，限於一時，拘於一處，而可以謂之中哉？然則天理本真，隨處發見，不少停息者，其體用固如是，而豈物欲之私所能壅遏而梏亡之哉？故雖汨於物欲流蕩之中，而其良心萌蘖，亦未嘗不因事而發見。學者於是而致察操存之，則庶乎可以貫乎大本達道之全體而復其初矣！

145. This description of the second letter is paraphrased from *ibid.*, 32: 5ab:
蓋通天下只是一箇天機活物，流行發用，無間容息。據其已發者而指其未發者，則已發者人心，而凡未發者皆其性也，亦無一物而不備矣！夫豈別有一物，拘於一時，限於一處，而名之哉？即夫日用之間，渾然全體，如川流之不息，天運之不窮耳。此所以體用精粗動靜本末，洞然無一毫之間，而鳶飛魚躍，觸處朗然也。

146. These two verses are:
半畝方塘一鑑開，天光雲影共徘徊。問渠那得清如許？為有源頭活水來。
昨夜江邊春水生，蒙衝巨艦一毛輕。向來枉費推移力，此日中流自在行。（觀書有感二首）
"Kuan shu yo kan erh-shou" (Two Verses on Reading), *Ta-ch'üan*, I, 2: 10b; also seen in "Ta Hsü Shun-chih" 答許順之, V, 39: 15; and collected in Wang Mao-hung, p. 27. Ch'ien Mu thinks they were composed in 1161 when Chu Hsi was thirty-two, see Ch'ien (1971), III, 31. But Ch'en Lai presents sufficient evidence to justify his contention that they were written in

1166 when Chu Hsi was thirty-seven. See Ch'en Lai (1982b).

147. 只一念之間已具此體用，發者方往而未發者方來，了無間斷隔截處，夫豈別有物可指而名之哉？…熟玩中庸，只消著一未字，便是活處，此豈有一息停住時耶？只是來得無窮，便常有箇未發底耳！
Ta-ch'üan, IV, 30: 20ab.

148. 向所謂未發者，即列子所謂生之所生者死矣，而生生者未嘗終；形之所形者實矣，而形形者未嘗有爾。豈子思中庸之旨哉？（觀列子偶書）
"Kuan *Lieh-tzu* ou shu," *ibid*, VIII, 67: 24b.

149. For the date of the fourth letter, see Ch'en Lai (1982a), p. 268.

150. The description of the fourth letter is based on *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 4ab:
大抵日前所見，累書所陳者，只是髣髴地見得箇大本達道底影象，便執認以為是了，卻於致中和一句，全不曾入思議，所以累蒙教告以求仁之為急，而自覺殊無立脚下功夫處。蓋只見得箇直截根源，傾湫倒海底氣象，日間但覺為大化所驅，如在洪濤巨浪之中，不容少頃停泊。蓋其所見一向如是，以故應事接物處，但覺粗厲勇果增倍於前，而寬裕雍容之氣略無毫髮。雖竊病之，而不知其所自來也。而今而後，乃知浩浩大化之中，一家自有一箇安宅，正是自家安身立命主宰知覺處，所以立大本行達道之樞要。所謂體用一源顯微無間者，乃在於此。而前此方往方來之說，正是手忙足亂，無著身處。道邇求遠，乃至於是，亦可笑矣！

151. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 29-30.

152. Chu Hsi criticised Hu Hung and Chang Shih, see *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 6a:
孟子諸說，始者猶有齟齬處，欲一二條陳以請。今復觀之，恍然不知所以為疑矣！但性不可以善惡名，此一義畢終疑之。…知言於此雖嘗著語，然恐孟子之言本自渾然，不須更分裂破也。

153. The poem is as follows:

昔我抱冰炭，從君識乾坤，始知太極蘊，要眇難名論。謂有寧有跡？謂無復何存？惟應酬酢處，特達見本根。萬化自此流，千聖同茲源。曠然遠莫禦，惕若初不煩。
Ibid., I, 5: 8b; also collected in Wang Mao-hung, p. 30.

154. "Ta Ch'eng Yün-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 41: 18a; also collected in Wang Mao-hung, p. 32:
如艮齋銘便是做工夫底節次。近日相與考證古聖所傳門庭，建立此箇宗旨，相與守之。（答程允夫）

155. Here Chang Shih used the concept of *ssu-tuan* or four clues, the Four Feelings which are the clues of innate morality. Mencius says:
惻隱之心，仁也；羞惡之心，義也；恭敬之心，禮也；是非之心，智也。仁義禮智，非由外鑠我也，我固有之也。
"The Feeling of compassion is what we call Humanity; the Feeling of shame-and-disgust is what we call Righteousness; the Feeling of respect-and-reverence is what we call Propriety, and the Feeling of right-and-wrong is what we call Wisdom. Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom are not drilled into us from outside. We originally have them with us." See *Meng-tzu*, 6A: 6; translated in Chan (1973), p. 54. Translation modified by the author.

156. The text of "Gen-chai ming," see Chang Shih, ch. 7, pp. 111-112:
天心粹然，道義俱全；是曰至善，萬化之源。人所固存，曷自違之？求之有道，夫何遠爾！四端之著，我則察之；豈惟思慮？躬以達之。功深力到，大體可明；匪由外鑠，如春發生。知其至矣，必由其知；造次克念，戰兢自持。事物雖眾，各循其則；其則匪他，吾性之體。（艮齋銘）

157. (去冬走湖湘，講論之益不少。)然此事須是自做工夫，於日用間行住坐臥處，方自有見處，然後從此操存，以至於極，方為己物爾！（答程允夫）
"Ta Ch'eng Yün-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 41: 17a.

158. 日用之間，觀此流行之體，初無間斷處，有下功夫處。（答何叔京）
"Ta Ho Shu-ching," *ibid.*, V, 40: 26a; There are many other examples collected in Wang Mao-hung, pp. 32-34.

159. 熹謂感於物者心也，其動者情也。情根乎性而宰乎心。心為之宰，則其動也無不中節矣！何人欲之有？惟心不宰而情自動，是以流於人欲而每不得其正也。（問張敬夫）

"Wen Chang Ching-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 6b.

160. See "Ta Chang Ching-fu," *ibid.*, 8a:
（人心私欲之說，…）必有事焉，却是見得此理而存養下功處，與所謂純是道心者蓋有間矣！然既察本原，則自此可加精一之功而進夫純耳！中間儘有次第也。惟精惟一亦未離夫人心，特須如此克盡私欲，全復天理。儻不由此，則終無可至之理耳！（答張敬夫）

161. See "Ta Shih Tzu-ch'ung," *ibid.*, V, 42: 23a:
其實始終是箇敬字，但敬中須有體察功夫，方能行著習察，不然，兀然持敬，又無進步處也。（答石子重）

162. See "Chung-ho chiu-shuo hsü," *ibid.*, IX, 75: 22b-23b:
然間以語人，則未見有能深領會者。乾道己丑之春，為友人蔡季通言之。問辨之際，予忽自疑，斯理也，雖吾之所默識，然亦未有不可以告人者。今析之如此其紛糾而難明也，聽之如此其冥迷而難喻也。…然則予之所自信者，其無乃反自誤乎？則復取程氏書，虛心平氣而徐讀之，未及數行，凍釋冰釋，然後知情性之本然，聖賢之微旨，其平正明白乃如此。（中和舊說序）

163. 中庸未發已發之義，前此認得此心流行之體，又因程子凡言心者皆指已發之云，遂目心為已發，而以性為未發之中，自以為安矣！比觀程子文集遺書，見其所論多不符合，因再思之，乃知前日之說，雖於心性之實未始有差，而未發已發命名未當，且於日用之際欠却本領一段工夫，蓋所失者不但文義之間而已。…
思慮未萌事物未至之時為喜怒哀樂之未發。當此之時，即是心體流行，寂然不動之處，而天命之性，體段具焉，以其無過不及，不偏不倚，故謂之中。然已是就心體流行處見，故直謂之性則不可。（已發未發說）

"Yi-fa wei-fa shuo," *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 10a-11a.

164. 孟子曰："盡其心知其性，"心即性也。在天為命，在人為性，論其所主為心，其實只是一箇道。
Erh-Ch'eng i-shu, 18: 17a.

165. 性之本謂之命，性之自然者謂之天，自性之有形者謂之心，自性之有動者謂之情，凡此數者皆一也。
Ibid., 25: 2b.

166. (或曰："先生於喜怒哀樂未發之前，下動字？下靜字？"曰："謂之靜則可，然靜中須有物始得。"
Ibid., 18: 15b.

167. 心本善，發於思慮則有善有不善。若既發則可謂之情，不可謂之心。
Ibid., 17a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 567.

168. For Chu Hsi's description of the inefficacy of the method of examination of substance, see "Yi-fa wei-fa shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 11b-12a:
向來講論思慮，直以心為已發，而所論致知格物，亦以察識端倪為初下手處，以故缺却平日涵養一段功夫。其日用意趣常偏於動，無復深潛純一之味；而其發之言語事為之間，亦常躁迫浮露，無古聖賢氣象，由所見之偏而然爾。（已發未發說）

169. 未發之中，本體自然，不須窮索。但當此之時，敬以持之，使此氣象常存而不失，則自此而發者，其必中節矣！此日用之際本領工夫。其曰却於已發之處觀之者，所以察其端倪之動而致擴充之功也；一不中，則非性之本然，而心之道或幾乎息矣。故程子於此，每以敬而無失為言。
Ibid., 11b.

170. 當此之時，即是心體流行，寂然不動之處，而天命之性，體段具焉！（已發未發說）
"Yi-fa wei-fa shuo," *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 11a.

171. 當此之時，即是此心寂然不動之體，而天命之性，當體具焉！（與湖南諸公論中和第一書）
"Yü Hunan chu-kung lun chung-ho ti-i shu," *ibid.*, 64: 28b.

172. 方其靜也，事物未至，思慮未萌，而一性渾然，道義全具。（答張欽夫）
"Ta Chang Ch'in-fu," *ibid.*, IV, 32: 24b-25a.

173. 心則貫通乎已發未發之間，乃大易生生流行，一動一靜之全體也。（答林擇之）
"Ta Lin Tse-chih," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 43: 19b.

174. See "I-fa wei-fa shuo," *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 12a. Cf. Tomoeda (1969), p. 158-160:
周子曰："無極而太極，"程子又曰："人生而靜以上不容說。纔說時周子曰："無極而太極，"程子又曰："人生而靜以上不容說。纔言之說時，便已不是性矣！"蓋聖賢論性，無不因心而發。若欲專發未言之，則是所謂無極而不容言者，亦無體段之可名矣。（已

175. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 51, 53.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 166. *T'ung-shu chieh* seems to have been published earlier, in September 1187 when he was fifty-eight. See "Chou-tzu t'ung-shu hou-chi" 周子通書後記 (Postscript to the Penetrating the Book of Changes), *Ta-ch'üan*, X, 81: 28ab.

177. This paragraph is paraphrased from "T'ai-chi shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 16a:
動靜無端，陰陽無始，天道也。始於陽，成於陰；本於靜，流於動者，人道也。然陽復本於陰，靜復根於動，其動靜亦無端，其陰陽亦無始；則人蓋未始離乎天，而天亦未始離乎人也。（太極說）

178. This description of Chu Hsi's interpretation is paraphrased from *ibid.*:
一動一靜，循環無窮，而貞也者，萬物之所以成終而成始者也。故人雖不能不動，而立人極者必主乎靜。惟主乎靜，則其著乎動也無不中節，而不失其本然之靜矣！

179. See "Ta Chang Ch'in-fu," *ibid.*, IV, 32: 24b-25a.
然方其靜也，事物未至，思慮未萌，而一性渾然，道義全具，其所謂中，是乃心之所以為體，而寂然不動者也。及其動也，事物交至，思慮萌焉，則七情迭用，各有攸主，其所謂和，是乃心之所以為用，感而遂通者也。（答張欽夫）

180. See "T'ai-chi shuo," *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 16ab:

情之未發者性也，是乃所謂中也，天下之大本也。性之已發者情也，其皆中節則所謂和也，天下之達道也。皆天理之自然也。妙性情之德者心也，所以致中和立大本而行達道者也。天理之主宰也。（太極說）

181. 靜者性之所以立也，動者命之所以行也。然其實則靜亦動之息爾。故一動一靜皆命之行，而行乎動靜者，乃性之真也。故曰：天命之謂性。
Ibid., 16a.

182. Chu Hsi used the adjective *miao* in place of substance. He interpreted *miao* as "domination and manipulation." See *Yü-lei*, 101: 187, VII, 4104. The substance is immovable in itself, but it dominates and manipulates the circulation and changes of Yin and Yang.

183. "Vehicle" is a loose translation of *chi*. Chu Hsi explains *chi* as "treadal" (*kuan-li-tzu*, 關捩子). When the Great Ultimate is in activity, it gives rise to a subsequent tranquility. When it is in tranquility, it again gives rise to the subsequent activity. The Great Ultimate dominates and manipulates the alternation between tranquility and activity, and so the activity and the tranquility indwelling the Great Ultimate may be considered as constituting the "treadle." See *Yü-lei*, VI, 94: 51, 3774.

184. 蓋太極者，本然之妙也；動靜者，所乘之機也。太極，形而上之道也；陰陽，形而下之器也。是以自其著者而觀之，則動靜不同時，陰陽不同位，而太極無不在焉；自其微者而觀之，則沖漠無朕，而動靜陰陽之理已悉具於其中矣！雖然，推之於前，而不見其始之合；引之於後，而不見其終之離也。（太極圖說解）
T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh, 1: 15b. Reprint, p. 22.

185. See *ibid.*:
其動也，誠之通也，繼之者善，萬物之所資以始也。其靜也，誠之復也，成之者性，萬物各正其性命也。

186. Tomoeda Ryûtarô proposes the two-dimensional substance-function relationship. See Tomoeda (1969), pp. 139, 161, 192. I add that the lower dimension is from the point of view of creatures, and therefore establishes the position of Man as subject.

187. Tomoeda (1969), pp. 102-122, Mou (1968), pp. 229-354, Chan (1982), pp. 37-68.

188. In my opinion, the letters in the *Ta-ch'üan* relevant to the development of "Jen shuo" may be listed in the following temporal order:
"Ta Wu Hui-shu," the sixth letter, V, 42: 13b,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the third, V, 42: 3b,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the third, VI, 46: 26a,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the sixteenth, IV, 31: 4b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the seventeenth, IV, 31: 5b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the eighteenth, IV, 31: 6a,
"Ta Wu Hui-shu," the seventh, V, 42: 14b,
"Ta Wu Hui-shu," the ninth, V, 42: 16a (written in the winter of 1172, his forty-third year), the draft of "Jen-shuo,"
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-three, IV, 32: 16b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-four, IV, 32: 19a,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fifth, V, 42: 5b,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b,
"Ta Wu Hui-shu," the tenth, VI, 42: 17b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-fifth, IV, 32: 20a,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-sixth, IV, 32: 21a.

189. The following quotations constitute evidence:
累蒙教告，以求仁之為急。（答張敬夫）
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 4a;
夙夜講明，動靜體察，求仁格物，不敢弛其一日之勞，以庶幾乎有聞者。（與王龜齡）
"Yü Wang Kuei-ling," *ibid.*, 37: 8b.

190. The Hunan scholars include Hu Po-fung, Hu Kuang-chung, Hu Chi-sui, and Wu Hui-shu. Chang Shih is supposed to have belonged to this group, but he was convinced by Chu Hsi whom he followed.

191. 子曰：人之過也，各於其黨，觀過，斯知仁矣！
Lun-yü, 4: 7; translated in Legge (1893), I, 167. Translation modified by the author.

192. 竊觀來教，所謂苟能自省其偏，則善端已萌。此聖人指示其方，使人自得，必有所覺知，然後有地可以施功而為仁者。（答胡伯逢）
This passage is Chu Hsi's summary of the opinion of Hu Po-feng. "Ta Hu Po-feng", the third, *Ta-ch'üan*, VI, 46: 26b.

193. 程子曰："人之過也，各於其類。君子常失於厚，小人常失於薄。君子過於愛，小人過於忍。"尹氏曰："於此觀之，則人之仁不仁可知矣！"（集注）

Lun-yü chi-chu, 4: 7, Reprint, 2: 12a. Chu Hsi followed the interpretation of Ch'eng I and Yin Ch'un from 1172, at the age of forty-three. This is evident from "Ta Chang Ching-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 31: 5b:

大概觀過知仁之說，欲只如尹說發明程子之意，意味自覺深長。（答張敬夫）

194. 心既有此過矣，又不舍此過而別以一心觀之。既觀之矣，而又別以一心知此觀者之為仁。若以為有此三物遞相看覷，則紛紜雜擾，不成道理。若謂只是一心，則頃刻之間，有此三用，不亦怱遽急迫之甚乎？（答吳晦叔）
"Ta Wu Hui-shu," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 42: 14a.

195. See "Kuan-kuo shuo", *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 14ab:
若謂觀己過，竊嘗試之，尤覺未穩。蓋必俟有過而後觀，則過惡已形，觀之無及，久自悔咎，乃是反為心害，而非所以養心。若曰不俟有過而預觀平日所偏，則此心廓然本無一事，却不直下栽培涵養，乃豫求偏處而注心觀之，聖人平日教人養心求仁之術，似亦不如此之支離也。（觀過說）

196. Mou (1968), pp. 314-319, 337-342.

197. Referring to the *Lun-yü*, 12: 1:
顏淵問仁。子曰：克己復禮為仁。
Yen Yüan asked about Humanity. Confucius said, "To master oneself and return to propriety is Humanity." Translated in Chan (1973), p. 38.

198. 有所知覺然後有地以施其功者，此則是矣！然覺知二字所指自有淺深。若淺言之，則所謂覺知者，亦曰覺夫天理人欲之分而已。夫有覺於天理人欲之分，然後可以克己復禮而施為仁之功，此則是也。今連上文讀之，而求來意之所在，則所謂覺知者，乃自得於仁之謂矣！如此則覺字之所指者已深，非用力於仁之久，不足以得之，不應無故而先能自覺，却於既覺之後，方始有地以施功也。（答胡伯逢）
"Ta Hu Po-feng", the third, *Ta-ch'üan*, VI, 46: 27a.

199. Ch'eng I opposed the definition of Humanity in terms of love. See *Erh-Ch'eng i-shu*, 18: 1a:

孟子曰：'惻隱之心，仁也。'後人遂以愛為仁。惻隱固是愛也，愛自是情，仁自是性，豈可專以愛為仁？孟子言惻隱為仁，蓋為前已言惻隱之心仁之端也，既曰仁之端，則不可便謂之仁。退之言'博愛之謂仁'，非也，仁者固博愛，然便以博愛為仁則不可。

200. 大抵二先生之前，學者全不知有仁字，凡聖賢說仁處，不過只作愛字看了。自二先生以來，學者始知理會仁字，不敢只作愛說。然其流復不免有弊者，蓋專務說仁，而於操存涵泳之功不免有所忽略，故無復優柔厭飫之味，克己復禮之實。（答張敬夫）

"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the sixteenth, *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 31: 5a.

201. 若且欲曉得仁之名義，則又不若且將愛字推求。若見得仁之所以愛，愛之所以不能盡仁，則仁之名義意思瞭然在目矣！

Ibid.

202. See "Ta Chang Ching-fu," the eighteenth, *ibid.*, 6a:

為仁固是須當明善，然仁字主意不如此。所以孔子每以仁智對言之也。近年說得仁字與智字都無分別，故於令尹子文、陳文子事，說得差殊，氣象淺迫，全與聖人語意不相似。（答張敬夫）

203. Paraphrased from the following quotation:

故人之為心，其德亦有四，曰仁義禮智，而仁無不包。其發用焉，則為愛恭宜別之情，而惻隱之心無所不貫。（仁說）

"Jen shuo," *ibid.*, VIII, 67: 20a; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 593-597. Translation modified by the author.

204. Cf. Chan (1982), pp. 83-85.

205. 此孔門之教所以必使學者汲汲於求仁也。其言有曰："克己復禮為仁，"言能克去己私，復乎天理，則此心之體無不在，而此心之用無不行也。（仁說）

"Jen shuo," Ta-ch'üan, VIII, 67: 20b.

206. Cf. Chan (1982), pp. 47-50.

207. 彼謂心有知覺者，可以見仁之包乎智矣，而非仁之所以得名之實也。（仁說）
"Jen shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 21a.

208. See the following quotation:
四德之元，猶五常之仁，偏言則一事，專言則包四者。
Chin-ssu lu, 1: 3b-4a; translated in Chan (1967), p. 9. Translation modified by the author.

209. See *Yü-lei*, I, 6: 117, 191:
又問"知覺亦有生意？"曰："固是。將知覺說來，冷了。覺在知上却多，只些小搭在仁邊，仁是和底意。"

210. 上蔡所謂知覺，正謂知寒暖飢飽之類爾！推而至於酬酢佑神，亦只是此知覺，無別物也，但所用有小大爾！然此亦只是智之發用處，但惟仁者為能兼之，故謂仁者心有知覺則可，謂心有知覺謂之仁則不可。（答張欽夫，又論仁說）
"Ta Chang Ch'in-fu," the forty-fifth, *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 20ab.

211. 專言知覺者，使人張皇迫躁而無沈潛之味，其弊或至於認欲為理者有之矣！（仁說）
"Jen-shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 21b.

212. 心字實幽明，通上下，無所不在，不可以方體論也。（答胡廣仲）
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung", *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 42: 7a.

213. 心主性情，理亦曉然。今不暇別引證據，但以吾心觀之。未發而知覺不昧者，豈非心之主乎性者乎？已發而品節不差者，豈非心之主乎情者乎？ *Ibid.*

214. See "Jen-shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 20a:
蓋天地之心，其德有四，曰元亨利貞，而元無不統。其運行焉，則為春夏秋冬之序，而春生之氣無所不通。（仁說）

215. The following saying of the two Ch'engs is an example:
"復其見天地之心，"一言以蔽之，天地以生物為心。
Erh-Ch'eng wai-shu, 3: 1a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 593.

216. For example, in the explanation of the two terms in *Lun-yü*, 4: 15, Ch'eng I says:

忠，天道也；恕，人事也。忠為體，恕為用。

"'Integrity' is the Way of Heaven, whereas 'altruism' is the way of man; the former is substnce, while the latter is function." *Erh-Ch'eng i-shu*, 21B: 1b; translated in Chan (1973), p. 27.

217. 天地以生物為心者也，而人物之生，又各得夫天地之心以為心者也。故語心之德，雖其總攝貫通，無所不備，然一言以蔽之，則曰仁而已矣！（仁說）

"Jen-shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 20a; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 593-594. Translation modified by the author.

218. The description of Chu Hsi's opinion is based on "Ta Chang Ching-fu," *ibid.*, IV, 32: 6a:

但性不可以善惡名，此一義熹終疑之。蓋善者無惡之名，夫其所以有好有惡者，特以好善而惡惡耳，初安有不善哉？然則名之以善，又何不可之有？今推有好有惡者為性，而以好惡以理者為善，則是性外有理，而疑於二矣！知言於此雖嘗著語，然恐孟子之言本自渾然，不須更分裂破也。知言雖云爾，然亦曰："粹然天地之心，道義完具，"此不謂之善，何以名之哉？（答張敬夫）

219. Chu Hsi's arguments of the goodness of nature with the Hunan scholars may be found in the following letters in the *Ta-ch'üan*:
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the third letter, V, 42: 4ab,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fifth, V, 42: 7ab,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b-28a.

220. 蓋孟子所謂性善者，以其本體言之，仁義禮智之未發者是也。所謂可以為善者，以其用處言之，四端之情發而中節者是也。蓋性之與情，雖有未發已發之不同，然其所謂善者，則血脈貫通，初未嘗有不同也。此孟子道性善之本意，伊洛諸君子之所傳，而未之有改者也。（答胡伯逢）

"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b-28a.

CHAPTER IV THE RESHAPING OF THE NEW METAPHYSICS IN TERMS OF PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE

221. Ch'eng I says:
主於身為心。
Erh-Ch'eng i-shu, 18: 17a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 567. Chu Hsi says:
然人之一身，知覺運用，莫非心之所為，則心者，固所以主於身而無動靜語默之間者也。（答張欽夫）
"Ta Chang Ch'in-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 32: 24b.

222. The problems were discussed while the debate about the observation of faults was nearing its end, and the "Jen shuo" was formulating, probably between 1172 and 1173, his forty-third and forty-fourth year. See "Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fourth and the fifth, *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 42: 5ab, 6b-7a.

223. 天地儲精，得五行之秀者為人。其本也真而靜，其未發也，五性具焉，曰：仁義禮智信。形既生矣，外物觸其形而動於中矣！其中動而七情出焉，曰：喜怒哀樂愛惡欲。情既熾而益蕩，其性鑿矣！（顏子所好何學論）
"Yen-tzu suo-hao ho-hsüeh lun," *I-ch'uan wen-chi*, 4: 1a; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 547-548. Translation modified by the author.

224. 人生而靜，天之性也。感於物而動，性之欲也。物至知知，而後好惡形焉。好惡無節於內，知誘於外，不能反躬，天理滅矣！（樂記）
"Yüeh-chi," *Li-chi*.

225. 蓋人受天地之中以生。其未感也，純粹至善，萬理具焉，所謂性也。然人有是性，則即有是形，有是形則即有是心，而不能無感於物。感於物而動，則性之欲者出焉，而善惡於是乎分矣！性之欲即所謂情也。（樂記動靜說）
"Yüeh-chi tung-ching shuo," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 67: 8a.

226. This description of Hu Hung's argument is paraphrased from the following quotation:
或問："心有生死乎？"曰："無生死。"曰："然則人死，其心安在？"曰："子既知其死矣，而問安在耶？"或曰："何謂也？"曰："夫

惟不死，是以知之。又何問焉？"或者未達。胡子笑曰："甚哉！子之蔽也。子無以形觀心，而以心觀心，則其知之矣！"（胡子知言疑義）

"Hu-tzu chih-yen i-i", *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 73: 44a.

227. 心無生死，則幾於釋氏輪迴之說矣！天地生物，人得其秀而最靈，所謂心者，乃夫虛靈知覺之性，犹耳目之有見聞耳！在天地則通古今而無成壞，在人物則隨形氣而有始終。

Ibid., 73: 44b.

228. 夫天下無性外之物，而性無不在，此無極二五所以混融而無間者也，所謂妙合者也。真以理言，無妄之謂也。精以氣言，不二之名也。凝者聚也，氣聚而成形也。蓋性為之主，而陰陽五行為之經緯錯綜，又各以類聚而成形焉！（太極圖說解）

Collected in *Hsing-li ta-ch'üan*, 1: 33ab, Reprint, p. 31.

229. For example, see *Yü-lei*, II, 18: 29, 640:
釋氏云："一月普現一切水，一切水月一月攝。"這是那釋氏也窺見得這些道理。

230. Gotô Toshimizu (1936), pp. 84-87.

231. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

232. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

233. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138, 161-162.

234. Ching, (1979), p. 281.

235. "Ta Liao Tzu-hui", *Ta-ch'üan*. V, 45: 18b-20b. The topic of the letter is mentioned in another letter, "Ta Fang Po-mo" 答方伯謨, V, 44: 21ab, which was written probably in 1174.

236. 夫性者，理而已矣！乾坤變化，萬物受命，雖所稟之在我，然其理則非有我之所得私也。…性只是理，不可以聚散言。其聚而生、散而死者，氣而已矣！所謂精神魂魄、有知有覺者，皆氣之所為也。故聚則有、散則無。若理則初不為聚散而有無也。（答廖子晦）

"Ta Liao Tzu-hui," *Ibid.*, 45: 19b.

237. 但有是理則有是氣，苟氣聚乎此，則其理亦命乎此耳！不得以水漚比也。
Ibid.

238. 氣之已散者，既化而無有矣！其根於理而日生者，則固浩然而無窮也。
Ibid.

239. I have followed Gotô's interpretation of the ontology of Chu Hsi, viz. that the universe emerges as the combination of the Great Ultimate (formal cause) and Material Force (material cause). See Gotô Toshimizu (1936), pp. 174-188.

240. See *Yü-lei*, I, 1: 18, 6-7:
某謂天地別無勾當，只是以生物為心。一元之氣，運轉流通，略無停間，只是生出許多萬物而已。…今須要知得他有心處，又要見得他無心處，只恁定說不得。

241. 鬼神便是精神魂魄。程子所謂天地之功用，造化之迹；張子所謂二氣之良能，皆非性之謂也。
Ta-ch'üan, V, 45: 19b.

242. See *Yü-lei*, VI, 87: 165, 3586. Gotô Toshimizu suggested that "the Ghost and the Soul" are the essence of Material Force. Their functions are consciousness, movement, perception, and memory. "The Ghost and the Soul" refer to the substance whereas Mind refers to the functions. See Gotô Toshimizu (1937), pp. 396-398.

243. "The Spirits" and "return" are read as *kuei* 歸, while "the Divinities" and "expansion" are read as *shen* 伸. Therefore the Spirits and the Divinities are associated with Yin and Yang respectively.

244. Ch'ien (1971), I, 308.

245. 鬼神主乎氣而言，只是形而下者。但對物而言，則鬼神主乎氣，為物之體。物主乎形，待氣而生。蓋鬼神是氣之精英。
Yü-lei, IV, 63: 106, 2452.

246. See the following letters written in this periods:
熹舊讀程子之書有年矣，而不得其要。比因講究中庸首章之指，乃知所謂涵養須用敬、進學則在致知者，兩言雖約，其實入德之門無踰於此。 (答呂伯恭)

"Ta Lü Po-kung," *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 33: 2b; and
程夫子曰："涵養須用敬，進學則在致知，"此二言者，體用本末，無不該備，試用一日之功，當得其趣。（答劉子澄）
"Ta Liu Tzu-ch'eng," IV, 35: 12b.

247. The following is an example:
程夫子之言曰："涵養必以敬，而進學則在致知。"此兩言者，如車兩輪，如鳥兩翼，未有廢其一而可行可飛者也。（答孫敬甫）

"Ta Sun Ching-fu," *ibid.*, VIII, 63: 19a. According to Wang Mao-hung, p. 376, this letter was written in 1194.

248. see "Ta Hu Kuang-chung", *ibid.*, V, 42: 1ab, probably written after the winter of 1170, when he was forty-one years of age, since, in another letter (42: 9b) written in the autumn of 1170, Chu Hsi said that it had been a long time since he had heard from the Hunan scholars. Another relevant letter is "Ta Wu Hui-shu", 42: 16a-17b, written in the winter of 1172 when the debate about the observation of faults came to an end.

249. See the following example:
古之學者，八歲而入小學，學六甲五方書計之事；十五而入大學，學先聖之禮樂焉。非獨教之，固將有以養之也。（諭諸生）

"Yü chu-sheng," *ibid.*, IX, 74: 2a, written at the age of twenty-five.

250. This paragraph is paraphrased from "Ta Wu Hui-shu", *ibid.*, V, 42: 16b-17a:
夫泛論知行之理，而就一事之中以觀之，則知之為先，行之為後，無可疑者。然合夫知之淺深，行之小大而言，則非有以先成乎其小，亦將何以馴致乎其大者哉？蓋古人之教，自其孩幼而教之以孝悌誠敬之實，及其少長，而博之以詩書禮樂之文，皆所以使之即夫一事一物之間，各有以知其義理之所在，而致涵養踐履之功也。（自注：此小學之事，知之淺而行之小者也。）及其十五成童，學於大學，則其灑掃應對之間，禮樂射御之際，所以涵養踐履之者略已小成矣！於是不離乎此而教之以格物，以致其知焉。致知云者，因其所已知者推而致之，以及其所未知者而極其至也。是必至於舉天地萬物之理而一以貫之，然後為知之至。而所謂誠意正心脩

身齊家治國平天下者，至是而無所不盡其道焉。（自注：此大學之道，知之深而行之大者也。）（答吳晦叔）

251. The following saying is an example:
某於大學中所以力言小學者，以古人於小學中已自把捉成了，故於大學之道無所不可。今人既無小學之功，却當以敬為本。

Yü-lei, VII, 115: 26, 4425.

252. One letter of this interchange, mentioned that he wished to know Lu Chiu-yüan in order to state his disagreement. See "Ta Lü Tzu-yüeh", *Ta-ch'üan*, VI, 47: 20b. Chu Hsi met Lu Chiu-yüan in 1175, when he was forty-six. So the letter presumably dates from about 1174.

253. 孔子曰：操則存，舍則亡，出入無時，莫知其鄉，惟心之謂與。

Meng-tzu, 6A: 8; translated in Chan (1973), p. 57. Translation modified by the arthor.

254. 心體固本靜，然亦不能不動。其用固本善，然亦能流而入於不善。夫其動而流於不善者，固不可謂心體之本然，然亦不可不謂之心也，但其誘於物而然耳！故先聖只說操則存，（自注：存則靜，而其動也無不善矣！）舍則亡，（自注：於是乎有動而流於不善者。）出入無時，莫知其鄉。（自注：出者亡也，入者存也。本無一定之時，亦無一定之處，特係於人之操舍如何耳！）只此四句，說得心之體用始終、真妄邪正，無所不備，又見得此心不操即舍，不出即入，別無閑處可安頓之意。（答游誠之）

"Ta Yu Ch'eng-chih," *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 45: 4b. Chu Hsi himself was satisfied with the exposition in this letter. See "Ta Ho Shu-ching", V, 40: 34b.

255. Their opinion and Chu Hsi's refutation are as follows:
伏蒙示及心說，甚善。然恐或有所未盡。蓋入而存者即是真心，出而亡者亦此真心，為物誘而然耳。今以存亡出入皆為物誘所致，則是所存之外別有真心，而於孔子之言乃不及之，何耶？（答何叔京）

"Ta Ho Shu-ching", *Ibid.*, V, 40: 34a; and

又如所謂心之本體不可以存亡言，此亦未安。蓋若所操而存者初非本體，則不知所存者果為何物？而又何必以其存為哉？（答石子重）

"Ta Shih Tzu-ch'ung", 42: 21b.

256. His opinion and Chu Hsi's refutation are seen in the following quotation:

若如所論，出入有時者為心之正，然則孔子所謂出入無時者乃心之病矣！不應却以"惟心之謂與"一句直指而總結之也。（答游誠之）

"Ta Yu Ch'eng-chih", *ibid.*, V, 45: 4b.

257. This opinion and Chu Hsi's refutation are seen as the following:

蓋操舍存亡雖是人心之危，然只操之而存，則道心之微便不外此。今必謂此四句非論人心，乃是直指動靜無端、無方無體之妙，則失之矣！又謂荒忽流轉，不知所止，雖非本心，而可見心體之無滯，此亦非也。若心體本來只合如此，則又何惡其不知所止，而必曰主敬，以止之歟？（答呂子約）

"Ta Lü Tzu-yüeh," *ibid.*, VI, 47: 20b, 21a.

258. 天生斯人而予之以仁義禮智之性，而使之有君臣父子兄弟夫婦朋友之倫，所謂民彝者也。惟其氣質之稟，不能一於純秀之會，是以欲動情勝，則或以陷溺而不自知焉。古先聖王為是之故，立學校以教其民，…（南劍州尤溪縣學記）

"Nan-chien-chou yu-hsi hsien-hsüeh chi," *ibid.*, IX, 77: 22ab.

259. See "Ta Chiang Te-kung," *Ibid*, V, 44: 37a. The time of its composition is according to Wang Mao-hung, pp. 349-350.

格物之說，程子論之詳矣！而其所謂："格，至也，格物而至於物則物理盡"者，意句俱到，不可移易。熹之謬說實本其意，然亦非苟同之也。蓋自十五六時知讀是書，而不曉格物之義，往來於心，餘三十年。近歲就實用功處求之，而參以他經傳記，內外本末，反復證驗，乃知此說之的當。（答江德功）

260. "Fu-chai chi," *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 78: 12a:

抑予聞之，古人之學，博文以約禮，明善以誠身。必物格而知至，而後有以誠意而正心焉！此夫子顏曾子思孟子所相授受，而萬世學者之準程也。（復齋記）

261. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 59-60. Ching (1974), pp. 165-167.

262. 夫天生烝民，有物有則。物者形也，則者理也。形者，所謂形而下者也；理者，所謂形而上者也。人之生也，固不能無是物矣，而不明其物之理，則無以順性命之正而處事物之當，故必即是物以求之。知求其理矣，而不至夫物之極，則物之理有未窮，而吾之知亦未盡，故必至其極而後已。此所謂格物而至於物則物理盡者也。物理皆盡，則吾之知識，廓然貫通，無有蔽礙，而意無不誠，心無不正矣！此大學本經之意，而程子之說然也。（答江德功）
"Ta Chiang Te-kung," *ibid.*, V, 44: 37ab.

263. See *ibid.*, 37b:
人莫不與物接，但或徒接而不求其理，或粗求而不究其極，是以雖與物接，而不能知其理之所以然，與其所當然也。

264. 所厚者謂父子兄弟骨肉之恩，理之所當然，而人心之不能已者。
Ibid., 38a.

265. According to Gotô Toshimizu, Principle as "the way Things should be" lies in the "relationship," either between man and man, or between man and things. For example, the Principle of filial piety lies in the "relationship" between father and son. See Gotô Toshimizu (1964), p. 51. Although this explanation makes "the way Things should be" more accessible, Chu Hsi's original meaning is rather that "the way Things should be" dwells in "Things," but not in the "relationship" between Things. Only because it is in the level of manifestation, may all other things observe it and act accordingly.

266. See Wang Mao-hung, p. 65.

267. 盡其心者。
Meng-tzu, 7A: 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 78. Translation modified by the author.

268. See *Meng-tzu huo-wen*, 13: 1a:
心之體無所不統，其用無所不周。今窮理而貫通，以至於可以無所不知，則固盡其無所不統之體，無所不周之用矣。所謂盡心者，物格知至之事。

269. The title of a section in Tomoeda (1969). See p. 15 of that book.

270. *Chung-yung*, ch. 27. English translation in Chan (1973), p. 110.

271. See Wang Mao-hung, pp. 59-60; and Ching (1974), pp. 165-167.

272. The above comments are from the same passage:
子壽兄弟氣象甚好。其病却是盡廢講學而專務踐履，却於踐履之中要人提撕省察，悟得本心，此為病之大者。要其操持謹質，表裏不二，實有以過人者。惜乎其自信太過，規模窄狹，不復取人之善，將流於異學而不自知耳！（答張敬夫）
"Ta Chang Ching-fu", *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 31: 15b-16a.

273. Cf. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 99-101. "Ta Lin Tse-chih" 答林擇之, *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 43: 31b; "Yü Wu Mao-shih" 與吳茂實, 44: 30b-31a.

274. Referring to *Lun-yü*, 14: 25; translated in Legge (1893), I, 285.

275. 大抵子思以來教人之法，惟以尊德性道問學兩事為用力之要。今子靜所說專是尊德性事，而熹平日所論却是問學上多了。所以為彼學者，多持守可觀，而看得義理全不子細，又別說一種杜撰道理遮蓋，不肯放下。而熹自覺雖於義理上不敢亂說，却於緊要為己為人上多不得力。今當反身用力，去短集長，庶幾不墮一邊耳！（答項平父）
"Ta Hsiang P'ing-fu," *Ta-ch'üan*, VII, 54: 5b-6a.

276. Ching (1974), p. 176.

277. The relevant sources are collected in Wang Mao-hung, pp. 124-127. There is a careful study of the development of the controversy between Chu Hsi and the Lu School in Ch'ien (1971), III, 293-358. From 1185, Chu Hsi began to attack the Lu School publicly. See the following example:
去冬因其徒來此，狂妄凶很，手足盡露，自此乃顯然鳴鼓攻之，不復為前日之唯阿矣！（答程正思）
"Ta Ch'eng Cheng-ssu", *Ta-ch'üan*, VI, 50: 29b-30a.

278. See "Ta Lu Tzu-ching", *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 36: 6b.
所幸邇來日用功夫頗覺有力，無復向來支離之病。甚恨未得從容面論，未知異日相見，尚復有異同否？（答陸子靜）

279. Referring to *Lun-yü*, 9: 10; translated in Legge (1893), I, 220.

280. 蓋所謂道之全體雖高且大，而其實未嘗不實乎日用細微切近之間。……故聖人之教，循循有序，不過使人反而求之至近至小之中。博之以文，以開其講學之端，約之以禮，以嚴其踐履之實。使之得寸則守其寸，得尺則守其尺。如是久之，日滋月益，然後道之全體乃有所鄉望而漸可識，有所循習而漸可能。（答林退思）
"Ta Lin T'uei-ssu," *Ta-ch'üan*, VIII, 62: 11a-12a. According to Wang Mao-hung, Chu Hsi wrote it after 1193. See Wang Mao-hung, pp. 376-377.

281. Wang Mao-hung, pp. 105-124.

282. (然近日又有一般學問,)廢經而治史，略王道而尊霸術，極論古今興亡之變，而不察此心存亡之端。（答沈叔晦）
"Ta Shen Shu-hui," *Ta-ch'üan*, VII, 53: 33b.

283. A detailed discussion of these topics may be found in Tillman (1982), chs. 4, 5.

284. The description in this paragraph summarizes the following quotation:
蓋有是人則有是心，有是心則有是法，固無常泯常廢之理。但謂之無常泯，即是有時而泯矣！謂之無常廢，即是有時而廢矣！蓋天理人欲之並行，其或斷或續，固宜如此。至若論其本然之妙，則惟有天理而無人欲，是以聖人之教，必欲其盡去人欲而復全天理也。若心則欲其常不泯，而不恃其不常泯也；法則欲其常不廢，而不恃其不常廢也。所謂"人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中"者，堯舜禹相傳之密旨也。夫人自有生而梏於形體之私，則固不能無人心矣！然而必有得於天地之正，則又不能無道心矣！日用之間，二者並行，迭為勝負，而一身之是非得失，天下之治亂安危，莫不係焉！是以欲其擇之精，而不使人心得以雜乎道心；欲其守之一，而不使天理得以流於人欲，則凡其所行，無一事之不得其中，而於天下國家，無所處而不當。夫豈任人心之自危，而以有時而泯者為當然；任道心之自微，而幸其須臾之不常泯也哉？（答陳同甫）
"Ta Ch'en T'ung-fu", *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 36: 23ab.

285. 夫三才之所以為三才者，固未嘗有二道也。然天地無心而人有欲，是以天地之運行無窮，而在人者有時而不相似。蓋義理之心頃刻不存，則人道息；人道息，則天地之用雖未嘗已，而其在我者則固即此而不行矣！不可但見其穹然者常運乎上，穎然者常在乎下，便以為人道無時不立，而天地賴之以存之驗也。
Ibid., 24b.

286. See "Ta Lu Tzu-ching", *Ibid.*, 36: 6b-7a:
區區所憂，却在一種輕為高論，妄生內外精粗之別，以良心日用分為兩截，謂聖賢之言不必盡信，而容貌詞氣之間不必深察者。（答陸子靜）

287. (子靜後來得書，愈甚於前。)大抵其學於心地工夫不為無所見，但使欲恃此陵跨古今，更不下窮理細密功夫，卒并與其所得者而失之。人欲橫流，不自知覺，而高談大論，以為天理盡在是也，則其所謂心地工夫者又安在哉？（答趙子欽）
"Ta Chao Tzu-ch'in," *Ibid.*, VII, 56: 2b-3a.

288. The first few pages of the *Yü-lei* discuss the relation between Principle and Material Force. All of the conversation were recorded after he reached the age of sixty except possibly for two items by Wan Jen-chieh 萬人傑, which were recorded some time after Chu Hsi had reached the age of fifty-one.

289. See "Ta Yang tzu-chih", *Ta-ch'üan*, V, 45: 11a-12a:
原極之所以得名，蓋取樞極之義。聖人謂之太極者，所以指夫天地萬物之根也。（答楊子直）

290. 太極之義，正謂理之極致耳！有是理即有是物，無先後次序之可言，故曰："易有太極。"則是太極乃在陰陽之中，而非在陰陽之外也。(今以"大中"訓之，又以乾坤未判大衍未分之時論之，恐未安也。)（答程可久）
"Ta Ch'eng K'o-chiu", *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 37: 31b. Chu Hsi acquainted with Ch'eng Chiung when he came to govern Nan-kang chun in 1179, his fiftieth year. This letter must have been written between 1179 and 1181. See Ch'en Lai (1985), pp. 52-53.

291. The manuscript of these two commentaries were completed in 1173. In 1186, when Chu Hsi was fifty-seven, Lu Chiu-shao 陸九韶 attacked the original works of Chou Tun-i and Chang Tsai. This was an

important factor in Chu Hsi's decision to publish his earlier commentaries, as he wished to come to their defense.

292. Two letters of "Ta Lu Tzu-ching" written in 1188 and 1189 are concerned with the debate. *Ta-ch'üan*, IV, 36: 7b-16b.

293. 極是名此理之至極，中是狀此理之不偏。……太極固無偏倚而為萬化之本，然其得名，自為至極之極，而兼有標準之義，初不以中而得名也。（答陸子靜）

Ibid., 12ab.

294. See Ch'ien (1971), III, pp. 402-403. "Huang-chi pien", *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 72: 11a-14b.

295. 蓋皇者，君之稱也；極者，至極之義，標準之名，常在物之中央，而四外望之以取正焉者也。
Ta-ch'üan, IX, 72: 11a.

296. 但先儒未嘗深求其意，而不察乎人君所以脩身立道之本，是以誤訓皇極為大中。又見其詞多為含洪寬大之言，因復誤認中為含胡苟且、不分善惡之意。殊不知極雖居中，而非有取乎中之義。且中之為義，又以其無過不及，至精至當，而無有毫釐之差，亦非如其所指之云也。

Ibid., 13b-14a.

CHAPTER V THE CONCEPT OF MAN UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE

297. 天地之間，有理有氣。理也者，形而上之道也，生物之本也。氣也者，形而下之器也，生物之具也。是以人物之生，必稟此理，然後有性；必稟此氣，然後有形。其性其形，雖不外乎一身，然其道器之間，分際甚明，不可亂也。（答黃道夫）

"Ta Huang Tao-fu", *Ta-ch'üan*, VII, 58: 4b.

298. 蓋天理莫知其所始，其在人則生而有之矣！人欲者，梏於形、雜於氣、狃於習、亂於情，而後有者也。
"Hu-tzu chih-yen i-i", *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 73: 41b.

299. 生之謂性。性即氣、氣即性，生之謂也。

Erh-Ch'eng i-shu, 1: 7b-8a; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 527-529. Translation modified by the author.

300. 性即是理。理則自堯舜至於途人一也。才稟於氣，氣有清濁，稟其清者為賢，稟其濁者為愚。
Ibid., 18: 17b; translated in Chan (1973), p. 567. Translation modified by the author.

301. 形而後有氣質之性，善反之則天地之性存焉！故氣質之性，君子有弗性者焉！
Chang-tzu ch'üan-shu, 2: 18b-19a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 511. Translation modified by the author.

302. Ch'ien (1971), I, pp. 445-461.

303. 蓋生之謂性。人生而靜以上不容說，才說性時，便已不是性也。
Erh-Ch'eng i-shu, 1: 7b; translated in Chan (1973), p. 528. Translation modified by the author.

304. 蓋性須是箇氣質，方說得箇性字。若人生而靜以上，只說得箇天道，下性字不得。
Yü-lei, VI, 95: 53, 3860.

305. 然以其理而言之，則萬物一原，固無人物貴賤之殊。以其氣而言之，則得其正且通者為人，得其偏且塞者為物，是以或

貴或賤而不能齊也。

Ta-hsüeh huo-wen, p. 4a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 622. Translation modified by the author.

306. 天之生物，有有血氣知覺者，人獸是也。有無血氣知覺而但有生氣者，草木是也。有生氣已絕而但有形質臭味者，枯槁是也。（答余方叔）

"Ta Yü Fang-shu", *Ta-ch'üan*, VII, 59: 35a.

307. 故人為最靈，而備有五常之性。禽獸則昏而不能備。草木枯槁，則又并與其知覺者而亡焉！但其所以為是物之理則未嘗不具耳。

Ibid., 35ab.

308. 故為知覺運動者，此氣也；為仁義禮智者，此理也。知覺運動，人能之，物亦能之。而仁義禮智，則物固有之，而豈能全之乎？…而先生於集注，則亦以為以氣言之，則知覺運動，人物若不異；以理言之，則仁義禮智之稟，非物之所能全也。

Yü-lei, I, 4: 17, 94.

309. 孟子言"惻隱之心，仁之端也。"仁、性也，惻隱、情也，此是情上見得心。又曰："仁義禮智根于心，"此是性上見得心。蓋心便是包得那性情。性是體，情是用。

Yü-lei, I, 5: 65, 147-148.

310. 人之所以位天地之中，而為萬物之靈者，心而已矣！然心之為體，不可以聞見得，不可以思慮求。謂之有物，則不得於言；謂之無物，則日用之間，無適而非是也。（存齋記）

"Ts'un-chai chi", *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 77: 6b.

311. 心是神明之舍，為一身之主宰。

Yü-lei, VI, 98: 42, 3994.

312. 心與性自有分別。靈底是心，實底是性，靈便是那知覺底。…性便是那理，心便是盛貯該載敷施發用底。

Ibid., I, 16: 51, 515.

313. 性只是理，情是流出運用處。心之知覺，即所以具此理而行此情者也。（答潘謙之）

"Ta P'an Ch'ien-chih", *Ta-ch'üan*, VII, 55: 1a.

314. Originally written in 1189, it was revised two years later. See Ch'ien (1971), II, 113.

315. 心之虛靈知覺，一而已矣！而以為有人心道心之異者，則以其或生於形氣之私，或原於性命之正，而所以為知覺者不同，是以或危殆而不安，或微妙而難見耳。（中庸章句序）

Ta-ch'üan, IX, 76: 21b.

316. 人心惟危、道心惟危。

Translation in Legge (1893), III, 61. Translation modified by the author.

317. Tomoeda (1969), pp. 224-227.

318. 然人莫不有是形，故雖上智不能無人心；亦莫不有是性，故雖下愚不能無道心。二者雜於方寸之間，而不知所以治之，則危者愈危，微者愈微，而天理之公，卒無以勝夫人欲之私矣！精則察夫二者之間而不雜也，一則守其本心之正而不離也。從事於斯，無少間斷，必使道心常為一身之主，而人心每聽命焉，則危者安，微者著，而動靜云為，自無過不及之差矣！（中庸章句序）

"Chung-yung chang-chü hsü," *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 76: 21b.

319. 惟精惟一、允執厥中。

Translated in Legge (1893), III, p. 61.

320. 學之大小固有不同，然其為道則一而已。是以方其幼也，不習之於小學，則無以收其放心、養其德性，而為大學之基本。及其長也，不進之於大學，則無以察夫義理、措諸事業，而收小學之成功。

Ta-hsüeh huo-wen, p. 1ab.

321. See "Ta-hsüeh chang-chü hsü" (Preface to the *Commentaries on the Great Learning*), *Ta-ch'üan*, IX, 76: 20a:

三代之隆，其法寖備，然後王宮國都以及閭巷，莫不有學。人生八歲，則自王公以下，至於庶人之子弟，皆入小學，而教之以灑埽應對進退之節，禮樂射御書數之文。及其十有五年，則自天子之元子眾子，以至公卿大夫元士之適子，與凡

民之俊秀，皆入大學，而教之以窮理正心修己治人之道。（大學章句序）

322. See *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, p. 2a.

是其歲月之已迫者，則固不可得而復追矣！若其工夫之次第條目，則豈遂不可得而復補邪？蓋吾聞之，敬之一字，聖學之所以成始而成終者也。為小學者，不由乎此，固無以涵養本原而謹夫灑埽應對進退之節，與夫六藝之教。為大學者，不由乎此，亦無以開發聰明、進德修業，而致夫明德新民之功也。

323. See *ibid.*, 4ab:

唯人之生，乃得其氣之正且通者，而其性為最貴。故其方寸之間，虛靈洞徹，萬理咸備。…然其通也，或不能無清濁之異；其正也，或不能無美惡之殊。故其所賦之質，清者智而濁者愚，美者賢而惡者不肖，又有不能同者。

324. This paragraph is paraphrased from *ibid.*, 4b-5a:

然而本明之體得之於天，終有不可得而昧者。是以雖其昏蔽之極，而介然之頃，一有覺焉，則即此空隙之中，而其本體已洞然矣！是以聖人施教，既已養之於小學之中，而復開之以大學之道。其必先之以格物致知之說者，所以使之即其所養之中，而因其所發以啓其明之之端也。繼之以誠意正心修身之目者，則又所以使之因其已明之端，而反之於身，以致其明之之實也。

325. 德不勝氣，性命於氣。德勝其氣，性命於德。

Chang-tzu ch'üan-shu, 2: 19b; translated in Chan (1973), p. 512. Translations modified by the author.

326. See *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, p. 28a:

若其用力之方，則或考之事為之著，或察之念慮之微，或求之文字之中，或索之講論之際。使於身心性情之德，人倫日用之常，以至天地鬼神之變，鳥獸草木之宜，自其一物之中，莫不有以見其所當然而不容已，與其所以然而不可易者。

327. 若一箇書不讀，這裏便缺此一書之理。一件事不做，這裏便缺此一事之理。

Yü-lei, VII, 117: 35, 4493.

328. 明德者，人之所得乎天，而虛靈不昧，以具衆理而應萬事者也。
Ta-hsüeh chang-chü, p. 1a.

329. See *ibid.*, p. 28a:
自其一物之中，莫不有以見其所當然而不容已，與其所以然而不可易者。

330. 見得不容已處便是所以然。（答汪長孺別紙）
"Ta Wang Ch'ang-ju pieh-chih", *Ta-ch'üan*, VI, 52: 35.

331. 衆物之表裏精粗無不到。
Ta-hsüeh chang-chü, p. 6b.

332. 吾心之全體大用無不明矣！
Ibid., p. 6b.

333. See *ibid.*, p. 2a:
誠、實也；意者，心之所發也。實其心之所發，欲其一於善而無自欺也。

334. The description in this paragraph is based on *Ta-hsüeh huo-wen*, pp. 34a-35a:
天下之道二：善與惡而已矣！然揆厥所元而循其次第，則善者天命所賦之本然，惡者物欲所生之邪穢也。是以人之常性莫不有善而無惡，其本心莫不好善而惡惡，然既有是形體之累，而又為氣稟之拘，是以物欲之私得以蔽之，而天命之本然者不得而著。其於事物之理，固有瞢然不知其善惡之所在者，亦有僅識其粗而不能真知其可好可惡之極者。……故為大學之教，而必首之以格物致知之目，以開明其心術，使既有以識夫善惡之所在，與其可好可惡之必然矣。至此而復進之以必誠其意之說焉，則又欲其謹之於幽獨隱微之與，以禁止其苟且自欺之萌。

335. See *Ta-hsüeh chang-chü*, pp. 6b-7a:
使其惡惡則如惡惡臭，好善則如好好色，皆務決去，而求必得之，以自快足於己，不可徒苟且以徇外而為人也。

336. 人之一心，湛然虛明，如鑑之空，如衡之平。
Ta-hsüeh huo-wen, p. 37a.

337. 唯其事物之來，有所不察，應之既或不能無失，且又不能不與俱往，則其喜怒憂懼必有動乎中者，而此心之用始有不得其正者耳！

Ibid., pp. 37ab.

338. See *ibid.*, p. 37b:

惟是此心之靈，既曰一身之主，苟得其正而無不在是，則耳目鼻口四肢百骸，莫不有所聽命以供其事，而其動靜語默、出入起居，唯吾所使，而無不合於理。

339. 而所謂陰陽五行者，又必有是理而後有是氣。及其生物，則又必因是氣之聚，而後有是形。故人物之生，必得是理，然後有以為健順仁義禮智之性；必得是氣，然後有以為魂魄五臟百骸之身。

Ta-hsüeh huo-wen, 3b.

340. 凡有聲色貌象而盈於天地之間者，皆物也。既有是物，則其所以為是物者，莫不各有當然之則而自不容已。是皆得於天之所賦，而非人之所能為也。

Ibid., 26b.

341. 理有未明，則見物而不見理。理無不盡，則見理而不見物。（答李孝述繼善問目）

"Ta Li Hsiao-shu", *Ta-ch'üan*, XII, supplementary 10: 12a.

342. 今且以其至切而近者言之，則心之為物，實主於身，其體則有仁義禮智之性，其用則有惻隱羞惡恭敬是非之情，渾然在中，隨感而應，各有攸主而不可亂也。次而及於身之所具，則有耳目口鼻四肢之用。又次而及於身之所接，則有君臣父子夫婦長幼朋友之常。是皆必有當然之則而自不容已，所謂理也。外而至於人，則人之理不異於己也。遠而至於物，則物之理不異於人也。極其大，則天地之運、古今之變，不能外也。盡於小，則一塵之微，一息之頃，不能遺也。

Ta-hsüeh huo-wen, pp. 26b-27a.

343. The differentiation of these three terms is taken from *Yü-lei*, II, 18: 82, 658-660:

裏字看來只是箇無過不及恰好底道理。天之生人物，箇箇有一副當恰好無過不及底道理降與你。…天生烝民，有物有則，則字却似裏字。天之生此物，必有箇當然之則，故民執之以為常道，所以無不好此懿德。…故自天而言，則謂之降衷，自人受此衷而言，則謂之性。如云：天所賦為命，物所受為性。命便是那降字，至物所受，則謂之性而不謂之衷。…道者性之發用處。

344. 道猶路也。人物各循其性之自然，則其日用事物之間，莫不各有當行之路，是則所謂道也。
Chung-yung chang-chü, ch. 1, p. 1b.

345. 道也者，不可須臾離也，可離非道也。
Chung-yung., ch. 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 98.

346. 惟其平常，故可常而不可易。…謂之平常，則直驗於今而無所詭異，而其常久而不易者可兼舉也。
Chung-yung huo-wen, pp. 1b-2a. For Ch'eng I and his disciples *yung* had been interpreted as "constant". Therefore, "ordinary" is in fact a new interpretation.

347. 天下之達道五，…曰：君臣也、父子也、夫婦也、昆弟也、朋友之交也。五者，天下之達道也。
Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 105. Translation modified by the author.

348. 此一章因字最重。所謂損益者，亦是要扶持箇三綱五常而已。如秦之繼周，雖損益有所不當，然三綱五常終變不得。
Yü-lei, II, 24: 139, 963.

349. See *ibid.*, II, 18: 89, 664:
問所藉以為從事之實者，初不外乎人生日用之近，其所以為精微要妙不可測度者，則在乎真積力久，默識心通之中，是乃夫子所謂下學而上達者。曰：只是眼前切近起居飲食，君臣父子兄弟夫婦朋友處，便是這道理。只就近處行到熟處，見得自高。

350. (廣曰："大至於陰陽造化，皆是所當然而不容已者。所謂太極，則是所以然而不可易者。"曰："固是。人須是自何裏入深去理會此箇道理。才理會到深處，又易得似禪。須是理會到深處，又却不與禪相似，方是。
Ibid., II, 18: 94, 667.

351. 理遍在天地萬物之間，而心則管之。心既管之，則其用實不外乎此心矣！然則理之體在物，而其用在心也。
Ibid., II, 18: 97, 669.

352. See Wang Mao-hung, p. 168.

353. See *Yü-lei*, I, 14: 3, 397:

某要人先讀大學，以定其規模；次讀論語，以立其根本；次讀孟子，以觀其發越；次讀中庸，以求古人之微妙處。

354. 天下之達道五，所以行之者三。曰：君臣也、父子也、夫婦也、昆弟也、朋友之交也。五者，天下之達道也。知仁勇三者，天下之達德也。所以行之者一也。

Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 105. Translation modified by the author.

355. 達道者，天下古今所共由之路。…謂之達德者，天下古今所同得之理也。

Chung-yung chang chü, p. 16a.

356. 或生而知之，或學而知之，或困而知之，及其知之，一也。或安而行之，或利而行之，或勉強而行之，及其成功，一也。（朱注：知之者之所知，行之者之所行，謂達道也。）

Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 105. Translation modified by the author.

357. See *Chung-yung chang-chü*, p. 16a:

一則誠而已矣！…達德雖人所同得，然一有不誠，則人欲間之，而德非其德矣！

358. 詩云："鳶飛戾天，魚躍于淵。"言其上下察也。君子之道，造端乎夫婦，及其至也，察乎天地。

Chung-yung, ch. 12; translated in Chan (1973), p. 100. Translation modified by the author.

359. "鳶飛魚躍"，子思喫緊為人處。與"必有事焉而勿正心"之意，同活潑潑地。

Chung-yung huo-wen, p. 29b. The quotation of Mencius is from 2A: 2.

360. This description of Chu Hsi's explanation is paraphrased from *Chung-yung huo-wen*, pp. 29b-30b:

道之流行發見於天地之間，無所不在。在上則鳶之飛而戾於天者，此也；在下則魚之躍而出於淵者，此也。其在人，則日用之間，人倫之際，夫婦之所知所能，而聖人之所不知不能者，亦此也。此其流行發見於上下之間者，可謂著矣！子思於此指而言之，惟欲學者於此默而識之，則為有以洞見道體之妙而無疑。而程子以為子思喫緊為人處者，正以示人之

意為莫切於此也。其曰："與必有事焉而勿正心之意，同活潑潑地，"則又以明道之體用，流行發見，充塞天地，亘古亘今，雖未嘗有一豪之空闕，一息之間斷。然其在人而見諸日用之間者，則初不外乎此心，故必此心之存而後有以自覺也。必有事焉而勿正心、活潑潑地；亦曰此心之存，而全體呈露、妙用顯行，無所滯礙云爾。非必仰而視乎鳶之飛，俯而觀乎魚之躍，然後可以得之也。

361. 誠者，天之道也。誠之者，人之道也。誠者，不勉而中，不思而得，從容中道，聖人也。誠之者，擇善而固執之者也。博學之、審問之、愼思之、明辨之、篤行之。…果能此道矣，雖愚必明，雖柔必強。

Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 107. Translation modified by the author.

362. 誠者物之終始，不誠無物，是故君子誠之為貴。

Ibid, ch. 25; translated in Chan (1973), p. 108. Translation modified by the author.

363. This description is based on *Chung-yung huo-wen*, pp. 63b-64a:

所謂誠者物之終始，不誠無物者，以理言之，則天地之理至實而無一息之妄，故自古至今，無一物之不實；而一物之中，自始至終，皆實理之所為也。以心言之，則聖人之心亦至實而無一息之妄，故從生至死，無一事之不實；而一事之中，自始至終，皆實心之所為也，此所謂誠者物之終始者然也。苟未至於聖人，而其本心之實者猶未免於間斷，則自其實有是心之初，以至未有間斷之前，所為無不實者。及其間斷，則自其間斷之後，以至未相接續之前，凡所云為，皆無實之可言。雖有其事，亦無以異於無有矣！

364. 天地之道，可一言而盡也。其為物不貳，則其生物不測。

Chung-yung, ch. 26; translated in Chan (1973), p. 109. Translation modified by the author.

365. See *Chung-yung chang-chü*, ch. 26, p. 23b:

天地之道，可一言而盡，不過曰誠而已。不貳，所以誠也。

366. 誠者，非自成己而已也，所以成物也。成己，仁也；成物，知也。性之德也，合外內之道也。故時措之宜也。

Chung-yung, ch. 25; translated in Chan (1973), p. 108. Translation modified by the author.

367. See *Chung-yung chang-chü*, pp. 21b, 22a, 23ab, 25a.

368. The text says:
故至誠無息，不息則久，久則徵，徵則悠遠，悠遠則博厚，博厚則高明。
Chu Hsi comments:
此章所謂至誠無息以至於博厚高明，乃聖人久於其道而天下化成之事。其所積而成者，乃其氣象功效之謂，若鄭氏所謂至誠之德著於四方者是也，非謂在己之德亦待積而後成也。
Chung-yung huo-wen, p. 65b.

369. 苟非至德，至道不凝焉。
Chung-yung, ch. 27; translated in Chan (1973), p. 110.

370. 故君子尊德性而道問學，致廣大而盡精微，極高明而道中庸，溫故而知新，敦厚以崇禮。
Ibid., ch. 27; translated in Chan (1973), p. 110.

371. See *Chung-yung chang-chü*, ch. 27, p. 25a:
尊德性，所以存心而極乎道體之大也。道問學，所以致知而盡乎道體之細也。

372. See *Yü-lei*, VII, 117: 52, 4517:
聖賢說話，許多道理平鋪在那裏，且要闊著心胸平去看，通透後自能應變。不是硬捉定一物，便要討常，便要討變。今也須如僧家行腳，揩四方之賢士，察四方之事情，覽山川之形勢，觀古今興亡治亂得失之迹，這道理方見得周遍。士而懷居，不足以為士矣！不是塊然守定這物事，在一室關門獨坐便了，便可以為聖賢。自古無不曉事情底聖賢，亦無不通變底聖賢，亦無關門獨坐底聖賢。聖賢無所不通，無所不能，那箇事理會不得？

373. 且如天地之運，萬端而無窮。其可見者，日月清明，氣候和正之時，人生而稟此氣，則為清明渾厚之氣，須做箇好人。若是日月昏暗，寒暑反常，皆是天地之戾氣。人若稟此氣，則為不好底人，何疑？
Ibid., I, 4: 60, 110-111.

374. Relevant sources are collected in Ch'ien (1971), I, 501-507, 516-518.

375. 子曰：舜其大孝也與！德為聖人，尊為天子，富有四海之內，宗廟饗之，子孫保之。故大德必得其位，必得其祿，必得其名，必得其壽。故天之生物，必因其材而篤焉，故栽者培之，傾者覆之。詩曰："嘉樂君子，憲憲令德。宜民宜人，受祿于天。保佑命之，自天申之。"故大德者必受命。

Chung-yung, ch. 17; translated in Chan (1973), p. 102. Translation modified by the author.

376. The description in this paragraph is based on *Chung-yung huo-wen*, pp. 40b-41a:

或問十七章之說。曰：程子張子呂氏之說備矣！楊氏所辨孔子不受命之意，則亦程子所謂非常理者盡之。而侯氏所推，以謂舜得其常而孔子不得其常者，尤明白也。至於顏冉壽夭之不齊，則亦不得其常而已。…蓋德為聖人者，固孔子之所以為栽者也；至於祿也位也壽也，則天之所當以培乎孔子者，而以適丁氣數之衰，是以雖欲培之而有所不能及爾，是亦所謂不得其常者…。

377. 君子素其位而行，不願乎其外。素富貴，行乎富貴；素貧賤，行乎貧賤；素夷狄，行乎夷狄；素患難，行乎患難。君子無入而不自得焉！在上位，不陵下；在下位，不援上。正己而不求於人，則無怨。上不怨天，下不尤人。故君子居易以俟命，小人行險以徼幸。

Chung-yung, ch. 14; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 101-102.

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比較思想的關心よりの朱子學研究の課題 東方學

GLOSSARY

A. Glossary of Proper Names

This glossary includes names of people, dynasties, places, and titles of works referred to but not cited in the text.

Ch'an	禪
Chang Chiu-ch'eng, Tzu-shao	張九成 子韶
Chang Shih, Nan-hsüeh, Ching-fu, Ch'in-fu	張栻,南軒,敬夫,欽夫
Chang Tsai	張載
Chao Yen-su, Tzu-ch'in	趙彦肅 子欽
Chekiang	浙江
Che-tung	浙東
Ch'en Ch'un	陳淳
Ch'en Huan, Ying-chung, Liao-chai	陳瓘 瑩中 了齋
Ch'eng Chiung, K'o-chiu, Sha-sui	程迥 可久 沙隨
Ch'eng Hao	程顥
Cheng Hsüan	鄭玄
Ch'eng I	程頤
Cheng-meng	正蒙
Chi-tsang	吉藏
Chiang Mo, Yüan-shih	江默 元適
Chih-yen	知言
Chin	金
Ch'in	秦
Chin-kang ching	金剛經
Ch'in K'uai	秦檜
Ch'in-tsung	欽宗
Ch'ing	清
Chou	周
Chou-li	周禮
Chou Tun-i	周敦頤

chu-pu 主簿
Chu Sung 朱松
Chung-ho chiu shuo 中和舊說
Chung-yung 中庸
Chung-yung chieh 中庸解
Fa-hua ching 法華經
Fa-ta 法達
Fan Chung-yen 范仲淹
Fukien 福建
"Gen-chai ming" 艮齋銘
Han 漢
Han Yü 韓愈
Ho Hao, Shu-ching 何鎬 叔京
Hsi-hsia 西夏
"Hsi-ming" 西銘
Hsi-ming chieh-i 西銘解義
Hsiang An-shih, P'ing-fu 項安世 平父
Hsiang tsung 相宗
Hsiao ching 孝經
Hsiao-tsung 孝宗
Hsieh Liang-tso, Shang-ts'ai 謝良佐 上蔡
Hsing tsung 性宗
Hu Hsien, Chi-hsi 胡憲 籍溪
Hu Hung, Wu-feng 胡宏 五峯
Hu Yüan 胡瑗
huang-chi 皇極
Huang Tao-fu 黃道夫
Hui-neng 慧能
Hui-tsung 徽宗
Hunan 湖南
"hung-fan" 洪範
I chieh 易解
I ching 易經
I-hsüan 義玄
I t'ung 易通
Jen-tsung 仁宗

Kao-shih hsüan 高士軒
Kao-tsung 高宗
Kuei-tsung 歸宗
K'ung tsung 空宗
K'ung Ying-ta 孔穎達
Lao-tzu 老子
Lao-tzu chieh 老子解
Li chi 禮記
Li T'ung, Yen-p'ing 李侗 延平
Liao 遼
Liao Te-ming, Tzu-hui 廖德明 子晦
Lieh-tzu 列子
Lin-chi 臨濟
Lin Pu, T'uei-ssu 林補 退思
Liu Mien-chih, Po-shui 劉勉之 白水
Liu Tsung-yüan 柳宗元
Liu Tzu-hui, Yen-ch'ung, Ping-weng, P'ing-shan
劉子翬 彥沖 病翁 屏山
Liu Tzu-yü, Pao-hsüeh 劉子羽 寶學
Liu Yü-hsi 劉禹錫
Lo Ts'ung-yen 羅從彥
Lu Chiu-ling 陸九齡
Lu Chiu-yüan, Tzu-ching, Hsiang-shan 陸九淵 子靜 象山
Lü Pen-chung, Chü-jen 呂本中 居仁
Lü Tsu-chien, Tzu-yüeh 呂祖儉 子約
Lü Tsu-ch'ien, Po-kung 呂祖謙 伯恭
Lun-yü 論語
Meng-tzu 孟子
Ming 明
O-hu ssu 鵝湖寺
Shao-hsing 紹興
Shao Yung 邵雍
Shen-hsiu 神秀
Shen Shu-hui 沈叔晦
Shih ching 詩經
Shih Lei, Tzu-ch'ung 石磊 子重

Shu ching	書經
Shun	舜
Ssu-ma Kuang	司馬光
Su Ch'e, Huang-men	蘇轍　黃門
Su Shih, Tung-p'o	蘇軾　東坡
Sung	宋
Sung shih	宋史
Ta-hsüeh	大學
T'ai-chi t'u shuo	太極圖說
T'anchou	潭州
Tao-chih	盜跖
Tao-sheng	道生
Tsa-hsüeh pien	雜學辨
Ts'ai Chi-t'ung	蔡季通
Tsung-kao, Ta-hui, Miao-hsi	宗杲　大慧　妙喜
T'ung-an	同安
T'ung-shu	通書
Tzu-ssu	子思
Wang An-shih	王安石
Wang Ch'ang-ju	汪長孺
Yang Fang, Tzu-chih	楊方　子直
Yang Shih, Kuei-shan	楊時　龜山
Yao	堯
Yen Hui	顏回
Yu Chiu-yen, Ch'eng-chih	游九言　誠之
Yü Ta-yu, Fang-shu	余大猷　方叔
Yüan	元
"Yüeh-chi"	樂記

B. Glossary of Technical Terms (Chinese Form to English)

ch'a-shih 察識: Examination of Substance
chen 貞: Constancy
ch'eng 誠: Purity
cheng 正: integrity
cheng-hsin 正心: Rectification of Mind
ch'eng-i 誠意: Purification of the Will
chi 繼: continuation
ch'i 氣: Material Force; Ether
ch'i-chia 齊家: Regulation of the Family
ch'i-chih chih hsing 氣質之性: Physical Nature
chieh (sila) 戒: to behave correctly
chieh-shen k'ung-chü 戒愼恐懼: Caution and Apprehension
ch'ien 乾: the hexagram of Heaven
chih 知: Knowledge
chih-chi 至極: consummation
chih-chih 致知: Extension of Knowledge
chih-chung-ho 致中和: to actualise Equilibrium and Harmony
ch'ih-kuo 治國: Bringing Order to the State
ch'ii 器: Concrete Things
chin-hsin 盡心: to extend the Mind to the utmost
ching 敬: Attentiveness
ch'ing 清: clearness
ching-tso 靜坐: quiet-sitting, meditation
ch'iu-jen 求仁: Seeking for Humanity
chu-ching 主敬: to Hold Fast to Attentiveness
chung 中: Equilibrium; the Mean
chuo 濁: turbidity
e 惡: ugly
fa (dharma) 法: Things, Beings
fa-t'ien 法天: to imitate the Way of Heaven
fo-hsing 佛性: Buddha Nature
han-yang 涵養: Inner Cultivation
han-yung 涵泳: Inner Cultivation

heng 亨 : Flourish
ho 和: Harmony
hsiao-hsüeh 小學 : Elementary Learning
hsin 心 : Mind
hsin 信 : Faithfulness
hsing (sankara) 行 : activity of will
hsing 性 : Nature
hsing 形 : Physical Form
hsing-ch'i 形氣 : Physical Form and Material Force
hsing-erh-hsia 形而下 : that which has Physical Form
hsing-erh-shang 形而上 : that which is above Physical Form
hsing-hsing-che 形形者 : that which forms the forms
hsiu-shen 修身 : Personal Cultivation
hui (pana) 慧 : wisdom
hun 魂 : the Soul
i 義 : Righteousness
i-ch'eng hsin-cheng 意誠心正 : the Will Purified and the Mind Rectified
i-fa 已發 : the Aroused
i-fa chih ho 已發之和 : Aroused Harmony
jen 仁 : Humanity
jen-hsin 人心 : Human Mind
jen-lun 人倫 : the Essential Relationships
jen-yü 人欲 : Human Desires
jou 柔 : the weak
jung-shih 融釋 : melting
kang 剛 : the strong
ko-wu 格物 : Investigation of Things
kuei 鬼 : the Spirits
k'un 坤 : the hexagram of Earth
li 理 : Principle
li 禮 : Propriety, rites
li 利 : Advantage
li chih chih-chi 理之至極 : consummation of Principle
li-i fen-shu 理一分殊 : the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars

ling 靈: intelligent
mei 美: beauty
ming 命: Destiny
ming 明: Brilliance
nieh-pan (Nirvana) 涅槃: renunciation
pen-hsin 本心: Original Mind
piao-chun 標準: standards
p'ien 偏: partiality
ping-chieh tung-shih 冰解凍釋: the melting of ice
p'ing-t'ien-hsia 平天下: Bringing Peace to the World
p'o 魄: the Ghost
pu-li pu-tsa 不離不雜: neither separate nor alloyed
sa-jan 灑然: casual and elegant
sa-luo 灑落: casual and elegant
se 塞: cloggedness
shen 身: the Body
shen 神: the Divinities; spirit
sheng 生: to live, life, living
sheng-li 生理: Vital Principle
sheng-sheng-che 生生者: that which gives birth to the living
sheng-sheng pu-i chih chi 生生不已之機: the perennial living force
shih 實: real; substantial
shih-shen 士紳: scholar-gentry
shih-ta-fu 士大夫: scholar-official
shu-chi 樞極: hinge-pole
ssu-te 四德: Four Virtues
suo-hsing-che 所形者: the formed
suo-i-jan 所以然: the reason things should be so
suo-sheng-che 所生者: that which is born
suo-tang-jan 所當然: the way things should be
ta-chung 大中: the Great Equilbrium; the Great Mean
ta-hsüeh 大學: the Great Learning
t'ai-chi 太極: the Great Ultimate
t'ai-hsü 太虛: the Great Void

tao 道: the Way
tao-hsin 道心: Moral Mind
tao-wen-hsüeh 道問學: to follow the path of enquiry and study
te 德: Virtue
t'i-ch'a 體察: expriencing and examining
t'ien-li 天理: Heavenly Principle
t'ien-ming liu-hsing 天命流行: the natural unfolding of the Heavenly Destiny
ting (samadhi) 定: to discipline the will
ts'ai 才: capacity
ts'ao 操: to hold fast
ts'ao-ts'un 操存: self-containment
tse 則: Standards
ts'un 存: Containment, to contain, to preserve
tsun-te-hsing 尊德性: to honour moral nature
t'ung 通: clarity
tzu-hsing 自性: Self Nature
wan-fa 萬法: Ten Thousand Things
wei-chi chih hsüeh 為己之學: learning for self-cultivation
wei-fa chih chung 未發之中: Unaroused Equilibrium
wu 物: Thing
wu 悟: Enlightenment
wu 無: having no being
wu-chi 無極: the Ultimate of Non-being
wu-chi erh t'ai-chi 無極而太極: the Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate
wu-kuo-pu-chi ch'ia-hao te tao-li 無過不及恰好底道理: exactness and criterion
wu-ming (avijja) 無明: Illusion
yang 陽: the positive material force
yin 陰: the negative material force
yu 有: having being
yüan 元: Generation
yüan-ch'i 元氣: Primitive Ether
yüeh 樂: music

yung 勇: Courage
yung 用: Function

C. Glossary of Technical Terms (English Form to Chinese)

the Aroused: i-fa 已發
Aroused Harmony: i-fa chih ho 已發之和
Attentiveness: ching 敬
the Body: shen 身
Brilliance: ming 明
Buddha Nature: fo-hsing 佛性
Caution and Apprehension: chieh-shen k'ung-chü 戒愼恐懼
Concrete Things: ch'ii 器
Constancy: chen 貞
Containment, to contain: ts'un 存
Courage: yung 勇
Destiny: ming 命
the Divinities: shen 神
Elementary Learning: hsiao-hsüeh 小學
Enlightenment: wu 悟
Equilibrium: chung 中
the Essential Relationships: jen-lun 人倫
Ether: ch'i 氣
Examination of Substance: ch'a-shih 察識
Extension of Knowledge: chih-chih 致知
Faithfulness: hsin 信
Four Virtues: ssu-te 四德
Function: yung 用
Generation: yüan 元
the Ghost: p'o 魄
Great Learning: ta-hsüeh 大學
the Great Ultimate: t'ai-chi 太極
Harmony: ho 和
Heavenly Destiny: t'ien-ming 天命
Heavenly Principle: t'ien-li 天理
to hold fast: ts'ao 操
to Hold Fast to Attentiveness: chu-ching 主敬
Human Desires: jen-yü 人欲

Human Mind: jen-hsin 人心
Humanity: jen 仁
Illusion: wu-ming (avijja) 無明
Inner Cultivation: han-yang 涵養
Investigation of Things: ko-wu 格物
Knowledge: chih 知
Material Force: ch'i 氣
the Mean: chung 中
Mind: hsin 心
Moral Mind: tao-hsin 道心
Nature: hsing 性
the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of particulars: li-i fen-shu 理一分殊
Original Mind: pen-hsin 本心
Physical Form: hsing 形
Physical Nature: ch'i-chih chih hsing 氣質之性
Primitive Ether: yüan-ch'i 元氣
Principle: li 理
Propriety: li 禮
Purification of the Will: ch'eng-i 誠意
Purity: ch'eng 誠
the reason things should be so: suo-i-jan 所以然
Rectification of Mind: cheng-hsin 正心
Righteousness: i 義
Seeking for Humanity: ch'iu-jen 求仁
Self Nature: tzu-hsing 自性
the Soul: hun 魂
the Spirits: kuei 鬼
Standards: tse 則
Substance: t'i 體
Ten Thousand Things: wan-fa 萬法
Things: wu 物; fa 法
the Ultimate of Non-being: wu-chi 無極
the Unaroused Equilbrium: wei-fa chih chung 未發之中
Virtue: te 德
Vital Principle: sheng-li 生理

the Way: tao 道
the way things should be: suo-tang-jan 所當然